Posted by Jonathan Adler:
Restrictions on Cuba-based Study Abroad Are Constitutional:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_11_02-2008_11_08.shtml#1226091375


   On Tuesday, while the rest of us were focused on the election, the
   U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a fascinating
   opinion. In [1]Emergency Coalition to Defend Educational Travel v.
   U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Court unanimously rejected
   constitutional and statutory challenges to federal regulations
   limiting academic study abroad programs held in Cuba. In the process,
   the Court offered an extended analysis of the plaintiffs' standing to
   challenge the regulations, and two of the judges -- Senior Circuit
   Judges Harry Edwards and Laurence Silberman -- authored concurring
   opinions on the question of whether the U.S. Constitution protects
   academic freedom.

   In 2004, the Treasury Department tightened its regulations governing
   educational travel to Cuba. Concerned that some individuals took
   advantage of educational programs to engage in otherwise-illegal
   tourism or business activities, the Department decided to restrict
   authorized educational programs to those that consist of at least one
   full academic term of ten-weeks or longer and limiting participation
   in such programs to students enrolled full-time and faculty "regularly
   employed" at the offering institution. A practical effect of this rule
   was to eliminate shorter educational programs and prevent students
   studying at one school from participating in a Cuba study-abroad
   program offered by another school.

   The [2]Emergency Coalition to Defend Educational Travel (ECDET), was
   formed to challenge the "savage" 2004 revisions and "to defend the
   freedom of U.S. professors and students to design, teach, and attend
   courses in Cuba free of U.S. Government diktat." ECDET argued that the
   2004 revisions were unconstitutional insofar as they violated its
   members' right to "academic freedom" under the First and Fifth
   Amendments and their right to travel internationally.

   After concluding that ECDET had standing to challenge the regulations,
   the Court rather easily dispatched the coalition's constitutional
   claims. As understood by the court, the coalition's academic freedom
   claims were essentially claims that regulations imposed
   unconstitutional burdens on coalition members' free speech rights. The
   regulations at issue impose no content-based restriction on the speech
   or expression of any of the coalition's participants and, the Court
   concluded, furthered an important governmental interest in restricting
   travel to Cuba and support for the Cuban regime, such as by
   restricting the regime's access to hard currency. Even though the
   regulations had the practical effect of virtually eliminating certain
   types of academic programs in Cuba -- and therefore eliminated
   academic content unavailable elsewhere -- they are still content
   neutral. The Court gave even less credence to ECDET's right to travel
   argument, found little basis to question neutral travel restrictions
   imposed across-the-board on all American citizens due to foreign
   policy concerns.

   Senior Judges Edwards and Silberman both wrote concurrences addressing
   the broader question of whether there is a constitutionally protected
   right to academic freedom beyond the express protections afforded by
   the Bill of Rights. As Judge Edwards noted, in this case, ECDET's
   members relevant First Amendment rights wee "coterminous with any
   applicable rights to academic freedom." As a consequence, he noted,
   there was no need for the Court to consider the scope or contours of
   any broader right to academic freedom, such as the extent to which an
   educational institution or professors have a right to govern their
   institution free from government interference.

     Academic freedom is not an easy concept to grasp, and its breadth
     is far from clear. It has generally been understood to protect and
     foster the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among
     teachers and students and the serious pursuit of scholarship among
     members of the academy. However, as Professor [Judith] Areen notes
     in her article [[3]Government as Educator: A New Understanding of
     First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97
     GEO. L.J. ____ (forthcoming Apr.2009)], academic freedom as a First
     Amendment concept may extend beyond writing and teaching and
     include concepts of �shared governance.�

   Edwards further noted that several justices have suggested that there
   may be constitutional protection for academic expression that is more
   expansive than might otherwise be suggested by the Court's approach to
   employee-speech. Nonetheless, Judge Edwards noted, ECDET's claims did
   "not raise any serious questions about the contours of academic
   freedom," so there was no need for the court to leave such questions
   unresolved.

   Judge Silberman, who also wrote the opinion for the Court, wrote a
   concurring opinion of his own. According to Judge Silberman, "the very
   notion of academic freedom�as a concept distinct from the actual
   textual provisions of the First Amendment�is elusive." He found little
   basis for concluding that academic freedom, understood as "shared
   governance" within the university, was entitled to constitutional
   protection. After all, he wondered, why would universities be entitled
   to such special treatment?

     With great respect for my colleague, Judge Edwards (and Professor
     Judith Areen), I do not perceive any principled reason why the
     First Amendment should be thought to protect internal governance of
     certain academic institutions (are �think tanks� included?) but not
     other eleemosynary bodies or, for that matter, trade unions or
     corporations.

   It is hard to question the importance of universities, and other
   institutions of higher learning, to the maintenance of a free and
   orderly society. Yet this does not mean that such institutions, as
   such, are entitled to special constitutional protections above and
   beyond those provided by other recognized rights.

References

   1. 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200811/07-5317-1147415.pdf
   2. http://www.ecdet.org/
   3. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1291922

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