Posted by David Hyman:
Damage Caps and Medical Malpractice Litigation: III
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_11_30-2008_12_06.shtml#1228449657


   Ok, so today I will be much shorter, and start right up with our
   findings. I ended my last post with a bunch of points, including our
   estimation that the Texas cap will reduce payouts in tried cases by
   27%, and settled cases by 18% (assuming no change in the volume and
   mix of cases). In dollar terms, that corresponds to a reduction of
   $60M in payouts for tried cases, and $780M in settled cases. (For
   reasons that the paper outlines, these figures are in 1988$ -- to get
   to 2008$, multiply by 1.83 � and you get $110M, and $1.47B.

   Whose hide do those savings come out of? Predictably enough, it is
   claimants with non-economic damages that exceed the cap � and the
   greater the percentage of one�s award that is non-economic and above
   the cap, the larger the impact. Payouts in tried cases are larger than
   in settled cases, and size does matter: 47% of the tried cases (and
   18% of the settled cases) have paid non-economic damages that exceed
   the cap.

   Who has paid non-economic damages that exceed the cap? We have
   demographic information on age, employment status, and whether the
   plaintiff is deceased or not. The following table shows how payout is
   affected, in the tried and settled cases, for various groups defined
   by these categories. 

   The table shows that some types of cases (death cases, cases in which
   the plaintiff is unemployed, and cases in which the plaintiff is
   elderly) had higher aggregate and per-claim reductions in payout. The
   reduction is larger in tried cases than in settled cases � which makes
   sense, since as noted above, the payouts in settled cases are smaller.
   This means that fewer cases are over the cap, and those that are have
   a smaller �haircut� from the cap. The differences are statistically
   significant for per-case mean reductions in tried cases, comparing
   death with non-death (23% v. 12%), and unemployed with employed (19%
   v. 11%) � but not for elderly v. adult-non-elderly (19% v. 14%).

   The next table provides a finer breakdown for adult, non-elderly
   plaintiffs. 

   There is a striking gap between the 53% aggregate reduction in payout
   for unemployed deceased plaintiffs, versus 17% for employed deceased
   plaintiffs or 15% for employed non-deceased plaintiffs. The gap for
   unemployed non-deceased plaintiffs v. employed non-deceased plaintiffs
   is more modest (24% v. 15%). Within the death and non-death groups,
   the per-case mean differences are not significant -- perhaps due to
   small sample size, but they become so in the last comparison, between
   unemployed deceased plaintiffs and employed non-deceased plaintiffs
   (31% v. 9%).

   To summarize, the Texas cap hits hardest those with large non-economic
   damage awards � and those plaintiffs are disproportionately likely to
   be deceased, unemployed, and perhaps elderly.

   My next post will address how �tweaking� cap design affects the
   impact. Stated differently, it will address which of the 31 states has
   the most severe and least severe cap -- and how a $250k flat cap
   compares to a $1.75M total damages cap in terms of its impact on
   payouts.

References

   Visible links
   Hidden links:
   1. file://localhost/files/davidh-Table_5.jpg
   2. file://localhost/files/davidh-Table_5A.jpg

_______________________________________________
Volokh mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.powerblogs.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volokh

Reply via email to