Posted by Todd Zywicki:
Fifth Circuit Upholds Sec. 526(a)(4):
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_12_14-2008_12_20.shtml#1229705846


   The Fifth Circuit has just handed down an opinion in [1]Hersh v.
   United States, upholding sec. 526(a)(4) of the Code (added by BAPCPA).

   Section 526(a)(4) provides:

     �(a) A debt relief agency shall not � . . . (4) advise an assisted
     person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in
     contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to
     pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for
     services performed as part of preparing for or representing a
     debtor in a case under this title.�

   The purpose of the provision was to prevent attorneys from advising
   their clients to incur additional debt right before filing bankruptcy
   (and discharging the debt). Or, as the statute indicates, to deal with
   the situation where lawyers would tell clients to use their credit
   cards to pay for the lawyers' filing fees and then discharge it.

   The Eight Circuit previously had ruled that the statute constituted a
   facial violation of the First Amendment as a violation on free speech
   of the attorneys. Hersh summarizes that case as follows:

     where the panel majority held �that § 526(a)(4) is substantially
     overbroad, and unconstitutional as applied to attorneys who provide
     bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons, as those terms are
     defined in the Code.� 541 F.3d at 794 (footnote omitted). The panel
     majority there reasoned that �§ 526(a)(4) prohibits attorneys . .
     . from advising any assisted person to incur any additional debt in
     contemplation of bankruptcy; this prohibition would include advice
     constituting prudent bankruptcy planning that is not an attempt to
     circumvent, abuse, or undermine the bankruptcy laws,� and that thus
     �[s]ection 526(a)(4), as written, prevents attorneys from
     fulfilling their duty to clients to give them appropriate and
     beneficial advice not otherwise prohibited . . . .� Id. at 793.8
     Judge Colloton dissented, on the ground that the court, under
     authorities such as Boos v. Barry, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (1988), should
     have adopted a narrowing construction of �in contemplation of�
     bankruptcy in section 526(a)(4) to mean �with the intent to abuse
     the protections of the bankruptcy system,� and that as so construed
     section 526(a)(4) was not overbroad. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 798-99
     (Colloton, J., dissenting).

   The Fifth Circuit rejected that reasoning, invoking the canon of
   avoiding constitutional conflicts to hold that the statute survived a
   facial challenge, even if there were situations where it might be
   unconstitutional as applied:

     If interpreted literally and broadly, section 526(a)(4) would raise
     serious constitutional problems because, as Hersh suggests, it
     would restrict some speech that is protected by the First
     Amendment. The statute does not expressly qualify its restriction
     on advice to situations in which incurring more debt would be an
     abuse of the bankruptcy system. Thus, if interpreted literally,
     section 526(a)(4) creates a blanket restriction on attorneys
     advising clients to incur any debt when intending, or contemplating
     whether to, file for bankruptcy under any circumstances. It would
     prohibit some attorney advice that would not be abusive to the
     bankruptcy system, harmful to creditors, or harmful to debtors.10
     Thus, if interpreted literally, section 526(a)(4) may apply to
     speech that is protected by the First Amendment.

     However, Hersh does not dispute that section 526(a)(4), even when
     read literally, does prohibit some speech that Congress can
     regulate without violating the First Amendment. The �principal
     purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a fresh start to the
     honest but unfortunate debtor.� Marrama v. Citizens Bank of
     Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1105, 1107 (2007) (internal citation
     omitted). By incurring debt before bankruptcy without intending to
     repay the debt, a debtor can cost creditors significant amounts of
     money. A debtor may also disqualify himself from obtaining
     bankruptcy relief. See id. at 1112 (holding that a debtor cannot
     automatically convert his bankruptcy from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13
     under section 706(a) if he acts in bad faith). Thus, Congress has
     an interest in preventing abuse of the bankruptcy system by both
     the debtors who incur debts just before filing for bankruptcy and
     by the people who advise them to do so. A debtor who incurs debt
     before bankruptcy in order to abuse the system is not one of the
     �honest but unfortunate� debtors that the bankruptcy system is
     designed to protect. Id. at 1107.

     Furthermore, when a debtor incurs debt in contemplation of
     bankruptcy with no intention of repaying his debts or with the
     intention to otherwise manipulate the bankruptcy system, he may
     well be committing a fraudulent act that may violate federal law.
     See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2);11 18 U.S.C. § 152(2) (�A person who .
     . . knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or
     in relation to any case under title 11 . . . shall be fined under
     this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.�); Id. at §
     157.12 See also Attorney Grievance Comm�n of Maryland v. Culver,
     849 A.2d 423, 434 (Md. 2004) (�[b]y advising his client to obtain
     loans with the intention of having the debts discharged in
     bankruptcy, [the defendant] counseled [his client] to commit a
     fraudulent act,� which violated the Maryland Rules of Professional
     Conduct). Taking out loans without intending to repay them may also
     be considered theft under state law. See Henke v. State, 730 S.W.2d
     117, 118-19 (Tex. App.�Corpus Christi 1987) (affirming a grain
     hauler�s conviction of felony theft because he took grain under a
     contract knowing that he would not be able to pay for it). The
     government may regulate or ban speech in which a person proposes an
     illegal transaction. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
     Hoffman Estates, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192 (1982).

   At the time of the Eighth Circuit's opinion I expressed the view that
   I thought that it had misapplied the canon of constitutional
   avoidance.

   Eventually the Supreme Court will take up the issue and I expect that
   it will agree with the holding of the Fifth Circuit.

References

   1. http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/07/07-10226-CV0.wpd.pdf

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