Posted by Orin Kerr:
Oral Argument in *United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing*::
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_12_21-2008_12_27.shtml#1229839775


   I blogged a week or so ago about the Ninth Circuit's pending en banc
   decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, a computer
   search-and-seizure case arising from the investigation into steroid
   use in baseball. The Court held its oral argument on Thursday, and it
   is available for downloading [1]here (10mb download).
     The judges on the en banc panel were Kozinski, Kleinfeld, Graber,
   Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Berzon, Callahan, Bea, M. Smith, and
   Ikuta. I found it a little hard to get a sense of where the court was
   going because I could only recognize a few of the judges by their
   voices. A few panelists expressed strong views, but without knowing
   who they were it was hard to know if those views were likely
   associated with outcome-determinative votes.
     Anyway, here are a few general thoughts about the argument:
     1) The issue of whether Rule 41 was the right vehicle for this sort
   of relief received some attention, but my sense was that most of the
   judges weren't particularly interested in it. If the en banc court
   ends up reaching the merits and allows this use of Rule 41, the Ninth
   Circuit may create a novel sort of pre-indictment suppression remedy
   that may be the most important development of this case. As a
   practical matter, only rich defendants would be likely to benefit from
   such a development: Most searches occur before the right to counsel
   has attached, so pre-indictment challenges would only tend to be
   brought by defendants wealthy enough to hire sharp lawyers who would
   know what to do. But this would still be a very interesting and
   important development, albeit one that might be short-lived if the
   Supreme Court wanted to take a look.
     2) At argument, the United States tried to circumvent a lot of the
   difficult questions raised on the merits by arguing that the common
   denominator of computer searches was one virtual file, rather than
   specific information revealed to the government. Because the evidence
   in dispute here was on one file, counsel argued, there were no issues
   of plain view. I considered this argument in my article on computer
   searches, and ended up rejecting it: I concluded that files are just
   virtual constructs, and it's arbitrary to base a rule on them.
   Instead, the common denominator of a computer search should be the
   information exposed. If a government agent sees part of a file and has
   to scroll down to the bottom of the file to see the rest, that
   scrolling amounts to an additional Fourth Amendment search. See pages
   554-57 of [2]this article for the argument.
     3) Peters, counsel for the Players' Association, offered what I
   thought was a highly unrealistic sense of how the government can know
   when they have the needed evidence responsive to a warrant. If I
   understood him correctly, Peters suggested at argument that when the
   company came forward with a piece of paper during the execution of the
   warrant that the company said was the needed test results, that the
   government should have stopped searching and presumed the company's
   truthfulness and accuracy. Peters reasoned that it looked like in
   hindsight that the company was being truthful and accurate, and the
   government should have recognized that. And at the very least, a very
   minimalist key word search would have done the job. But knowing
   something ex post is not the same as knowing it ex ante. I think it's
   a bad idea to have a Fourth Amendment rule that says that you have to
   rely on that sort of representation or narrow search, as it would
   leave the government in the dark about whether there was a larger
   picture on the computer that casts doubt on what the government agents
   think they learned.
     A rule requiring that reliance could also create interesting
   evidentiary hurdles for the prosecution if charges are brought.
   Imagine you are counsel for a defendant charged with doping, and your
   client is being charged largely on the basis of evidence that an
   employee claimed were the relevant test results. The jury won't know
   that the government relied on the paper to avoid a Fourth Amendment
   violation. As a defense attorney, you're going to slam the government
   for relying on the employee with the piece of paper. The real records
   are on the computer, you would argue, and the government never even
   checked the computer! How can your client be convicted on the basis of
   purported evidence when the government never even confirmed that it
   was the real thing?
     4) Finally, if the Ninth Circuit ends up ruling against the
   government, the next important issue will become how the court's new
   standard interacts with the Fourth Amendment's particularity
   requirement. The warrants here were facially valid, and the challenge
   is to their execution. But if the court concludes that the warrants
   were executed improperly, the government will respond by drafting
   their warrants more broadly so that their execution is more in line
   with their facial validity. That will put the new doctrinal pressure
   on the particularity requirement for computer searches, which courts
   have so far not enforced very strictly. It will be interesting to see
   if that might change.

References

   1. 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/media.nsf/526d390090f67d8488256e1a006323db?OpenView&Count=200&ExpandView
   2. http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/119/Dec05/Kerr.pdf

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