Posted by Eugene Volokh:
*Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical 
Framework and a Research Agenda*:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_03_22-2009_03_28.shtml#1238001528


   I now have a pretty clean copy of [1]this forthcoming UCLA Law Review
   article of mine, and I thought I'd post it and invite comments.
   There's still some time (though not a lot) to make corrections, so
   please let me know about any errors you find. My one request is that
   before you respond to some of the items I note below, you look at the
   relevant parts of the article to see whether that response has already
   been taken into account.

   I expect the article will not entirely please either gun rights
   maximalists or gun rights minimalists. For instance, I conclude that
   bans on so-called "assault weapons" -- bans that I think are entirely
   pointless -- are probably constitutional; not every bad idea is an
   unconstitutional idea, even where constitutional rights are involved.
   At the same time, I argue that there should be a right to carry loaded
   weapons in public (except for a few places). Even if one accepts the
   correctness of Heller's conclusion that concealed carry can be
   restricted, your right to keep and bear arms for self-defense must
   generally include your right to have those arms where self-defense is
   needed, not just to have them at home when you're out on the street.
   Whether this idiosyncratic (moderate? extremist in different
   derections?) position on the constitutional questions (on the policy
   questions, I'm generally skeptical of gun restrictions) is right or
   wrong is for you to judge. But I thought I'd note it so that people
   know what to expect.

   Note also that the first part of the article proposes a general
   analytical framework that can also help think through existing
   doctrine for some other constitutional provisions -- I hope that will
   be useful even for people who aren't at all interested in the right to
   keep and bear arms.

   In any case, here is the Introduction:

     The Second Amendment, the Supreme Court has held, secures an
     individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Whether or
     not the federal right will be applied to the states, at least 40
     state constitutions secure a similar right. How should courts
     translate this right into workable constitutional doctrine?

   ([2]Click here to show the rest of the Introduction.)

   In this Article, I offer a few thoughts towards answering this
   question (chiefly in Part I), and apply those thoughts to some areas
   in which the question will need answering (chiefly in Part II). I
   sometimes offer my views on how particular gun rights controversies
   should be resolved, but more often I just suggest a structure for
   analyzing those controversies and chart an agenda for future research.

   In particular, I argue that the question should not be whether federal
   or state right-to-bear-arms claims should be subject to �strict
   scrutiny,� �intermediate scrutiny,� an �undue burden� test, or any
   other unitary test. Rather, as with other constitutional rights,
   courts should recognize that there are four different categories of
   justifications for a restriction on the right to bear arms.

   1. Scope: A restriction might not be covered by the constitutional
   text, the original meaning of the text, the traditional understanding
   of the text�s scope, or the background legal principles establishing
   who is entitled to various rights.

   2. Burden: A restriction might only slightly interfere with
   rightholders� ability to get the benefits that the right secures, and
   thus might be a burden that doesn�t rise to the level of
   unconstitutionally �infring[ing]� the right.

   3. Reducing Danger: A restriction might reduce various dangers (in the
   case of arms possession, chiefly the dangers of crime and injury) so
   much that the court concludes that even a substantial burden is
   justified. This is where talk of intermediate scrutiny or strict
   scrutiny would normally fit, though, as Part I.C argues, such labels
   likely obscure more than they reveal.

   4. Government as Proprietor: The government might have special power
   stemming from its authority as proprietor, employer, or subsidizer to
   control behavior on its property or behavior by recipients of its
   property.

   Paying attention to all four of these categories can help identify the
   proper scope of government authority. For instance, even if some kinds
   of gun bans are presumptively unconstitutional, under something like
   �strict scrutiny� or a rule of per se invalidity, it doesn�t follow
   that lesser restrictions must be judged under the same test.
   Conversely, the conclusion that certain kinds of restrictions should
   be upheld even when they might not pass muster under a demanding form
   of review, shouldn�t lead courts to entirely reject that demanding
   review for all restrictions.

   Breaking down the possible elements of the constitutional test into
   these categories can also tell us which analogies from one restriction
   to another are sound. For example, if the limitation on possession of
   guns by minors is a matter of scope -- stemming from the background
   legal principle that minors� constitutional rights are narrower than
   adults� rights -- this would suggest that the validity of bans on
   possession by minors offers little support for bans on possession of
   handguns by 18-to-20-year-olds. On the other hand, if the limitation
   is a matter of the danger posed by ownership by relatively immature
   people, then the analogy between under-18-year-olds and
   18-to-20-year-olds becomes more plausible.

   And laying out these categories can help us notice and evaluate
   analogies to other constitutional rights. Many of the disputes that
   arise in the context of gun control debates are similar to disputes
   that arise in other fields, such as free speech, abortion rights,
   property rights, and more. Consider, for instance, debates about
   whether the presence of ample alternative means for self-defense
   should justify a restriction on one means, whether gun possession may
   be taxed, or whether waiting periods are constitutional. Understanding
   exactly why these types of restrictions are upheld or struck down
   elsewhere can inform the discussion about whether they should be
   upheld or struck down where gun rights are involved.

   * * *

   A few notes on the limitations of this Article: First, let me repeat
   that this Article offers a framework for gun rights, and a research
   agenda for further inquiry about the constitutionality of some
   particular gun controls. It does not offer an exhaustive analysis of
   each regulation, or an answer about which ones are sound. But I hope
   the framework, and some brief sketches of how the framework would
   apply in each area, will prove useful to those who are working on such
   questions.

   Second, the Article focuses solely on the right to keep and bear arms
   for self-defense. The constitutional provisions I discuss may have
   other components, for instance a right to keep arms that would deter
   government tyranny, or in seven states a �right to keep and bear arms
   ... for hunting and recreational use.� But those components are left
   for other articles.

   Third, the Article tries to discuss the right to bear arms under both
   the federal Constitution (whether or not the right is eventually
   incorporated against the states) and under state constitutions. But
   state constitutions often have different wording and different
   histories: For instance, a general discussion of whether waiting
   periods are constitutional says little about the Florida
   right-to-bear-arms provision, which expressly authorizes a three-day
   waiting period. Nonetheless, broadly discussing a multistate law of
   the right to bear arms -- or of search and seizure, civil jury trial
   rights, and other constitutional rights -- can be helpful, so long as
   we recognize that there may be significant differences among states
   that override any general theoretical framework we develop.

   ([3]Hide most of the Introduction.)

References

   1. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/2am.pdf
   2. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1238001528.html
   3. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1238001528.html

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