Posted by Todd Zywicki:
A Good Time to Be a Bankruptcy Lawyer:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_12-2009_04_18.shtml#1239968309


   This will come as no surprise, but it is a good time to be a
   bankruptcy lawyer. The front page of the[1] WSJ reported yesterday
   (may be subscriber only) that Weil, Gotshal & Manges is requesting
   $55.1 million in quarterly fees and expenses for its work in the
   Lehman Brothers case. "The firm says it worked more than 100,000
   billable hours during that period. Lead lawyer Harvey Miller is asking
   to be paid $950 for each of the nearly 795 hours he worked during the
   period."

   And [2]a few months back was the first reported sighting of a $1000 an
   hour bankruptcy lawyer, an English chap at Kirkland who cracked the
   $1000 barrier after converting dollars into pounds. The rate for
   Kirkland's domestic bankruptcy partners topped out at $965 an hour.
   Skadden's lawyers requested $1050 an hour for its work in the Circuit
   City bankruptcy case.

   There are several structural peculiarities in bankruptcy that tends to
   push fees in an upward direction.

   First, as Lynn LoPucki stresses in his book [3]Courting Failure,
   forum-shopping in bankruptcy is easy and prevalent. And one of the
   margins on which a debtor can forum-shop is the receptiveness of
   bankruptcy judges in a given district to generous awards of attorneys'
   fees. So a judge that takes a hard-line on fees, such as capping fees
   at a local prevailing rate or scrutinizing the necessity of expenses
   closely, will soon discover that no big cases are filed in his court.
   Firms like Weil or Kirkland won't accept a case unless they get these
   rates. So a debtor given a choice between a venue that pays full fees
   versus one that limits fees will choose the one that pays full fees
   because otherwise it won't get the lawyers of its choice.

   Second, fees are paid from "the estate" rather than a typical client.
   There is no inherent incentive for the debtor-in-possession acting on
   behalf of the estate to seek to minimize fees. Creditors can object to
   excess fees, but the lawyers for the creditors committee are also paid
   from the estate. As a result, if the creditors' lawyers object to the
   fees of debtor's counsel, debtor's counsel later may object to the fee
   requests of the creditors committee's lawyers. Thus, they are
   repeat-players and tend to adopt a "go along to get along" attitude
   toward each others fees, rather than vigorously challenging excessive
   fees.

   Third, unlike a traditional client, bankruptcy lawyers don't really
   negotiate their fees with the debtor in the case. Because the fees are
   paid from the estate, the debtor has no incentive to try to cut down
   hourly rates or to demand volume discounts or the sort of thing that
   occurs in regular legal practice.

   All of these factors tend to exert an upward hydraulic pressure on
   fees in bankruptcy. Thus, while one might expect that the overriding
   principle of fees and expenses in bankruptcy cases would be one of
   "economy" (which was the principle until 1978), today bankruptcy
   lawyers tend to push the upper-end of fees and expenses for lawyers.

   This points out an issue for Congress to think about. There have been
   much chatter about whether federal judges are underpaid. I take no
   position on the general point. These massive fees in bankruptcy cases,
   however, does raise the question about the adequacy of salaries for
   bankruptcy judges. The opportunity cost for bankruptcy judges in this
   economy seems extremely high. And while there are many good things
   about being a bankruptcy judge, they are paid less than Article III
   judges ([4]92% of a district court judge salary) and lack the prestige
   and life tenure of Article III judges. As a result, their salaries
   also are tied to those of district court judges.

   Thus, one possible concern to keep an eye on in the near future is the
   potential that smart and able bankruptcy judges may be tempted to
   leave the bench in the near future to take advantage of what is
   starting to look like a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in private
   practice. I've not heard of bankruptcy judges stepping down for this
   reason, but I'm sure there must be some and there will be more.

   While on my soapbox, and regardless of what one thinks of raising
   bankruptcy judges' salaries, one area of bankruptcy practice that
   needs to be addressed is the ridiculously low rate paid to Chapter 7
   trustees in no-asset cases. Chapter 7 trustees are[5] paid $60 for a
   no asset case, a sum that has not been raised in years. I was talking
   to a chapter 7 trustee the other day and he noted that today's
   no-asset 7's are not at all like those in the past. He had a case
   where a debtor owned 10 properties, all encumbered by various liens,
   mortgages, and junior mortgages. So technically it was a case with no
   assets to be distributed to unsecured creditors. Yet he had a
   fiduciary duty to figure out what was happening with all those
   properties. That seems absurd. It seems especially absurd in light of
   the fact that the unwinding of the real estate bubble is going to
   expose more than usual levels of fraud for which chapter 7 trustees
   are going to be essential to uncover.

References

   1. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123983855752122935.html
   2. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=agfjWe9ZN25Y&refer=us
   3. 
http://www.amazon.com/Courting-Failure-Competition-Corrupting-Bankruptcy/dp/0472031708
   4. http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/2007/04/03/here-comes-the-judge/
   5. http://www.nabt.com/faq.cfm

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