Posted by Adam Mossoff, guest-blogging:
Patent Thickets, Patent Pools and Antitrust:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_05_03-2009_05_09.shtml#1241750971


   This is my final blog posting, and I�d like to briefly raise an issue
   with the readers of this series about a complex policy and legal
   issue: antitrust and its impact on patent pools.

   Among all the differences between the nineteenth century and the
   modern age that have been identified and discussed by VC commentators
   and others over the past week, this is perhaps one of the most
   consequential. Interestingly, it�s a difference in law, not in science
   or technology. Yet this may have the biggest impact on patent
   thickets, because it makes its private-ordering solution that much
   harder to form.

   As I discussed in my posting about the [1]Sewing Machine Combination,
   this patent pool and commercial trust was attacked in the popular
   press as a �grinding, pitiless monopoly.� In the Sewing Machine
   Combination�s patent infringement lawsuits, defendants repeated such
   arguments, such as calling its litigation war chest an act of
   �oppressive conduct.� Such arguments, however, fell on deaf ears in
   the courts. In one 1862 case, for instance, a federal court rejected
   this claim, asking rhetorically, �why they might not make a common
   fund for the purpose of protecting their common rights by prosecuting
   those they thought had infringed them, I am at a loss to conceive.�

   After the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, this was no
   longer a rhetorical question for a court to ask, as the federal
   government embarked on a campaign of �trust busting� (to use Teddy
   Roosevelt�s famous term).

   I am not an antitrust expert, and so I am very much hoping for some
   substantial feedback from the VC readers. It�s my understanding that,
   for much of its history, antitrust law prohibited patent pools as
   anticompetitive -- they were deemed to be a form of collusion for the
   purpose of squelching competition. In more recent years, this hard
   line against patent pools has softened a bit, as the federal
   government now applies a �rule of reason� analysis to determine if
   patent pools are pro- or anti-competitive. This requires the courts to
   engage in a market-specific, context-sensitive, patent-specific
   analysis of the nature of the pool and its function, asking such
   questions as whether the patents in the pool are complementary or
   substitutes for each other, whether prices will rise or fall, whether
   the pool will facilitate a product coming to market or not, etc.

   Now, I think there is a legitimate philosophical question to ask about
   whether such concepts are even valid, but that is beyond the scope of
   both my paper and this blog posting. Here, my inquiry is pretty
   limited in scope.

   Antitrust scholars acknowledge that rule-of-reason analysis is
   �indeterminate,� which means that it is next to impossible for the
   firms to predict ex ante whether their actions will run afoul of the
   antitrust laws or not. So, here�s my question: How does this
   indeterminacy impact the use of patent pools to resolve paten
   thickets? If so, does this make patent thickets more or less
   problematic today? In other words, is one of the reasons for the
   problem of patent thickets today exogenous to the patent system -- is
   antitrust mucking up the workings of the patent system here?

   I don�t know the answers to these questions yet, but it seems
   commonsensical that antitrust would be relevant to the patent thicket
   problem. The question would seem to be how much and in what way. I�m
   really interested in hearing from people who know more about antitrust
   than I do -- I'm currently researching it as part of my writing
   project on patent thickets -- and so any ideas, suggestions, pointers,
   cases, etc. would be greatly appreciated.

   With that said, I�m now signing off from my guest-blogging stint here
   at The Volokh Conspiracy. I wanted to thank Eugene again for inviting
   me to do this. I had a lot of fun, and I hope you (the readers) did,
   too. I know that my final paper will be far improved as a result of
   this experience. In fact, I really enjoyed my engagements with the
   commentators, who are to be commended for their thoughtful and
   substantive remarks. The comments stayed on track and did not get
   sidetracked, and for that, thank you.

References

   1. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_26-2009_05_02.shtml#1241239150

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