Posted by Peter Leeson, guest-blogging:
Pirates and the Law: A Retrospective
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_05_17-2009_05_23.shtml#1242997749


   In the late 1720s the Caribbean pirates� flourishing community was
   brought to a screeching halt. An enhanced British naval presence was
   partly responsible for this. But, as I discuss in [1]The Invisible
   Hook, most important in bringing pirates to their end was a series of
   early 18th-century legal changes that made it possible to effectively
   prosecute pirates.

   In the years before 1536 England tried pirates in its Admiralty courts
   under the civil law. Convicting an accused pirate proved very
   difficult, however. Civil law rules required an accused pirate to
   confess his guilt or two eyewitness, neither of whom could be
   accomplices, to testify to his piracy. Such eyewitnesses were hard to
   come by, and pirate confessions, even harder. Thus many pirates
   escaped conviction.

   To rectify this problem, in 1536 England introduced the Offenses at
   Sea Act, which kept piracy a crime at civil law but allowed pirates to
   be tried via common law rules. Under this procedure the fate of
   accused pirates was decided by a jury of 12 men and, crucially,
   accomplice testimony was permitted.

   The Offenses at Sea Act was helpful but eventually proved
   insufficient. In the 17th century, pirates were increasingly active in
   and around England�s distant and growing colonies. Under the 1536 law,
   accused pirates and potential witnesses had to be shipped to England
   for trial at the capturing colonial government�s expense. Rather than
   bear this cost, many colonial governments simply let pirates go
   instead.

   Out of this unfolding of events emerged the Act for the More Effectual
   Suppression of Piracy, initially introduced by parliament in 1700.
   This act permitted colonial governments to try and execute pirates on
   location. (It also eliminated jury trials for pirates, placing their
   fate in the hands of colonial-appointed commissioners, but continued
   to permit accomplice testimony). No longer constrained by the need to
   send pirates to England for trial, the 1700 law proved to be a
   critically important legal change for bringing pirates to justice.

   The initial act was set to expire seven years after its introduction
   but was made permanent in 1719 when the pirate population began
   exploding and when various additions to the act, such as rewards for
   capturing pirates, and punishments for pirate consorters, were also
   introduced. In 1721 further modifications were made, including a
   provision for punishing armed merchantmen that refused to fight their
   pirate attackers.

   The effect of these early 18th-century legal changes was to
   significantly increase the risk, and thus the cost, of pirating after
   1719 and 1721 in particular. Whereas only 31% of all pirates hanged
   between 1704 and 1726 (for which I have data readily available) were
   hanged in the 15 years spanning 1704-1718, 69% were hanged in the mere
   seven years spanning 1719-1726 (with the vast majority of these
   occurring in the years spanning 1721-1726). This posed a significant
   problem for pirates because as the legal cost of piracy rose, pirates�
   ability to find willing recruits declined, threatening the viability
   of their criminal enterprise.

   But pirates did not sit on their laurels in the face of tightening
   legal screws. Although they ultimately failed in their efforts, for a
   short time, at least, they succeeded in partially offsetting the
   rising legal costs of piracy, helping them to continue to find the
   recruits they sought. Pirates achieved this by exploiting a loophole
   in anti-piracy law that let off any man who could demonstrate to the
   court that he was a �forced man,� pressed against his will into
   pirates� service. The �forced� defense was plausible since pirates
   sometimes did conscript sailors (though it seems that in general this
   was not the case, volunteers from overtaken ships sometimes being more
   numerous than the overtaking pirate crew was willing to have). Pirates
   exploited this loophole in several ways. But perhaps the most
   interesting was their reliance on �ads of force,� which proved to be a
   remarkable recruiting tool for pirates.

   An ad of force was a newspaper ad, published by an allegedly
   conscripted sailor�s released captain or fellow seamen on behalf of
   their forced compatriot, publicly certifying that the sailor had been
   �forced against his will� to join so-and-so�s pirate crew on this
   such-and-such date, etc. If this pirate crew was ever captured--an
   increasingly likely event after 1719 and 1721 owing to the legal
   changes discussed above--the ostensibly forced sailor could point to
   his ad in his defense at his trial and the court might consider this
   evidence for his claim, thus increasing his chances of being let off.

   Ads of force were an excellent invention for conscripted sailors. But
   they were equally excellent for volunteers who wanted a little extra
   insurance against the greater risk of their newly chosen trade. An ad
   of force was far from an iron clad means of getting off at a pirate
   trial. But it certainly helped. (It was most helpful when used in
   conjunction with other evidence of alleged innocence, which pirates
   also concocted, but which there�s not space to discuss here). Courts
   considered it and some sailors appear to have been acquitted at least
   partially on the basis of such ads--some no doubt legitimately, but
   for many others this was simply their pirate insurance policy paying
   off. Pirates thus managed to use ads of force to help offset the
   rising cost of piracy in the early 18th century and in some cases were
   eager to remind merchant sailors they sought to recruit that they
   could use this device to help persuade them to join.

   Notably, the popularity of ads of force tracks the risk of pirating,
   which in turn tracks changes in anti-piracy law during this period,
   quite well. Of all those ads of force published in the Boston
   News-Letter between 1704 and 1726, for instance, only 7% appear in the
   15 years spanning 1704-1718, while 93% appear in the mere seven years
   spanning 1719-1726, the bulk of these again appearing between 1721 and
   1726.

   As discussions begin moving forward about how legal changes might be
   used to help suppress modern pirates, it�s useful to look to the past
   to see what problems were confronted in prosecuting pirates
   historically, what was useful for overcoming these problems, and what
   wasn�t. Similarly, as modern pirates, eager to persuade courts of
   their innocence, begin to come under the purview of various nations�
   legal systems, it�s useful to recall that pirates, like other people,
   are unlikely to be passive responders to the law. Rather, as (or if)
   the law becomes an important constraint on their behavior, pirates may
   seek to offset the law�s effects in unanticipated ways, manipulating
   the law as the law seeks to manipulate them.

   As this is my final day guest-blogging for the week, I�d like to thank
   Eugene for kindly inviting me to do so and those of you who offered
   thoughtful comments for participating in the discussion. I greatly
   enjoyed the opportunity and conversation.

References

   1. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691137471/npr-5-20

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