Posted by Dale Carpenter:
The right formerly known as the right to marry:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_05_24-2009_05_30.shtml#1243377394


   is now "the constitutional right to establish, with the person of
   one's choice, an officially recognized and protected family
   relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based incidents
   of marriage (or, more briefly, the constitutional right to establish
   an officially recognized family relationship with the person of one's
   choice)." Strauss v. Horton, p. 35.

   One of the most striking things (rhetorically, at least) about
   [1]today's Prop 8 decision is the extent to which the court labors to
   minimize its decision just a year ago in In Re Marriage Cases. Recall
   that in Marriage Cases the underlying issue was not really whether the
   state was obliged to provide gay couples specific rights "incident to
   marriage" (e.g., intestacy rules, adoptions, powers of attorney,
   hospital-visitation rights). With trivial exceptions, as the court
   recognized, California's domestic partnership law had already done
   that. Instead, the petitioners sued to have their relationships
   recognized as "marriages," title and all, on the theory that anything
   different would violate the right to marry and embody a suspect
   classification.

   Back then, the state supreme court repeatedly referred to the right
   "to marry" and to "marriage" as the main issue in a case styled, after
   all, Marriage Cases. The court explicitly rejected the state's last
   line of defense -- that while gay couples might be entitled to all of
   the "incidents" of marriage the state could leave the designation of
   "marriage" to opposite-sex couples. Back then, the court warned darkly
   that denying the title of "marriage" to gay families risked
   second-class citizenship, harm to children, and loss of dignity:

     [T]he exclusion of same-sex couples from the designation of
     marriage works a real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples
     and their children. As discussed above, because of the long and
     celebrated history of the term �marriage� and the widespread
     understanding that this word describes a family relationship
     unreservedly sanctioned by the community, the statutory provisions
     that continue to limit access to this designation exclusively to
     opposite-sex couples � while providing only a novel, alternative
     institution for same-sex couples � likely will be viewed as an
     official statement that the family relationship of same-sex couples
     is not of comparable stature or equal dignity to the family
     relationship of opposite-sex couples. Furthermore, because of the
     historic disparagement of gay persons, the retention of a
     distinction in nomenclature by which the term �marriage� is
     withheld only from the family relationship of same-sex couples is
     all the more likely to cause the new parallel institution that has
     been established for same-sex couples to be considered a mark of
     second-class citizenship. Finally, in addition to the potential
     harm flowing from the lesser stature that is likely to be afforded
     to the family relationships of same-sex couples by designating them
     domestic partnerships, there exists a substantial risk that a
     judicial decision upholding the differential treatment of
     opposite-sex and same-sex couples would be understood as validating
     a more general proposition that our state by now has repudiated:
     that it is permissible, under the law, for society to treat gay
     individuals and same-sex couples differently from, and less
     favorably than, heterosexual individuals and opposite-sex couples.

   Compare that to this passage in today's opinion:

     Although the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases generally
     referred to this state constitutional right as the �constitutional
     right to marry,� at the same time that opinion explained that this
     constitutional right is distinct from the right to have one�s
     family relationship designated by the term �marriage.� (Id. at pp.
     812, 830-831.)Because in common speech the term �right to marry� is
     most often used and understood to refer to an individual�s right to
     enter into the official relationship designated �marriage,� and in
     order to minimize potential confusion in the future, instead of
     referring to this aspect of the state constitutional rights of
     privacy and due process as �the constitutional right to marry,�
     hereafter in this opinion we shall refer to this constitutional
     right by the more general descriptive terminology used in the
     majority opinion in the Marriage Cases � namely, the constitutional
     right to establish, with the person of one�s choice, an officially
     recognized and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the
     constitutionally based incidents of marriage (or, more briefly, the
     constitutional right to establish an officially recognized family
     relationship with the person of one�s choice).

   So marriage wasn't really the main issue in Marriage Cases, it was
   convenient shorthand. Elsewhere, the Strauss court tells us that Prop
   8 has only a "limited" effect, carves a "limited exception" to the
   right to marry, changes the content of a right in "one specific
   subject area," diminishes only "one aspect" of a fundamental right,
   and so on. It's a puzzle why the court feels the need to characterize
   Prop 8 as limited, since there's really nothing in the opinion to
   prevent a majority from repealing the state's domestic partnership law
   by constitutional amendment. (The court expressly and oddly leaves
   this issue open, see p. 93.) How would a repeal fundamentally alter
   the character of state government in the way the court understands
   that concept?

   There's plenty of ground to question the decision in Marriage Cases,
   and to support today's decision in Strauss as correct on the
   revision/amendment distinction. And I think the protections provided
   to gay families under the rubric of "civil unions" or California
   "domestic partnerships" are a huge advance that can't fairly be
   likened to a new form of segregation. But it seems to me that, given
   the rationale and rhetoric of the first decision, the court
   disingenuously minimized the deprivation in the second.

References

   1. http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S168047.PDF

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