Posted by Kenneth Anderson:
What in the War on Terror Will the Obama Bring to Congress?
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_06_14-2009_06_20.shtml#1244993676


   The Washington Post ran a news story on Friday (June 12, 2009, A1),
   titled [1]"Obama Bows on Settling Detainees: Administration Gives Up
   on Bringing Cleared Inmates to U.S., Officials Say." The article goes
   on to describe the situation of the Uighurs and how the
   administration, faced with revolt by his own party in Congress, and
   what amounts to a legislative rejection of bringing them or any other
   Guantanamo detainees to any place in particular actually in a
   Congressional district in the United States in which voters might
   reside, is trying to devise Plan B. Plan B in the case of the Uighurs
   involves buying off Palau with $200 million. But most particularly,
   Plan B, whatever it is, at least for now does not seem to involve
   going to Congress to get authority to do anything regarding
   Guantanamo.

   This runs contrary to what Obama said in his [2]much-noticed security
   speech at the National Archive on May 21, 2009. The title of the
   speech, after all, sounded like a [3]book by Benjamin Wittes, or the
   loosely unifying theme of the [4]Hoover Institution Task Force on
   National Security and Law: "Protecting Our Security and Our Values."
   It teed up Congress to work with the Administration to provide a long
   term framework for counterterrorism. Certainly that was how Ronald
   Brownstein heard the speech, in an article in the National Journal,
   "[5]Can Congress Step Up on Security?"

   Is any of that happening, and/or does it appear that it actually will
   happen? Is the administration going to Congress, does it really plan
   to do so, and if so, on what issues?

   I am going to skip over the usual listing of ways in which it would
   appear the new guard is the same as the old guard, etc., etc. - not
   that it's not important, but it's worth a whole post on its own. What
   I want to ask here is much more specific than that, so please confine
   comments to this particular question: Is there anything so far in the
   War on Terror in which the Administration has gone to Congress for
   legislation and authority? Is there anything in the War on Terror for
   which the Administration plans to go to Congress for authority?
   Really, truly will go to Congress? Is pretty darn likely to go to
   Congress? Or, notwithstanding the speech, did the administration learn
   a very different lesson from the Guanantamo rejection by Congress?

   I'm prepared to be corrected, because I haven't been following this
   minutely, and I might have missed some things, but offhand I can't
   think of anything so far it has sought and obtained from Congress in
   revamping the War on Terror. Am I wrong on that specific issue of
   seeking, and obtaining, legislation? Have I missed something?

   Granted, the Obama administration is not necessarily proceeding on the
   basis of pure assertion of executive authority. It is able to proceed,
   at least in part, on the basis of legislation sought (finally) by the
   Bush administration - the Military Commissions Act, for example.
   Nonetheless, I am trying to understand the extent to which the Obama
   administration is (a) seeking, and obtaining or not, Congressional
   legislation to regularize the War on Terror, or whatever name we are
   now calling it, (b) proceeding on the basis of Bush-era legislation,
   such as the MCA, or (c) proceeding by the exercise of executive
   authority, apart from specific Bush-era legislation. The speech
   suggested (a); I am not sure I see evidence of that, now or looking to
   the future, except for the assertions in the speech itself. On the
   contrary, the brief but unhappy experience of getting slammed by
   Congress on bringing detainees to US territory seems, unsurprisingly,
   to have raised the bar for going to Congress again on any of these
   issues.

   To the extent that (c) is the case. For people like me, who have
   written that a primary problem - indeed, perhaps the signal systemtic
   domestic problem of the Bush administration War on Terror - was the
   administration's adamant refusal to go to Congress in order to get
   both political branches on the same page through legislation, this
   raises many, many questions.

   My position since 2002 has been that the Bush administration should
   have gone to Congress - partly for the political solidarity; partly
   because in taking actions so drastic it was the democratically proper
   thing to do; and partly to have the legal shield of the most powerful
   of the Youngstown categories, the two political branches acting on a
   question of vital national security and foreign policy in concert, so
   to forestall Justice Kennedy becoming Proconsul Kennedy - rather than
   asserting executive power as the sole basis by which to act. As I put
   it in a piece a couple of years ago in the [6]New York Times Magazine
   (you can kind of tell from the title - "It's Congress's War, Too"),
   and again in [7]Policy Review, if policy lives by executive
   discretion, it also dies by executive discretion.

   Even if (b) is the case - the administration doesn't need to go to
   Congress for very much, because it has the specific legislative
   authority via the MCA and other, earlier enactments - rather than the
   pure exercise of executive power, I can't say I'm very happy. I had
   thought - hoped, indeed - that either an Obama or McCain
   administration would use the prestige that either one of them would
   bring to the political table to put the deep tradeoffs of national
   security and civil liberties in a considered long term legislative
   arrangement proposed and negotiated by the administration with
   Congress. When the election produced both Obama and a heavily
   Democratic Congress, I thought this was a done deal, even if I doubted
   I would be especially happy with particular substantive parts of the
   deal. To that end, I've been participating in various projects, such
   as Benjamin Wittes's forthcoming edited volume titled, funnily enough,
   [8]Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform.

   So I am looking around and trying to figure out whether there will be
   new legislation, whether comprehensive or piecemeal, to address such
   things as trials, detention, interrogation, Guantanamo, state secrets,
   surveillance, national security courts, and other things.
   Apart from the national security speech, what is the evidence for or
   against the proposition?

   Additional thought:

   (There is, by the way, another angle on this that is different from
   either the "meet the new boss, same as the old boss," or the "will
   they legislate anything?" memes. It is also worth an additional post,
   so I will only mention it here in passing.

   Back in the pieces I mentioned above, but particularly and forcefully
   in Jack Goldsmith's The Terror Presidency (a Brilliant and Remarkable
   review of which you can read [9]here in the Times LIterary Supplement,
   by the way), it was noted that the Bush administration's policies were
   extraordinarily lawyer-driven, very protective - excessively
   protective of the executive's litigation positions, as it were, even
   where those legal positions were light-years away from what the
   realistic policies might turn out to be. One might or might not agree
   with that; I'll post on it another day.

   The question now raised under the Obama administration is whether it
   actually has the same syndrome - and, if anything, more of it, because
   it has still more and more skilled lawyers with all the benefits of
   hindsight and, in many cases, having the been the Bush administration
   tormentors during those earlier years. Now, finding themselves in
   power, "they" now being "them," they are even more mindful of the need
   to protect the adminstration's litigation positions, and do so even
   at, as The Terror Presidency notes, the expense of actual, conceivable
   policy. When the lawyers are in charge of policy in the name of
   protecting the maximum position in litigation, zealous advocacy can
   become a disaster for crafting the sensible, non-maximalist policies
   that were all the non-lawyers wanted all along.

   But this I will leave for another post. Despite my having raised this
   here, I would be very grateful if comments would go to the main part
   of the post, and tell me what, if anything, is or is going to get
   legislated, and to what extent this is an exercise in pure executive
   discretion, and to what extent it is simply operationalizing the
   already passed legislation such as the MCA. Thanks.)

References

   1. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061101210.html?hpid=topnews
   2. 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/21/obama_guantanamo_speech_transcript_96610.html
   3. http://www.amazon.com/Law-Long-War-Future-Justice/dp/159420179X
   4. http://www.hoover.org/taskforces/taskforces/nationalsecurity
   5. http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20090530_6572.php
   6. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928083
   7. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=935394
   8. http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/2009/legislatingthewaronterror.aspx
   9. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1078624

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