Posted by David Bernstein:
"Incorporation," Originalism, and the Confrontation Clause:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_05-2009_07_11.shtml#1246932856


   I have no strong feelings, or really any feelings whatsoever, about
   the right of a criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against
   him, protected by the Sixth Amendment. So I can examine recent
   Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with an unjaundiced eye, and
   conclude that it makes no sense.

   The Supreme Court, led by Justice Scalia, created a revolution in
   Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in the 2004 Crawford case. Before
   Crawford, the Court for many years had held that testimony admitted
   under any "firmly rooted" hearsay exception satisfies the Clause.

   Scholarly work, especially by Prof. Richard Friedman of the University
   of Michigan Law School, showed that as a matter of original meaning,
   this was an incorrect interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, that
   the right to confront witnesses went beyond protecting a defendant
   from unreliable hearsay. The historical research persuaded Scalia, and
   Scalia persuaded his colleagues. This past term, the Court held, for
   the first time, that forensic reports are subject to the Confrontation
   Clause, threatening a certain level of havoc in state criminal justice
   systems.

   Here's the rub: Crawford is, as far as I can tell, correct as a matter
   of original understanding of the Sixth Amendment, and therefore is
   properly applied to federal prosecutions. The problem is that
   Crawford, and most of the major subsequent Confrontation Clause cases,
   are state cases, arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.

   The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is said to "incorporate"
   the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. But, as a logical matter,
   the right incorporated by the 14th Amendment in 1868 is the
   understanding of the Confrontation right as of 1868, not the
   understanding as of 1791. And my understanding is that the experts (I
   am not one) agree that by 1868 the original 1791 understanding of the
   Confrontation Clause had been lost, and that the Confrontation right
   was thought to be coextensive with protections against
   hearsay--precisely the position Scalia rejected on originalist grounds
   in Crawford!

   Thus, Crawford exposes what I see as a major flaw in Scalia's
   originalist methodology. When a right protected by the Bill of Rights
   is applied to the states via the 14th Amendment, it has to be the 1868
   understanding of that right, not the 1791 understanding, that governs.
   (This likely has implications for other rights as well, including
   freedom of expression, the right to bear arms, and the right to not
   have private property taken for public use without just compensation.)
   Not only has Scalia not applied this insight, I don't think (correct
   me if I'm wrong, please) there's any evidence that it's ever occurred
   to him.

   I'm not a hard-core originalist, but to the extent original meaning is
   supposed to govern Supreme Court decisions, Crawford, and its
   state-level progeny, are wrongly decided.

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