Posted by Randy Barnett:
Sotomayor (and Hatch & Feingold) on Fundamental Rights and the 14th Amendment:  
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_12-2009_07_18.shtml#1247600807


   I have posted the following on the [1]WashingtonPost.com's "Topic A"
   commentary on today's hearings:

     One of the things we hope to learn during confirmation hearings is
     a nominee's approach to the constitutional protection of liberty.
     But in her exchange with Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) about the second
     amendment and its potential application to the states, Sonia
     Sotomayor revealed remarkably little about her understanding of how
     the Supreme Court protects liberty under the fourteenth amendment.
     For example, more than once she said a right was "fundamental" if
     it was "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment. But this gets
     it backwards. The Supreme Court incorporates a right BECAUSE it
     finds it to be fundamental. When asked how she understands the
     criteria by which the court concludes that a right is fundamental,
     she did not give a substantive response. Then, when Hatch asked her
     about the difference between nineteenth century precedent involving
     the privileges or immunities clause and the twentieth century cases
     involving the due process clause, she said she did not recall the
     cases well enough to address the difference. Indeed, in the per
     curium opinion she joined in Maloney, the panel did not address
     this crucial issue, in contrast with panels in the 9th and 7th
     Circuits.
     In fairness, Hatch's questions were themselves both confused and
     confusing to anyone who did not know what he was trying to say. At
     one juncture, for example, he repeatedly referred to "the
     privileges AND immunities clause" (which is in Article IV of the
     constitution) and contrasted it with the fourteenth amendment. He
     seemed to be unaware that there is a privileges OR immunities
     clause in the fourteenth amendment itself, which the cases he was
     citing were about. However, I would have hoped that Sotomayor would
     have understood these cases -- which she had relied upon in her
     Maloney opinion -- as well as the discussion of this issue in the
     Supreme Court case of D.C. v. Heller well enough to have educated
     Hatch, as well as the rest of us, on this important aspect of
     Supreme Court doctrine.
     As it stands, we know next to nothing about her understanding of
     this area. Hopefully, she will be given an opportunity to revisit
     this issue in future questioning and will elaborate on her views of
     how the fourteenth amendment protects liberty.

   Here is her characterization of a "fundamental right":

     SOTOMAYOR: Those rights have been incorporated against the states.
     The states must comply with them. So in -- to the extent that the
     court has held that...
     HATCH: Right.
     SOTOMAYOR: ... then they are -- they have been deemed fundamental,
     as that term is understood legally.

   Here is the exchange that immediately preceded the previous answer in
   which she is asked to explain the criteria by which a right is deemed
   to be fundamental:

     HATCH: Well, what's ... excuse me, I'm sorry. I didn't mean to
     interrupt you.
     What's your understanding of the test or standard the Supreme Court
     has used to determine whether a right should be considered
     fundamental? I'm not asking a hypothetical here. I'm only asking
     about what the Supreme Court has said in the past on this question.
     I recall (inaudible) emphasizing that a right must be deeply rooted
     in our nation's history and tradition, that it is necessary to an
     Anglo- American regime of ordered liberty, or that it is an
     enduring American tradition.
     I think I've cited that pretty accurately on what the court has
     held with regard to what is a fundamental right. Now, those are
     different formulations from the Supreme Court's decisions, but I
     think the common thread there is obvious. Now, is that your
     understanding of how the Supreme Court has evaluated whether a
     right should be deemed fundamental?
     SOTOMAYOR: The Supreme Court's decision with respect to the Second
     Circuit incorporation -- Second Amendment incorporation doctrine is
     reliant on old precedent of the court, and I don't mean to use that
     as precedent that doesn't bind when I call it old. I'm talking
     about precedent that was passed in the 19th century.
     Since that time, there is no question that different cases
     addressing different amendments of the Constitution have applied a
     different framework. And whether that framework and the language
     you quoted are precise or not, I haven't examined that framework in
     a while to know if that language is precise or not. I'm not
     suggesting it's not, Senator. I just can't affirm that description.
     SOTOMAYOR; My point is, however, that once there's Supreme Court
     precedent directly on point, and Second Circuit precedent directly
     on point on a question, which there is on this incorporation
     doctrine and how it uses the word "fundamental," then my panel,
     which was unanimous on this point -- there were two other judges --
     and at least one other -- or one other panel on the Seventh Circuit
     by Justice -- by Justice -- by Judge Easterbrook has agreed that,
     once you have settled precedent in an area, then, on a precise
     question, then the Supreme Court has to look at that.
     And under the deference one gives to stare decisis and the factors
     one considers in deciding whether that older precedent should be
     changed or not, that's what the Supreme Court will do.

   I just listened to an exchange on the same topic with Senator Russ
   Feingold, which left me with 2 impressions. First, Feingold was much
   more articulate about the constitutional questions than was Orren
   Hatch. And, second, Sotomayor is giving entirely nonanswer answers to
   every substantive question she is asked. Here is her response to a
   question about a line of cases:

     FEINGOLD: I can understand some hesitance on this. But the truth is
     that courts are already dealing with these very issues.
     The Supreme Court itself has now struck down a number of post- 9/11
     policies. And you yourself sat on a panel that struck down one
     aspect of the National Security Letter statutes that were expanded
     by the Patriot Act.
     So, I'd like to hear your thoughts a bit on whether you see any
     common themes or important lessons in the Court's decisions in
     Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan and Boumediene. What is your general
     understanding of that line of cases?
     SOTOMAYOR: That the Court is doing its task as judges. It's
     looking, in each of those cases, at what the actions are of either
     the military, and what Congress has done or not done, and applied
     constitutional review to those actions.

   Hmmm. Very interesting. Here is Feingold trying to get her
   understanding of the general approach to incorportion:

     FEINGOLD: But what would be the general test for incorporation?
     SOTOMAYOR: Well...
     FEINGOLD: I mean, what is the general principle?
     SOTOMAYOR: One must remember that the Supreme Court's analysis in
     its prior precedent predated its principles or the development of
     cases discussing the incorporation doctrine. Those are newer cases.
     And so the framework established in those cases may well inform --
     as I said, I've hesitant of prejudging and saying they will or
     won't because that will be what the parties are going to be arguing
     in the litigation. But it is...
     FEINGOLD: Well...
     SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry.
     FEINGOLD: No, no. Go ahead.
     SOTOMAYOR: No, I was just suggesting that I do recognize that the
     court's more recent jurisprudence in incorporation with respect to
     other amendments has taken -- has been more recent. And those cases
     as well as stare decisis and a lot of other things will inform the
     Court's decision how it looks at a new challenge to a state
     regulation.

   The last part of her answer may be my favorite response so far in the
   hearing. To this point, it is impossible to tell from her responses
   whether she knows anything about constitutional law OR whether she
   simply does not want to offer any opinions that could possibly be
   criticized. I do not recall a confirmation hearings in which so little
   of substance is revealed by a nominee.

References

   1. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/07/14/ST2009071401786.html?sid=ST2009071401786

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