Posted by Eugene Volokh:
Georgia Courts Expressly Allow Religious Headgear in Court:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_26-2009_08_01.shtml#1248717239


   I blogged [1]late last year about a Georgia woman who "was jailed ...
   after a judge found her in contempt of court for refusing to remove
   her hijab, the head covering worn by Muslim women." I'm pleased to
   report that the [2]Georgia courts just announced a headgear policy
   that expressly allows religious headgear:

     The Georgia courts have adopted a new policy on head coverings that
     will take effect in every court in Georgia. At a meeting Wednesday
     of the Judicial Council of Georgia �- the policy-making body of
     Georgia�s courts -� judges from around the state voted unanimously
     to endorse the measure permitting headgear in court that is worn
     for religious or medical reasons. Other types of head coverings
     will continue to be prohibited in courtrooms.

     The policy is designed to balance a court�s legitimate security
     concerns with a person�s right to practice his or her faith in a
     public place. Under the new policy, if a security officer wanted to
     conduct a search, the person would have the option of having the
     inspection performed in a private area by an officer of the same
     gender.

     The measure stems from the December 2008 arrest of Lisa Valentine
     after she refused to remove her hijab, the head scarf worn by
     Muslim women. She said to do so would violate her faith. But Judge
     Keith Rollins of the Douglasville Municipal Court found her in
     contempt of court and ordered her to serve 10 days in jail. The
     incident prompted a formal complaint from the U.S. Department of
     Justice. The Anti-Defamation League, Council on American-Islamic
     Relations and American Civil Liberties Union also lodged
     complaints. On June 12th, Ms. Valentine testified before the
     Supreme Court of Georgia Committee on Access and Fairness in the
     Courts.

     �If this had been a nun, no one would have required her to remove
     her habit,� said Chief Justice Carol Hunstein, who chairs the
     Judicial Council. �I think this is a good rule, and I think it�s
     clear.�

     Specifically, the adopted policy states: �Head coverings are
     prohibited from the courtroom except in cases where the covering is
     worn for medical or religious reasons. To the extent security
     requires a search of a person wearing a head covering for medical
     or religious reasons, the individual has the option of having the
     inspection performed by a same-sex officer in a private area. The
     individual is allowed to put his or her own head covering back on
     after the inspection is complete.�

   As I wrote last December, this not a new or Muslim-specific issue
   (just as many of the religious accommodation questions involving
   Muslims have arisen in the past with non-Muslims). Trial judges have,
   for instance, applied no-hat rules to demand that parties or witnesses
   remove yarmulkes, see, e.g., Close-It Enterprises, Inc. v. Weinberger,
   64 A.D.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), or their Catholic or Episcopalian
   priestly garb, People v. Drucker, 418 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
   1979); O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1982);
   Ryslik v. Krass, 652 A.2d 767 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995). The priest
   cases didn't involve headgear, but one can easily imagine similar
   issues arising as to nuns' habits. And nearly all the appellate courts
   that have considered the matter have expressly held that such rules
   should not be so applied to people who wear headgear or religious garb
   for religious reasons. For instance, a Seventh Circuit opinion by
   noted conservative judge [3]Frank Easterbrook put it well:

     The Constitution does not oblige the government to accommodate
     religiously motivated conduct that is forbidden by neutral rules,
     and therefore does not entitle anyone to wear religious headgear in
     places where rules of general application require all heads to be
     bare or to be covered in uniform ways (for example, by military
     caps or helmets). Yet the judicial branch is free to extend
     spectators more than their constitutional minimum entitlement.

     Tolerance usually is the best course in a pluralistic nation.
     Accommodation of religiously inspired conduct is a token of respect
     for, and a beacon of welcome to, those whose beliefs differ from
     the majority's. The best way for the judiciary to receive the
     public's respect is to earn that respect by showing a wise
     appreciation of cultural and religious diversity. Obeisance differs
     from respect; to demand the former in the name of the latter is
     self-defeating.

     It is difficult for us to see any reason why a Jew may not wear his
     yarmulke in court, a Sikh his turban, a Muslim woman her chador, or
     a Moor his fez. Most spectators will continue to doff their caps as
     a sign of respect for the judiciary; those who keep heads covered
     as a sign of respect for (or obedience to) a power higher than the
     state should not be cast out of court or threatened with penalties.
     Defendants are entitled to trials that others of their faith may
     freely attend, and spectators of all faiths are entitled to see
     justice being done.

   Whatever might be the symbolism of wearing a normal hat indoors,
   surely there's no disrespect that's usually intended, or likely to be
   reasonably perceived, when someone is wearing religiously mandated
   garb. A judge need not feel insulted by an Orthodox Jew's wearing a
   yarmulke, or a Muslim woman's wearing a hijab.

   So there's no important government interest really being served here.
   But the burden on the religious objectors is very great: A
   no-religious-headgear rule in court means that if they are to comply
   with their felt religious obligations, they can't participate in one
   of the most important functions of American civic life. In some cases,
   the religious objectors might be accompanying relatives to court,
   itself a pretty important function. In other cases, they might be
   parties, witnesses, or even criminal defendants, whose presence may be
   legally mandated for some purposes. Even if they are not legally
   forced to be in the courtroom, they may still have to forgo adequately
   litigating their cases, or defending their liberty, as the price of
   complying with their religious obligations.

   This is precisely the sort of situation where religious accommodation
   makes perfect sense -- just as the [4]constitutionally specified
   accommodation of witnesses and officeholders who refuse to swear, and
   instead must affirm, makes perfect sense. As I've written [5]before,
   requests from minority religious groups for accommodation are a
   longstanding and respectable part of the American tradition of
   religious freedom. Where religious pluralism goes, multiculturalism is
   indeed a traditional American value. To be sure, not all religious
   beliefs have been accommodated, and not all should be accommodated.
   But when accommodation is cheap -- where the only matter at stake is
   the judge's sense of decorum, which shouldn't even be seen as
   undermined by the wearing of religious headgear, as opposed to a
   baseball cap -- and the religious objector's interests in
   participating in a government function are important, the religious
   objectors should indeed be accommodated.

   To be sure, under Employment Division v. Smith, which I [6]generally
   approve of, such accommodation probably wouldn't be a constitutional
   obligation (at least unless some other constitutional right, such as a
   criminal defendant's right to participate in her trial, or to put on
   witnesses, is involved). If a judge evenhandedly cites for contempt
   Orthodox Jews, Catholic nuns, and Muslim hijab-wearing women who
   refuse to remove their headgear, his actions might not violate the
   Constitution. But state court systems should aspire to something more
   than just constitutionally minimal religious accommodation; the
   Georgia courts' decision thus strikes me as quite right.

   Thanks to [7]Religion Clause for the pointer.

References

   1. http://www.volokh.com/posts/1229525304.shtml
   2. http://www.gasupreme.us/press_releases/headgear.pdf
   3. 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=02-3424_019.pdf
   4. 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MWRjNjk2NTdmMThlOWFjYmMzNDMwZmZkYmJmZDg3MDM=
   5. http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1218058942.shtml
   6. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/relfree.htm
   7. http://religionclause.blogspot.com/

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