Posted by Eugene Volokh:
Yet Another Reason Not To Sign the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_08_02-2009_08_08.shtml#1249589812


   [1]Prof. Peter Spiro (Opinion Juris) responds to [2]my earlier post,
   saying (among other things):

     First, joining the Convention makes sense in a conventional
     national interests analysis. America�s failure to join will cost it
     more than signing on. There is already a drumbeat on the subject:
     US nonparticipation is a boilerplate punchline among international
     actors critiquing US human rights practice. That doesn�t present a
     direct harm to US national security (in, say, the way that
     Guantanamo has), but it nibbles away at the national interest.
     Given the small cost of participation (especially as conditioned by
     some reasonable package of reservations and understandings),
     ratifying the treaty looks the preferred, rational choice.

     But even if we don�t sign on, the convention�s substantive terms
     will insinuate themselves into US practice. Eugene assumes that the
     US can say no to the CRC, that America can insulate itself from
     universal international practice (to anticipate Ken�s objection
     here, universal at some core discursive level even if many other
     countries have attached significant reservations to their
     ratification). I don�t think so. There are too many entry points
     for international law, including through state governments,
     nonstate actors, and the courts.

     Take the CRC provision barring life sentences for juvenile
     offenders, among those which Eugene finds objectionable. I�d be
     willing to make a small bet that within the next 20-25 years that
     practice is halted in the US, whether or not we formally join the
     CRC. It might be the courts that put a stop to it, a la Roper. It
     might be state governments that come around on their own, in the
     face of ramped-up international static. Nonstate actors (including
     academics) will be a part of the picture. In any event, the
     international norm will be a driver. That is, the fact that
     international law has moved to ban the practice will be
     consequential, policy aspects of the question aside. That�s
     something that international law skeptics have trouble
     understanding: the material power of international law.

   Now, as I argued in my original post, I find the "foreigners dislike
   us for our not signing the Convention" argument to be unpersuasive. In
   principle, I'm fine with doing (cheap) things to produce foreign
   goodwill that might eventually translate into material benefit for us.
   I'm just skeptical that the sorts of "international actors critiquing
   US human rights practice" to whom our nonparticipation in the
   Convention is "a boiler punchline" will really change their views
   about us if we ratify in the Convention; and I'm also skeptical
   (though more tentatively) that those listening to them will change
   their views about us.

   But Prof. Spiro's post also identifies -- perhaps inadvertently -- why
   signing the Convention might not be cheap. Displeased as I am with the
   Convention, I'm much more hostile to other aspects of "international
   practice," such as the norm that governments must suppress so-called
   "hate speech," the norm of not protecting an individual right to bear
   arms, and the norm that governments must suppress certain kinds of
   anti-religious speech (a norm that is not yet entrenched but that some
   are [3]trying to create). Yet Prof. Spiro has long argued that such
   norms are likely to insinuate themselves into American constitutional
   law, even to the point of [4]leading courts to take a more restrictive
   view of the First Amendment. And even in the post I quote above, Prof.
   Spiro has likewise argued that foreign norms are likely to insinuate
   themselves into American law, even if we don't ratify the Convention.

   What can people like me, who like American free speech rules, American
   right to bear arms rules, and the like do to prevent such erosions of
   our rights? Well, note that Prof. Spiro's claim that "even if we don�t
   sign on, the convention�s substantive terms will insinuate themselves
   into US practice" isn't a matter of some ineluctable physical law.
   Rather, it's an artifact of domestic opinion. "International practice"
   is influential to the extent that it has a high reputation among
   American decisionmakers, perhaps because they see Americans generally
   as approving of the influence of international practice. It is much
   less influential if it is broadly condemned as illegitimate by
   Americans.

   If we accept that we should conform with "international practice,"
   then we'll conform; or if our presumption with regard to
   "international static" is to change our understanding of human rights
   and proper legal rules, then we'll change them. But if we broadly
   adopt a view that our rights are a matter for us, and that we should
   bristle at foreign attempts to impose foreign "practice" rather than
   feeling cowed by such attempts, then our legal rules are more likely
   to be preserved in the state that we as Americans would like them to
   be without regard to foreign pressure.

   Now one possible reaction, of course, might be to pick and choose --
   to subscribe to those treaties that we like but not the ones we
   dislike, to take seriously "international practice" arguments but to
   reject those we disapprove of, and so on. But as I read Prof. Spiro's
   argument, such a nuanced response will fail: Even if we consider a
   proposed treaty and reject it, its "substantive terms will insinuate
   themselves into US practice" despite our rejection. That's true as to
   the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It would presumably be
   similarly true as to international conventions that demand the
   punishment of so-called "hate speech," or of harsh criticism of
   religions. We can try to pick and choose, but those that we've chosen
   to reject will still "insinuate themselves" into our law.

   It seems then that the one reaction that will most diminish the chance
   of rejected rules' "insinuat[ing] themselves" is a thoroughgoing
   condemnation of the influence of the relevance of international
   practice, and of the legitimacy of allowing such practice to influence
   our practice. If case-by-case attention to international norms won't
   be enough to block those norms that we rejected, then it seems to me
   that only a broad hostility to international norms will suffice.

   So if Prof. Spiro is right about the power of rejected treaties to
   "insinuate themselves" -- a big "if," I realize -- then I think those
   of us who deeply oppose some international norms (I mention again the
   norm of compulsory suppression of so-called "hate speech") need to
   reject many treaties simply for the sake of rejecting the treaties, so
   at to better create a culture in which international norms have the
   least chance of insinuating themselves. Every such treaty that's
   rejected will help reinforce the protection that our law offers to the
   independence of our own domestic legal tradition.

   To be sure, such rejectionism may sometimes be too costly. If we have
   something serious and likely to gain from accepting a particular
   treaty, we should be open to that benefit. But we should recognize
   that there's always a cost, even of a treaty whose terms are by
   themselves unobjectionable: the risk that endorsing such treaties (and
   especially "human rights" treaties) will promote a legal culture
   supporting the erosion of American legal principles that go against
   "international practice."

   (Of course, to the extent that some people find that they agree more
   with the "human rights" norms of Europeans than of Americans, they may
   welcome the replacement of American human rights norms in America with
   more European norms. I write this post, though, from the perspective
   of someone who prefers American human rights norms, imperfect as they
   are, over European norms, and who wants to maximize American
   flexibility to maintain those norms.) 

References

   Visible links
   1. 
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/08/06/even-eugene-volokh-cant-stop-the-childrens-convention/
   2. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_08_02-2009_08_08.shtml#1249501956
   3. http://www.volokh.com/posts/1137780446.shtml
   4. http://volokh.com/posts/1117559166.shtml

   Hidden links:
   5. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_08_02-2009_08_08.shtml#1249501956

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