Posted by Kenneth Anderson:
An Addendum to My FOIA-ACLU Post:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_08_09-2009_08_15.shtml#1249864555


   What follows was posted up as a final addendum to the FOIA-ACLU post
   below; I've been urged to put it up as a separate post. I've hesitated
   to do so, partly because I think it will leave numbers of people
   thinking, perhaps correctly, that its political heat is excessive -
   and also because, due to various schedules, I've written at
   high-professor speed - no time to amend, edit, or make comprehensible.
   Apologies on both counts. I think there's something of value here,
   even badly expressed. I'm leaving the comments off, however, as I
   would not have a chance to moderate or even read them.

   With reference to what a number of commenters have said
   differentiating between collect information and collecting information
   on individuals. I will simply say in all candor that I do not
   understand that there is a meaningful difference between citizens
   reporting "rumors" and such in the abstract to the White House email
   address, and reporting on fellow citizens. It has been a theme of many
   of the comments, and with all respect, I think it is a difference
   without a distinction. Certainly it is the sort of distinction that
   civil libertarians have long rejected, as a matter of principle.

   The principle, however, is not precisely the one that the commentators
   seem to be saying. Commenters on this thread, at least, seem to be
   taking the view that you treat everything the administration is doing
   in good faith so that unless someone presents evidence of - well, I'm
   not clear what for many of our commenters would actually count as
   something, but let's say something that would cross the line. Short of
   presenting evidence of that, good faith requires that we trust the
   government. Other commenters naturally take the opposite view and
   claim that the administration acts per se in bad faith.

   The American constitutional tradition, I suggest, is quite different
   from either - and consists of two not entirely consistent strands.
   First, it consists in not trusting the government. The freeborn
   citizens of this country have zero obligation to accept the
   government's claims that it collects information or does much of
   anything else in good faith; the government has the obligation, as a
   general presumption - it can be answered, yes, but still a presumption
   of popular democracy - that it, not the citizens, has to account. We
   honor that ornery, recalcitrant position not because we think it is
   always right, but because it is a considerable bulwark, procedural as
   well as cultural, against tyranny. That's why, crazy as I personally
   happened to think the left was acting during much of the Bush years,
   there was a certain abstract honor in it. But - and this is the
   crucial but - only as long as you are willing to grant the same to the
   other side in the alternation of power.

   ([1]show)

   The second is a constitutional tradition of doing the opposite of what
   I just stated above. One way of defining the role of 'His Majesty's
   Loyal Opposition', to express it anachronistically, is to say that it
   expresses its views, not by taking the majority's positions as being
   in good faith - but in 'suspending public disbelief' in the bad faith
   of the majority.

   Yes, that's a mouthful - and it is an even more difficult balancing
   act. Why? It requires acting as though one takes the majority's
   policies, proposals, etc., not in bad faith - which, however, is not
   quite the same thing as taking them in good faith, or even as though
   in good faith. There are subtle differences in affect, attitude and
   action as among these. But the problem of the loyal opposition is to
   walk as far as it can disagreeing with the majority's preferred
   policy, while still accepting that it is offered in good faith.

   Yet at some point, it might not be able to do so - in which case,
   well, see the first, above. It won't be possible to give an a priori
   rule telling one when that point, in good faith of its own, has been
   reached, alas. Hence many political battles of the kind we are seeing
   over claims of good and bad faith. But the essential line is not
   really between good faith and bad faith - it is when the loyal
   opposition should drop a certain public presumption of good faith,
   whether it actually believes it or not. This public presumption
   matters because it goes to the fundamental public-private divide - the
   fact that we sometimes properly act in public in ways that are not
   what we privately believe - upon which liberal democracy is premised.
   On the matters of policy substance - raise taxes, lower taxes, even go
   to war, not go to war, etc. - that should be regarded as a very
   drastic step. It has not been so treated, by either party, in recent
   opposition dealings with the past several administrations.

   However, one thing that the loyal opposition is always right to insist
   upon is that the 'traditions of process' be observed punctiliously -
   because those are the traditions of office by which the majority
   governs and to which the minority aspires, the traditions by which
   there is a political community and not simply contending factions. The
   office, including its sacralization and legitimation through those
   traditions of process, is greater than either.

   Again, to be blunt, however, the current administration does not seem
   to regard the office as greater than it. At least not in its current
   behavior, or up to this still early point of less than a year in
   office. One presumes things will change. But, for the moment, the
   seeming dispensability of traditions by which the office is understood
   by ordinary people to be honored - or dishonored. The honor of the
   office includes, in my view, that the office of the President of the
   United States not ask one group of loyal citizens to inform on the
   indisputedly lawful, constitutionally protected speech-activities
   (even if you think there's a difference between that and the citizens
   themselves, which I don't) of another group of loyal citizens. The
   president of the United States has treated the constitutional speech
   of citizens as - phrasing here is important, and it is not the
   equivalent of "the same as" - not sufficiently distinguishable from
   asking citizens to be on the lookout for suspicious activities that
   might turn out to be perfectly legal, but might turn out to be a bomb
   on an airplane, but in which there is a legitimate question of sifting
   for possible grave and violent criminality. We don't really like it in
   the latter case - and shouldn't - but accept some part of it, even
   while arguing over its extent, because it is related to a function of
   government to protect the physical security of the commonweal against
   mass criminal violence, for example, mass terrorism. In the current
   situation, however, there is no question of criminality or the need to
   have a suspicion thereof. The speech is all constitutionally
   protected, and so even that reason of state, and not simply the
   desires of a political administration, is quite absent.

   Why such a blunder over something that, at least if one is minimally
   attuned to the traditions of the office, is fairly obvious? At risk of
   giving great offense to many friends and correspondents, the current
   administration seems curiously to believe that it honors the office,
   rather the other way around. Moreover, the presence of - once again,
   so many friends and colleagues and correspondents, so risking offense
   - so many luminous and glittering intellectuals does not help the
   administration to find a certain humility in the mere office of the
   presidency. I imagine one reason is that a not-insignificant number do
   not especially see the office as having any special moral standing,
   compared, they would say, to a more just and universal institution of
   governance. A certain form of cosmopolitanism risks blinding one to
   the nuance of actual political communities, and to confuse their
   constitutive political elements with their mere politics.

   Nor does it help matters that the prevailing intellectual (as
   distinguished from strictly political) mood within the administration
   is one of pragmatism. Mere ordinary people will tend to believe that
   pragmatism is essentially a synonym for "moderate." It was part of the
   basis on which the Obama administration was elected - pragmatic
   moderates who would rule through the virtues of technocracy.

   But pragmatism as a political philosophy in this case is not strictly
   a matter of devotion to moderation. It might be. But then it might
   not. As a political program, it can have the virtue of lowering the
   affective temperatures of politics - as happened, for example, in the
   generation in Scotland following the civil wars, for whom pragmatic,
   technocratic language ("and now, a Report on the types and numbers of
   cattle in Certain Highland Villages") offered a neutral language out
   of the wars of religion. But pragmatism is not essentially moderate or
   immoderate; pragmatism is essentially unconstrained except by its own
   calculations of a remarkably reductionist moral psychology, which is
   both its virtue and vice. It arises out of certain versions of
   utilitarianism, and in that consideration, such things as the
   embodiment of rights within a political tradition means something very
   different from what ordinary people might have thought.

   This is equally a problem of pragmatists of the left and right, to be
   sure. But it is the pragmatism of the left that currently governs.
   Pragmatism in pursuit of ends that technocrats in majoritarian power
   have determined to be welfare maximizing has license to be radical and
   not always moderate, if that is what it takes. What matters are the
   costs on the other side. At this very moment, however, it might say,
   considerable numbers of people appear to have drawn from that a need
   to raise those costs across the country: and yet the pragmatists would
   be right in substance but wrong as to what people think they are
   doing. They think they are exercising their rights to speak and force
   their political representatives - not rulers - to hear them.
   Pragmatism's virtue is its pursuit of sense. The problem, however, is
   that a democratic polity consists partly of technocratic sense, but
   also of sensibility and that sensibility is embedded primarily in its
   traditions of process.

   (Look, I do understand entirely that half the readers are yawning
   because this is all so obvious - whereas the other half simply lack
   the receptors for the kinds of moral distinctions I am suggesting; it
   is as though, cribbing William James, I were trying to convert them to
   the gods of the Aztecs. The whole debate and all these distinctions
   don't register, just as certain things quite fail to register with me,
   such as the distinction between collecting information on what one's
   fellow citizens are saying but not collecting information on them. We
   try through mechanisms of cultural assimilation to prevent those gaps
   from growing too large, and in our public life, we properly try and
   rely upon the suspension of public disbelief about the good faith of
   the other. When those run out of grip upon us, we have a big problem.)

   See Burke on all of this, but particularly on his notion of the
   sublime, to grasp his moral psychology prior to reaching to his (often
   quite inconsistent) politics. There are subtle differences of
   sensibility in a democratic polity that the prevailing rationalist,
   reductionist pragmatism fails to capture, because it insists that all
   debates are over sense, rather than sensibility. (See also, a trifle
   weirdly, my post below about girls and college admissions, and how
   Austen no longer counts; fuse it with this one to grasp why the
   de-emphasis on Austen, and by extension the inability to use a
   language of politics to express a view on sensibility as well as sense
   is a way in which the intellectual class denudes our political
   language of the subtlety necessary to capture even the concept of a
   "loyal opposition" in a democracy.) La trahison des New Class? Yeah,
   something like it.

   I leave everyone else to sort it out, as I am going offline. I am
   sorry if I offend a sizable number of people with this addendum. I'm
   also sorry that it sounds like what it is - a professor writing at
   high speed; I don't have time to go back and amend or edit. But my
   general view of this is captured by Peggy Noonan's weekend column and
   likewise, even more strongly if possible, a passing remark of hers a
   week or so ago in a WSJ column, to the effect that we need to revive
   the category and analysis of the New Class. Amen to that. Agree with
   her or not; she's eloquent and clear - even if I'm not.

     But most damagingly to political civility, and even our political
     tradition, was the new White House email address to which citizens
     are asked to report instances of �disinformation� in the
     health-care debate: If you receive an email or see something on the
     Web about health-care reform that seems �fishy,� you can send it to
     [email protected]. The White House said it was merely trying to
     fight �intentionally misleading� information. Sen. John Cornyn of
     Texas on Wednesday wrote to the president saying he feared that
     citizens� engagement could be �chilled� by the effort. He�s right,
     it could. He also accused the White House of compiling an �enemies
     list.� If so, they�re being awfully public about it, but as Byron
     York at the Washington Examiner pointed, the emails collected could
     become a �dissident database.�

     All of this is unnecessarily and unhelpfully divisive and
     provocative. They are mocking and menacing concerned citizens. This
     only makes a hot situation hotter. Is this what the president
     wants? It couldn�t be. But then in an odd way he sometimes seems
     not to have fully absorbed the awesome stature of his office. You
     really, if you�re president, can�t call an individual American
     stupid, if for no other reason than that you�re too big. You cannot
     allow your allies to call people protesting a health-care plan
     �extremists� and �right wing,� or bought, or Nazi-like, either.
     They�re citizens. They�re concerned. They deserve respect.

   ([2]hide)

References

   1. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1249864555.html
   2. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1249864555.html

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