Posted by Abigail Thernstrom, guest-blogging:
DOJ: A Law Office Working for Minority Plaintiffs
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_08_16-2009_08_22.shtml#1250645841


   [Note to readers who have responded so thoughtfully to my previous
   posts. A number of issues raised will be addressed in this and my
   subsequent two posts. For instance, I do talk about the collaboration
   between the Republican Party and the civil rights groups in this post.
   In fact, I was the first -- in the mid-1980s -- to say that
   Republicans were laughing all the way to the political bank with
   racial gerrymandering, and at the time my point was generally
   dismissed as laughable. As for data, in my Thursday post, I will
   provide some. But in less than 1200 words a day, of necessity I am
   barely skimming the surface. Readers interested in my fully developed
   arguments -- and the evidence upon which I rely -- need to look at the
   book.]

   Changes in the method of voting are usually submitted to the Justice
   Department for preclearance as my first post noted. The use of the
   D.C. court quickly became the rare exception. The administrative route
   is faster and cheaper.

   The Justice Department was expected to function as a surrogate court
   -- with the legal standards articulated in judicial opinions guiding
   administrative decisions. The reality has been quite different.

   That reality was spelled out clearly in a 1995 Supreme Court decision,
   Miller v. Johnson. The issue was Georgia congressional districting,
   and the case tells a remarkable story of a lawless Republican
   Department of Justice that forced a state to accept a plan drawn by
   the American Civil Liberties Union in its capacity as advocate for the
   black caucus of the state�s general assembly.

   The enforcement of the Voting Rights Act has long made for strange
   bedfellows --although only superficially. In the Georgia case, John
   Dunne, the assistant attorney general for civil rights from 1990 to
   1993, was an unambivalent champion of race-based districting to
   maximize minority officeholding. His alliance with the ACLU and the
   state black caucus served the Republican Party�s interests, as well:
   What the ACLU called a �max-black� plan was also �max-white� -- more
   black voters in some districts meant fewer in others, and, in the
   South particularly, districts that had been �bleached� were fertile
   ground for Republican political aspirations.

   Of course, redistricting is not the only area in which Republican have
   failed to oppose what Chief Justice John Roberts has called the
   �sordid business . . . [of] divvying us up by race.� But seldom is the
   magnitude of the gap between alleged principle and a quite different
   reality so fully on display as it has been in some of the
   redistricting cases.

   The Georgia House and Senate redistricting committees, when they began
   the map-drawing process following the 1990 census, had no idea of the
   roadblocks that lay ahead. They drew one map and then another, both of
   them increasing the number of majority black congressional districts
   from one to two.

   The state, in fact, had no obligation to draw a map that gave
   minorities more safe districts than they previously had. The point of
   preclearance had been to prevent racially suspect states from
   depriving blacks of the political gains that basic enfranchisement
   promised, not to ensure a �fair� number of legislative seats, the
   Supreme Court had held in its controlling 1976 decision, Beer v. U.S.

   Georgia had clearly met the demands of the law. Nevertheless, the
   Justice Department found both maps in violation of section 5. John
   Dunne informed the state that it had not adequately explained its
   failure to create a third majority-minority district.

   Dunne wanted, among other changes, a reshuffling of black and white
   voters. But his reconfiguration would have created a district (CD 11)
   that connected black neighborhoods in metropolitan Atlanta and poor
   black residents on the coast, 260 miles away and �worlds apart in
   culture,� as the Supreme Court put it in Miller.

   �In short,� the Court continued, �the social, political and economic
   makeup of the Eleventh District [told] a tale of disparity, not
   community.� Dunne�s insistence on heavy-handed racial gerrymandering
   forced candidates to run in four major media markets, while leaving CD
   2 still only minority-black.

   Dunne�s communications were entirely guided by ACLU attorney Kathleen
   Wilde, who had drawn up a �max-black� plan. As the district court
   noted, �Throughout the preclearance process, from this first objection
   letter to the final submission, [DOJ] relied on versions of the
   max-black plan to argue that three majority-minority districts could
   indeed be squeezed out of the Georgia countryside. Ms. Wilde�s triumph
   of demographic manipulation became the guiding light.�

   Georgia legislators and staff who met with Justice Department
   attorneys in Washington were �told to subordinate their economic and
   political concerns to the quest for racial percentages.�

   These legislators on the redistricting committee, many of whom were
   veteran mapmakers, were essentially cut out of the districting process
   by the Justice Department. Excluding them raised grave constitutional
   questions. As the Court stated, rejecting the �max-black� plan as
   unconstitutional, �Electoral districting is a most difficult subject
   for legislatures, and so the States must have discretion to exercise
   the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests.�
   Plainly, judicial or Justice Department review �represents a serious
   intrusion on the most vital of local functions.�

   To make matters worse, DOJ attorneys had cultivated �informants�
   within the state legislature; ��whistleblowers� became �secret
   agents,�� the district court found. One of these informants described
   one black state senator who had not toed the line as a �quintessential
   Uncle Tom� and �the worst friend of blacks in Georgia.� By contrast,
   attorneys from the ACLU and the voting section of the DOJ�s Civil
   Rights Division were characterized as �peers working together.� They
   discussed the smallest details of the Wilde plan and its revisions,
   with the result that �there were countless communications, including
   notes, maps, and charts, by phone, mail and facsimile.�

   In fact, the lower court found, the �DOJ was more accessible -- and
   amenable -- to the opinions of the ACLU than to those of the Attorney
   General of the State of Georgia.� The DOJ�s March 1992 objection
   letter, quoted above, actually arrived at the state attorney general�s
   office after members of the Georgia black caucus were already
   discussing it with the press, since the Justice Department attorneys
   had told the ACLU lawyers of their decision before informing any state
   official. The court found this �informal and familiar� relationship
   between federal attorneys and an advocacy group �disturbing� and an
   �embarrassment.�

   The preclearance process was not supposed to work as it did in Georgia
   in the early 1990s, as well as in countless other jurisdictions, large
   and small, in the 1980s as well. By 1991, when the Justice Department
   reviewed the Georgia plan, the initial vision of the department as a
   more accessible court had completely broken down. The voting section
   of the Civil Rights Division was operating as a law office for
   minority plaintiffs, working as partners with civil rights advocacy
   groups.

   As UCLA law professor Daniel Lowenstein has written, �Much is at stake
   for politicians and the interests they represent in a districting
   plan, and enacting a plan is typically a difficult and contentious
   process. Once they strike a deal, they want it to stay struck, and
   therefore they tend to be risk-averse with respect to possible legal
   vulnerabilities in a plan.�

   A risk-averse plan was one that accepted racial quotas, which the
   Justice Department believed in as a matter of principle through the
   1980s and 1990s. Blacks here, whites there, in just the right numbers
   to ensure the election of blacks to public office roughly in
   proportion to their population numbers. In all likelihood, that
   commitment to proportionality will resurface in the enforcement of the
   Voting Rights Act under the current administration.

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