Posted by Eugene Volokh:
Further Defense of College Students' First Amendment Rights
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_09_20-2009_09_26.shtml#1253810999


   -- and rejection of the "must prevent hostile environment harassment"
   justification for broad campus speech codes -- from Judge George King
   in [1]Lopez v. Candaele.

   The analysis is generally focused on campus speech codes, and
   distinguishes hostile work environment harassment law generally from
   similar restrictions emposed on college students. But part of its
   reasoning can also apply to [2]First Amendment challenges to the
   application of hostile work environment harassment law to otherwise
   protected speech:

     Defendants quote the Supreme Court�s statement in R.A.V. v. City of
     St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that �since words can in some
     circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against
     conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling
     the enemy the Nation�s defense secrets), a particular content-based
     subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up
     incidently within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
     than speech.� This reliance on R.A.V. misconstrues the context and
     meaning of the Court�s discussion and mistakes its relevance to
     this case. In context, the Court was attempting to distinguish
     between instances where content-based regulation of a subcategory
     of otherwise proscribable speech is unconstitutional (as in the St.
     Paul ordinance at issue) from those where �a particular
     content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be
     swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at
     conduct rather than speech.� The issue before us is whether the
     Policy, in including expression within the scope of its regulation,
     unduly reaches a substantial amount of otherwise protected speech.
     It is no response to assert that a law may regulate a content-based
     subclass of unprotected speech that is swept up incidentally within
     the reach of a law targeting conduct rather than speech. Indeed,
     the Court went on to observe that �[w]here the government does not
     target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
     shielded from regulation merely because they express a
     discriminatory idea or philosophy.� Here, the Policy is undeniably
     aimed at the content of the expression by prohibiting speech
     involving certain content, i.e., sexist comments, insulting remarks
     or intrusive comments about one�s gender.

     Defendants also cite the Court�s comment that �sexually derogatory
     �fighting words,� among other words, may produce a violation of
     Title VII�s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
     employment practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 29 CFR § 1604.11
     (1991).� They argue that �[t]he [R.A.V.] Court singled out a
     time-tested definition of sexual harassment as an example of a
     valid proscription of �sexually derogatory fighting words.�� If
     this argument means that fighting words can be within the cited CFR
     definition of sexual harassment, it is both correct and irrelevant.
     Our conclusion is not that the Policy has no valid application.
     Rather we held that it was unconstitutionally overbroad by sweeping
     within its reach a substantial amount of protected speech. If, on
     the other hand, Defendants mean that all speech that offends this
     definition is necessarily proscribable as sexually derogatory
     fighting words, then we reject this argument as an unwarranted and
     unconstitutional enlargement of what constitutes fighting words.

   This fits well with the [3]argument about R.A.V. that I've made as to
   hostile work environment harassment law.

   This case stems from the incident in which an L.A. City College speech
   class professor refused to grade a student's presentation, apparently
   because of the religious nature of the student's presentation, the
   student's expression of opposition for same-sex marriage in the
   presentation, or both. (The professor apparently also called the
   student a "fascist bastard" in front of the class for having supported
   the anti-same-sex-marriage Prop. 8, and refused to let the student
   finish the presentation.) The case filed over that became a general
   challenge to the campus speech code, which the court [4]preliminarily
   enjoined in July. The decision I link to today rejects the defendants'
   motion for reconsideration.

References

   1. 
http://www.archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.437120/gov.uscourts.cacd.437120.61.0.pdf
   2. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/harass
   3. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/harass/substanc.htm#RAV
   4. http://www.volokh.com/posts/1247685307.shtml

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