At 05:42 PM 12/2/2009, Jed Rothwell wrote:
I meant to say:
Simon is interested in the process of "closure." And what he comes
to with Undead Science is that there can be an apparent closure
where an apparent scientific consensus arises, but there is "life
after death," hence, undead science.
This is like saying there is no apparent scientific CLOSURE about
evolution because the creationists STILL disagree.
"Closure" does not mean that a large group of people come down on
one side or another. It shouldn't mean that, anyway.
Glad you stated that, Jed. Now, the attempt is to deal with sociology
as a science, it's not a "hard" science, at least not yet!, but,
still, one can attempt to approach it objectively. What's the proper
field of study in sociology: what is, as can be observed, measured,
reported, as to the topic (which is society, Jed, not cold fusion),
or what should be?
Tell me, in the field of condensed matter nuclear science, what would
we report, the design of experiments and their results, or what those
results should be? In a few cases, sure, a theoretical paper, we'd
report something like, "According to this analysis, measurement of
neutrons at low levels should be possible." But that's theory, not
actual experimental report.
The closer that Simon is talking about, and where he shares language
with other sociologists of science, is indeed about a group of people
coming down on one side or another. Closure is a social phenomenon,
and is not contingent upon the apparently closed fact.
I.e., by the standards of sociology, the cold fusion issue was closed
by 1990. Simon is pointing out the contradiction, the existence of
non-closure in spite of apparent closure. And, again, this is not
dependent upon the fact. All those scientists who continued to work
in the field could be wrong, not the "mainstream." Unlikely, from the
perspective of what we know. But Simon is interested in how they did
it. How did they manage to continue in spite of heavy obstacles
placed in their way by the general "conclusion"?
By traditional standards, closure happens when a definitive
experiment is performed. Whether anyone pays attention to that
experiment or not is irrelevant.
Absolutely incorrect, Jed. You are again confusing what should be
with what is. Closure is a social phenomenon, not a matter of
absolute truth. A sociologist can't actually compare a "consensus"
with "truth." Nor can a sociologist judge whether or not an
experiment is definitive. All that a sociologist can do is to
research and report what people think about it, and what they do about it.
There really aren't traditional "standards" for closure, though there
are processes which sometimes worked, i.e., the apparent consensus
was real and reflected the opinion of the knowledgeable, and
presumably including some of those who stuck their feet in their
mouths approving of N-rays or polywater. While opinion may bounce for
a time when there is a definitive experiment, "definitive,"
sociologically, must mean nothing other than "convincing," and the
convincing must be the convincing of a defined population. It's about
people, and only indirectly about science.
There is the scientific method, which you correctly observe was not
followed, and there is "science" as a body of knowledge held and
shared by more than isolated individuals. We can call the opinion of
an isolated individual "science," but you surely know that such
opinions aren't very reliable in themselves. "Science," in terms of
knowledge, more properly refers to shared knowledge, where the
foundations of the knowledge are well understood. The edges of
science are areas where there is speculative knowledge, partial
knowledge, inference, and, yes, opinion.
It's possible that everyone agrees on something that is an error.
However, it's unlikely that the knowledgeable will so agree, as long
as the knowledge is sufficiently comprehensive. And if I find that my
own opinion in a field is rejected by everyone but me, I should think
long and hard about how solid my knowledge is before I proceed with
an assumption that I'm right, and I should be prepared, if I proceed
on that assumption, for opposition.
But, of course, there never was a real scientific consensus on cold
fusion, just the opinion of a politically powerful faction that was
able to sway the rest of "science," i.e., the community of scientists
who *aren't* familiar with the specific field.
Once one has sufficient knowledge of the literature, it's trivial to
see the errors and false assumptions of the "expert" critics. They
aren't familiar with the actual evidence, but maintain *belief* as
not only the evidence but also as to what those convinced that CF is
real believe and claim. They are not familiar with the present field,
though they may have substantial knowledge of the early history of it.
For them, the topic closed, and was no longer worth the effort of
consideration. People have to make those decisions, individually, and
I do not blame anyone for thinking the topic closed, but I do blame
them for continuing to argue tendentiously that CF is only "wishful
thinking," based on thoroughly obsolete evidence that was never
strong in the first place, and was often plainly incorrect (such as
supposed lack of replication, or the claim that the effect disappears
routinely with better measurement techniques. As to individual
experiments or efforts, that was true, but as a gross and
over-arching generalization, it was false. Sometimes better
measurement techniques simply made the certainty of the effect increase.)
Townes proved that masers can exist, and even though no one believed
him at first, the issue was still closed. In my opinion, Simon is
trying to overthrow traditional standards and substitute a blurry
new-age version of scientific closure.
No, the issue remained open, obviously. It had only become
*potentially* closed. If only people would look at the evidence.
Ah, Jed. You have displayed your axe. Again, you are confusing the
sociological study with the science of LENR.
Simon shows, quite effectively, that the normal processes of science
broke down with CF, and that much more was going on besides what the
critics claim is pathological clinging to wishes about results. Simon
is discussed in the *phenomenon of closure," which is a sociological
phenomenon, and it has to do with how knowledge is shared and
validated collectively. It's not about "truth." To Simon, it would
also be of interest what keeps people from looking at the newer
evidence. Indeed, Jed, don't you find that interesting?
You know and I know that there is *highly conclusive* evidence that
LENR are taking place in the palladium deuteride environment, for
starters. But our shared knowledge cannot properly be called a
"scientific consensus" until it is broadly shared, such that the
minority opinion (that LENR is bogus) has almost completely
disappeared. We can talk about the "scientific consensus" of a group,
and I often write about the "consensus among LENR researchers." But I
would never call that "the scientific consensus," at least not yet.
But my strong suspicion is that we are rapidly getting there. Given
the magnitude of the obstacle, "rapid" might still take a few years.
But the skeptical position on cold fusion (i.e, the pseudoskeptical
position, not the legitimate and even necessary skepticism that
requires claims to be carefully vetted before being accepted) has
largely become untenable. It would be impossible to continue to
maintain the position at, say, a colloquium that included the
knowledgeable and that wasn't heavily biased in process. The stubborn
clinging to prior opinion would become too obvious for most to
maintain. Garwin really displayed his nether regions in his comments
on the CBS special. He apparently believes that evidence isn't
convincing because he is not convinced. He's essentially claiming
superior knowledge based on nothing other than his own personality. Oops.
An experiment is objective proof that stands outside the human imagination.
No. No experiment is proof, it is merely evidence. Evidence can be
misleading. However, experimental results, carefully reported, are
the closest that we ever see to "objective evidence." "Proof" is, in
fact, a subjective concept, by which we mean that evidence has become
convincing. Lost performative there: who is convinced? And how does
that person know?
They know it because they are convinced, and, if they are indeed
advanced in perception, they know it because they know the mechanism
of conviction, but ... the process remains open to error.
Suppose an experiment reveals some evidence that, if understood,
would show, with very high probability, that A causes B. I.e.,
whenever A occurs, B follows. A might need to be *very* narrowly
specified, for starters. Yet nobody understands the experiment. Was
it "proof"?
No, it was potential proof, with the potential unrealized. Indeed,
Mizuno had proof years earlier, didn't he?
Simon would replace it with mere opinion.
No, he wouldn't. But he's studying opinion, Jed, and you seem to be
distressed by that. You apparently want him to study something else,
and write about it. Maybe he will someday. But he did a great job
with the sociology, and that's what you are missing.
He does not even acknowledge that what he is describing -- closure,
as he defines it -- is ersatz.
I think you are quite incorrect on that, and for you to make that
error, you must have read him shallowly, with a series of knee-jerk
reactions to all the garbage that has been written on the topic,
which you laid upon Simon for reporting.
It is a poor substitute that we must settle for when we cannot
understand the experiments, or the experiments remain inconclusive,
or no one tries to replicate them. Real closure is what happened at
BARC when developed the autoradiograph x-ray film. Bingo! There's
your answer. Case closed.
I think so too. That experiment was a piece of what convinced me
earlier this year. But the "case" isn't closed until the "jury"
returns a verdict, Jed. Rather, we'd have to say that the truth
became apparent to those who were willing to look. If you want to be
an attorney for the defense -- or for the prosecutor -- you'd need to
consider how people become convinced of a thing.
some hints. Claiming that the thing is "true" has almost no effect,
because every advocate claims that for their position. And telling
the jury that if they dig through the mountain of evidence
themselves, so they can come to an independent judgement, is also
quite likely to fail. Most people couldn't do that if they wanted to,
and they often don't want to. Especially if they already believe, for
whatever reason, that it will be a boring waste of time.
Many aspects of science are revolutionary, but one that appeals to
me most -- that Francis Bacon emphasized -- is that it takes place
outside our minds.
Old thinking, Jed, really old, and really naive. That's not
"science." Reality "takes place" outside our minds, I go with that
one, I am *not* a relativist. But Reality and our understanding of
reality are different, and always will be.
It was the first great institution in which disputes are judged by
standards divorced from culture and the human imagination.
And where did this institution exist? Jed, it existed as an ideal,
not as a reality, or certainly not as a completely realized one. The
judges are human. Or do you have some proposed judge that is not
human? A computer, perhaps? Let's say that many, including myself,
might think of this as a nightmare, not as some benefit!
Individually, we may sometimes approach that ideal judgment, but we
are quite fallible. Everyone, as far as I know. Know of any exceptions?
No individual or large group of individuals can appeal the judgement.
Whose judgement? Do you imagine that facts judge themselves?
Reality rules, for sure, but that's not about human knowledge, and
science is about human knowledge, as a study of and relationship with
Reality. The scientific *ideal* is that Reality rules and takes
precedence over our opinions, but we are helpless against our own
blindness, the best we can do is to keep in mind the possibility of
personal blindness.
A thermocouple reading, or a humble piece of x-ray film, outweigh
the opinions of ten thousand scientists. Even if the x-ray film is
lost, or suppressed, ridiculed and eventually forgotten, it will
remains eternally right, and the scientists will be eternally mistaken.
If unknown, it's not "knowledge," but it seems you have some concept
of science that isn't knowledge. Perhaps you think of science as
Reality? Of course, if this is true, there is no "progress" in
science, it's already perfect. Right?
In fact, though, our knowledge can and does progress. And I
understand "science" to mean "knowledge based on evidence." Knowledge
based on evidence can be wrong. Easily. Because evidence requires
interpretation if it is to be more than a mere collection of data.
Interpretation is based on experience with fact and is necessarily
limited, cannot be fully comprehensive. Hence it is fallible, though
when genuine consensus exists, it's highly unlikely to be too far off....
The problem with cold fusion is that it was considered rejected when
the consensus wasn't genuine, was not based on open and clear
communication, but rather on oppression and "victory" for one side.
Even if that side had been correct, if cold fusion were actually
bogus, that oppression and repression would have been a major error,
postponing genuine consensus, wasting a great deal of energy, highly
inefficient even as it appeared to be efficient (i.e, supposedly
preventing wasted effort and funding studying a non-existent effect).
Ideally, that is how it works. In actual practice we cannot escape
from people's opinions and influence, but we strive to meet the ideal.
Sure. The ideal, though, is a process, not a fact. The process is one
which, if followed, is reasonably likely to give us knowledge rooted
in reality and thus efficient for prediction. And when it isn't
followed, we see the damage that results.
Look back at earlier institutions. Even the ones that depended on
objective criteria, such as ancient Roman aqueduct technology, were
still largely ruled by the opinions of powerful men and laws set by
legislators. Where, when and how aqueducts were built was as much a
political decision as a technical one. Power, money and influence held sway.
Sure. We can improve that process, but we won't change what's called
the Iron Law of Oligarchy. We can harness oligarchy, we can't get rid
of it. It's quite natural and probably essential, but it isn't
necessary that it be harmful, as it too-often is.
The same is true of modern infrastructure and projects such as
highway construction, the Space Station, a Tokamak, or a new weapon
system. Objective criteria play only a small role. It does not
matter whether a fighter airplane works well, or would be of any
use in war. What matters is which congressional districts get the
funding to build it.
I smell some cynicism, Jed. Be careful. In my view, the major enemy
of better social process is the belief that it's impossible.
Cynicism, in a word. Based on what scientific knowledge?
We did not know if low energy reactions were possible until we looked
for them. So how would we know that social progress is possible or
impossible unless we look for it, try to understand how social
process works already (what's good about it, for starters), and then
how it might be improved in ways that don't buck basic human
psychology, but rather utilize it intelligently. Possible?
Impossible? How would we know?
What I can tell you is that, in whatever way I find, I'm doing it.
I'm just one person, and I can't do it alone, but .... I'm seeing
progress, here and there. I do know that if many people did what I'm
doing -- maybe even if a handful did it steadily -- the world would move.
But I'm only in charge of myself. Even my kids belong to themselves.
