(Infelizmente o texto esta em ingl�s)

Veja a Mat�ria:   " Stealing an Election"

e a conclus�o do autor:

Conclusion:  The risks to electronic voting machine software are even
greater than first appears.


Joaquim
-----Mensagem original-----
De: Bruce Schneier [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Enviada em: quinta-feira, 15 de abril de 2004 02:39
Para: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Assunto: CRYPTO-GRAM, April 15, 2004


                  CRYPTO-GRAM

                 April 15, 2004

               by Bruce Schneier
                Founder and CTO
       Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
            [EMAIL PROTECTED]
            <http://www.schneier.com>
           <http://www.counterpane.com>


A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

Back issues are available at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.  To subscribe, visit
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html> or send a blank message to
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

In this issue:
      National ID Cards
      TSA-Approved Locks
      Crypto-Gram Reprints
      Stealing an Election
      Counterpane News
      Security Notes from All Over:
        Man-in-the-Middle Attack
      BeepCard
      Bluetooth Privacy Hack
      News
      Virus Wars
      Comments from Readers


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

               National ID Cards



As a security technologist, I regularly encounter people who say the
United States should adopt a national ID card.  How could such a
program not make us more secure, they ask?

The suggestion, when it's made by a thoughtful civic-minded person like
Nicholas Kristof in the New York Times, often takes on a tone that is
regretful and ambivalent: Yes, indeed, the card would be a minor
invasion of our privacy, and undoubtedly it would add to the growing
list of interruptions and delays we encounter every day; but we live in
dangerous times, we live in a new world....

It all sounds so reasonable, but there's a lot to disagree with in such
an attitude.

The potential privacy encroachments of an ID card system are far from
minor.  And the interruptions and delays caused by incessant ID checks
could easily proliferate into a persistent traffic jam in office
lobbies and airports and hospital waiting rooms and shopping malls.

But my primary objection isn't the totalitarian potential of national
IDs, nor the likelihood that they'll create a whole immense new class
of social and economic dislocations.  Nor is it the opportunities they
will create for colossal boondoggles by government contractors.  My
objection to the national ID card, at least for the purposes of this
essay, is much simpler.

It won't work.  It won't make us more secure.

In fact, everything I've learned about security over the last 20 years
tells me that once it is put in place, a national ID card program will
actually make us less secure.

My argument may not be obvious, but it's not hard to follow,
either.  It centers around the notion that security must be evaluated
not based on how it works, but on how it fails.

It doesn't really matter how well an ID card works when used by the
hundreds of millions of honest people that would carry it.  What
matters is how the system might fail when used by someone intent on
subverting that system: how it fails naturally, how it can be made to
fail, and how failures might be exploited.

The first problem is the card itself.  No matter how unforgeable we
make it, it will be forged.  And even worse, people will get legitimate
cards in fraudulent names.

Two of the 9/11 terrorists had valid Virginia driver's licenses in fake
names.  And even if we could guarantee that everyone who issued
national ID cards couldn't be bribed, initial cardholder identity would
be determined by other identity documents... all of which would be
easier to forge.

Not that there would ever be such thing as a single ID card.  Currently
about 20 percent of all identity documents are lost per year.  An
entirely separate security system would have to be developed for people
who lost their card, a system that itself is capable of abuse.

Additionally, any ID system involves people... people who regularly
make mistakes.  We all have stories of bartenders falling for obviously
fake IDs, or sloppy ID checks at airports and government
buildings.  It's not simply a matter of training; checking IDs is a
mind-numbingly boring task, one that is guaranteed to have
failures.  Biometrics such as thumbprints show some promise here, but
bring with them their own set of exploitable failure modes.

But the main problem with any ID system is that it requires the
existence of a database.  In this case it would have to be an immense
database of private and sensitive information on every American -- one
widely and instantaneously accessible from airline check-in stations,
police cars, schools, and so on.

The security risks are enormous.  Such a database would be a kludge of
existing databases; databases that are incompatible, full of erroneous
data, and unreliable.  As computer scientists, we do not know how to
keep a database of this magnitude secure, whether from outside hackers
or the thousands of insiders authorized to access it.

And when the inevitable worms, viruses, or random failures happen and
the database goes down, what then? Is America supposed to shut down
until it's restored?

Proponents of national ID cards want us to assume all these problems,
and the tens of billions of dollars such a system would cost -- for
what? For the promise of being able to identify someone?

What good would it have been to know the names of Timothy McVeigh, the
Unabomber, or the DC snipers before they were arrested? Palestinian
suicide bombers generally have no history of terrorism.  The goal is
here is to know someone's intentions, and their identity has very
little to do with that.

And there are security benefits in having a variety of different ID
documents.  A single national ID is an exceedingly valuable document,
and accordingly there's greater incentive to forge it.  There is more
security in alert guards paying attention to subtle social cues than
bored minimum-wage guards blindly checking IDs.

That's why, when someone asks me to rate the security of a national ID
card on a scale of one to 10, I can't give an answer.  It doesn't even
belong on a scale.

This essay originally appeared in the Minneapolis Star Tribune:
<http://www.startribune.com/stories/1519/4698350.html>

Kristof's essay in the New York Times:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/17/opinion/17KRIS.html?ex=1394946000&en=
938b60e9bdb051f7&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND> or <http://tinyurl.com/26fg2>

My earlier essay on National ID cards:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0112.html#1>

My essay on identification and security:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0402.html#6>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

              TSA-Approved Locks



Way back in 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed the Clipper
Chip.  The government was concerned that the bad guys would start using
encryption, so they had a solution.  The Clipper Chip would provide
strong encryption that could not be broken, but there was a secret key
-- known only by the government -- that could decrypt the
traffic.  That way legitimate users could be secure, but the bad guys
could have their messages read by the government.

As you can imagine, this didn't go over very well.

People didn't like the idea of the government having a back door into
their cryptography.  Experts like me didn't believe that the "back
door" would remain secret, and didn't think that deliberately crippled
cryptography was a good idea.  The general concept, known as key
escrow, key recovery, or trusted third-party encryption, hung around
for a few years and was eventually forgotten.

Who would have thought it would come back in the form of a luggage lock?

Since 9/11, airport security has started opening checked luggage
more.  If they find a locked suitcase, they break the lock.  But some
travelers lock their suitcases, as they don't want the bags either
accidentally opening up in transit or being opened up by some baggage
handler looking for something to filch.  In an attempt to satisfy both
of these requirements, there's now a key escrow lock.  You lock and
unlock your suitcase normally, but there's a special TSA key that
allows airport security to unlock it, too.

There are a couple of reasons why this is different.  First, there's no
other option.  Either you use one of these special locks, or you leave
your suitcase unlocked.  In this case, the solution might be better
than nothing.

Second, it's only a suitcase.  We're not trying to defend against a
criminal cutting into it with a knife, or walking away with the entire
bag.  We're trying to defend against an opportunist sticking his hand
into the bag and grabbing something.

Sure, the bad guys will get copies of the special TSA keys and be able
to unlock your suitcase, but they were able to open that sorry-ass
luggage lock already.

I have never locked my suitcase, even when traveling in the Third
World.  The risk seems pretty small to me.  But if someone is worried,
I recommend this lock.  Security theater plus a little bit of real
security seems like a good combination in this case.


Lock website:
<http://www.travelsentry.org/travelers.htm>

News articles:
<http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/news/s_172071.html>
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/12/07/TRGM239RJB1
.DTL> or <http://tinyurl.com/2azte>

My old writings on key recovery:
<http://www.schneier.com/essay-infosec-scrambled-ft.html>
<http://www.schneier.com/paper-key-escrow.html>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

              Crypto-Gram Reprints



Crypto-Gram is currently in its seventh year of publication.  Back
issues cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found
on <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.  These are a selection
of articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.

Automated Denial-of-Service Attacks Using the U.S. Post Office:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0304.html#1>

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Database Accuracy:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0304.html#7>

How to Think About Security:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#1>

Is 1028 Bits Enough?
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#3>

Liability and Security
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6>

Natural Advantages of Defense: What Military History Can Teach Network
Security, Part 1
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0104.html#1>

UCITA:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0004.html#ucita>

Cryptography: The Importance of Not Being Different:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html#different>

Threats Against Smart Cards:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html#smartcards>

Attacking Certificates with Computer Viruses:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html#certificates>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

             Stealing an Election



There are major efforts by computer security professionals to convince
government officials that paper audit trails are essential in any
computerized voting machine.  They have conducted actual examination of
software, engaged in letter writing campaigns, testified before
government bodies, and collectively, have maintained visibility and
public awareness of the issue.

The track record of the computerized voting machines used to date has
been abysmal; stories of errors are legion.  Here's another way to look
at the issue: what are the economics of trying to steal an election?

Let's look at the 2002 election results for the 435 seats in the House
of Representatives.  In order to gain control of the House, the
Democrats would have needed to win 23 more seats.  According to actual
voting data (pulled off the ABC News website), the Democrats could have
won these 23 seats by swinging 163,953 votes from Republican to
Democrat, out of the total 65,812,545 cast for both parties.  (The
total number of votes cast is actually a bit higher; this analysis only
uses data for the winning and second-place candidates.)

This means that the Democrats could have gained the majority in the
House by switching less than 1/4 of one percent of the total votes -- 
less than one in 250 votes.

Of course, this analysis is done in hindsight.  In practice, more
cheating would be required to be reasonably certain of winning.  Even
so, the Democrats could have won the house by shifting well below 0.5%
of the total votes cast across the election.

Let's try another analysis: What is it worth to compromise a voting
machine?  In contested House races in 2002, candidates typically spent
$3M to $4M, although the highest was over $8M.  The outcomes of the 20
closest races would have changed by swinging an average of 2,593 votes
each.  Assuming (conservatively) a candidate would pay $1M to switch
5,000 votes, votes are worth $200 each.  The actual value is probably
closer to $500, but I figured conservatively here to reflect the
additional risk of breaking the law.

If a voting machine collects 250 votes (about 125 for each candidate),
rigging the machine to swing all of its votes would be worth
$25,000.  That's going to be detected, so is unlikely to
happen.  Swinging 10% of the votes on any given machine would be worth
$2500.

This suggests that it is necessary to assume that attacks against
individual voting machines are a serious risk.

Computerized voting machines have software, which means we need to
figure out what it's worth to compromise a voting machine software
design or code, and not just individual machines.  Any voting machine
type deployed in 25% of precincts would register enough votes that
malicious software could swing the balance of power without creating
terribly obvious statistical abnormalities.

In 2002, all the Congressional candidates together raised over
$500M.  As a result, one can conservatively conclude that affecting the
balance of power in the House of Representatives is worth at least
$100M to the party who would otherwise be losing.  So when designing
the security behind the software, one must assume an attacker with a
$100M budget.

Conclusion:  The risks to electronic voting machine software are even
greater than first appears.


This essay was written with Paul Kocher.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                Counterpane News



Schneier is speaking at the CSO Perspectives Conference in San Diego on
April 19th.
<http://www.csoonline.com/perspectives/april2004/>

Counterpane is exhibiting at NetWorld + Interop, taking place at the
Las Vegas Convention Center, May 11 - 13.  Visit us in booth #2021.

Counterpane has sponsored a webcast with Gartner.  Both Gartner and
Counterpane talk about network security and Managed Security Services.
<http://www.accelacomm.com/jlp/cryptogram/0/10001788/>

More Beyond Fear reviews:
<http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/bookreviews/gr/aapr032104.htm>
<http://victoria.tc.ca/int-grps/books/techrev/bkbyndfr.rvw>
<http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/001598.html>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Security Notes from All Over:  Man-in-the-Middle Attack



The phrase "man-in-the-middle attack" is used to describe a computer
attack where the adversary sits in the middle of a communications
channel between two people, fooling them both.  It is an important
attack, and causes all sorts of design considerations in communications
protocols.

But it's a real-life attack, too.  Here's a story of a woman who posts
an ad requesting a nanny.  When a potential nanny responds, she asks
for references for a background check.  Then she places another ad,
using the reference material as a fake identity.  She gets a job with
the good references -- they're real, although for another person -- and
then robs the family who hires her.  And then she repeats the process.

Look what's going on here.  She inserts herself in the middle of a
communication between the real nanny and the real employer, pretending
to be one to the other.  The nanny sends her references to someone she
assumes to be a potential employer, not realizing that it is a
criminal.  The employer receives the references and checks them, not
realizing that they don't actually belong to the person who is sending
them.

It's a nasty piece of crime.


<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/
03/18/BAG6S5MUEO1.DTL> or <http://tinyurl.com/333dj>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                   BeepCard



BeepCard is a technology company.  They sell a sound authenticator for
credit cards.  The demo looks like a credit card -- an actual credit
card that passes all the credit card specs for bendability and
reliability and everything -- and contains a speaker and a sound
chip.  When you press a certain part of the card -- the "button" -- it
spits out an audible 128-bit random string.

It's a non-repeating string that's reproduced in software at the other
end, similar to a SecurID card, so an attacker can't record one audible
string and deduce the rest of them.

This is perhaps the coolest security idea I've seen in a long
time.  They have a demo application where you go to a website and
purchase something with a credit card.  To authenticate the
transaction, you have to put the card up to your computer's microphone
and press the button.  The sound is captured using a Java or ActiveX
control -- no plug-in required -- and acts as an authenticator.  It
proves that the person making the transaction has the card in his
hands, and doesn't just know the number.  In credit-card language, it
changes the transaction from "card not present" to "card present."

Even cooler, they are making an enhancement to the system that also
includes a microphone on the card.  This system will require the user
to speak a password into the card before pressing the button.

Why do I like this?  It's a physical authentication system that doesn't
require any special reader hardware.  You can use it on a random
computer at an Internet cafe.  You can use it on a telephone.  I can
think of all sorts of really easy, really cool applications.  If the
price is cheap enough, BeepCard has a winner here.

<http://www.beepcard.com>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

            Bluetooth Privacy Hack



Seems that Bluetooth cell phones are vulnerable to snooping: not the
conversations, the contents of the phones.

Adam Laurie, a security researcher in the U.K. discovered the flaw, the
the London Times broke the story yesterday.  The hack is called
"Bluesnarfing," and allows a hacker to remotely download the contacts
list, diary, and stored pictures in Bluetooth-enabled telephones.

I don't have any of the technical details, but the implications are
pretty scary.  You could take your Bluetooth-enabled laptop into a
trade show and download the contact list of your rivals' salespeople's
cell phones.  You could walk into a Congressional Press Conference and
download information from the cell phones of Congressmen.  This story
broke in the UK; I know that reporters would love to know who is on
Tony Blair's, or Prince Charles's, speed dial.

It's unclear how many phones are affected -- whether this is a
Bluetooth problem or an implementation problem with some Bluetooth
phones -- or whether the problem is fixable.  But it's a big
problem.  People treat cell phones like their wallets; they keep all
kind of sensitive information in them.  For someone else to have the
ability, remotely, of downloading the contents of the phone is disturbing.


News stories (paid access required):
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1073484,00.html?submit.x=47&s
ubmit.y=6>
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-7-1072761,00.html>

My 2000 essay on Bluetooth security:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0008.html#8>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                      News



It's possible -- easy, even -- to use Google to search for vulnerable
computers to hack.  Here are some of the possibilities:
<http://johnny.ihackstuff.com/index.php?module=prodreviews>

Once again, the U.S. Department of Interior has been told by the court
to take its computers off the Internet because it cannot secure
personal data:
<http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20040317S0005>

Worried about automatic cameras snapping a picture of your license
plate as you speed through red lights?  Here's a company that sells a
license plate cover that makes it hard to read at angles of more than
five degrees.  Not sure if it's legal to use one, though.
<http://www.phantomplate.com>

A security breach at Equifax Canada leaked personal info about 1400
people.  The criminals were "posing as legitimate credit
grantors."  Sounds like a non-technical attack to me.
<http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2004/03/16/canada/credittheft040316>
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1079408743242_24/?h
ub=TopStories> or <http://tinyurl.com/2ejcr>
Equifax Canada's response:
<http://www.equifax.com/EFX_Canada/news_and_perspective/press_e.html#Sec
uritybreach> or <http://tinyurl.com/3aeht>

CSO Magazine grades government information security:
<http://www.csoonline.com/read/020104/grade.html>

Here's a story of a man in the UK who flew to Italy and back, having
his passport checked several times.  However, he'd mistakenly picked up
his wife's passport.  No one
noticed.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/oxfordshire/3495299.stm>

The four big accounting companies, plus an insurance company, are
working together on a cybersecurity risk measurement framework.  Could
be interesting.
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,9145
0,00.html?nas=SEC-91450> or <http://tinyurl.com/2huxo>

Political activists are on the U.S. government "no fly" list:
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0927-01.htm>
<http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/020904E.shtml>

ATMs outfitted with equipment to steal debit card numbers and PINs:
<http://www.utexas.edu/admin/utpd/atm.html>

Interesting article about anti-counterfeiting technologies in
banknotes.  The author expresses surprise that the general public
doesn't check banknotes for authenticity very much.  To me this is
perfectly reasonable.  It's not in anyone's best interest to find
counterfeit money in his wallet.  Any anti-counterfeiting technology
that relies on citizens checking money for authenticity is going to
fail, because people just won't do it.  Now if banks gave 1.5x reward
for counterfeit bills, citizens would get very good at spotting fake
notes.  But that would cause another set of problems.
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/currency/money/0116878.html>
Banks and governments need to detect counterfeits:
<http://www.bis.org/press/p040309.htm>
Different countries' regulations on the use of images of money:
<http://www.rulesforuse.org>

A self-described psychic calls in a bomb tip and grounds an
airplane.  Guess you don't have to be a terrorist to disrupt airline
travel.
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/West/03/27/psychic.plane.ap/index.html>
<http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/8293055.htm>

Citing anonymous sources in the British intelligence community, the
Sunday Times reported that an e-mail message intercepted by NSA spies
precipitated a massive terrorism investigation.
<http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040406.gtterror06/
BNStory/Technology/> or <http://tinyurl.com/2675t>

Interesting interview with Gene Spafford:
<http://grep.law.harvard.edu/article.pl?sid=04/04/05/0353235&mode=nested
 > or <http://tinyurl.com/2yhgd>

Interesting, but long, essay on spam:
<http://www.colinfahey.com/spam_topics/spam_the_phenomenon.htm>

A couple of years I wrote about the security problems created by arming
airplane pilots.  Here's an interesting related story: a sky marshal
accidentally left his handgun in an airport bathroom...inside
security.  This isn't a big deal.  The chance that a terrorist would
have found and used the gun is essentially zero.  The chance that a
random nutcase would have found and used the gun is larger, but still
close enough to zero not to matter.  But the story is a good lesson
that even well-thought-out security systems fail sometimes.
<http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=4803867>
or <http://tinyurl.com/38kbv>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                    Virus Wars



We're in the middle of a huge virus/worm epidemic.  Dozens and dozens
of different ones have been found in the past few weeks.  Most of these
are not new, but variants on others.

There seems to be an ongoing war between the people who write the Bagle
worm and the people who write the Netsky worm.  Many variants of each
are running around the Internet, and more seem to be found all the
time.  Embedded in the different versions are comments and taunts to
the other.

For example, this is what was found in Netsky.R:  "Yes, true, you have
understand it.  Bagle is a shitty guy, he opens a backdoor, and he
makes a lot of money.  Netsky not, Netsky is Skynet, a good software,
Good guys behind it.  Believe me, or not.  We will release thousands of
our Skynet versions, as long as Bagle is there and the
people...  Thanks To Bruce Schneider.  And to all people in cz and
russia.  Best regards.  We are the only Skynet."

(Yes, I used this as an example because I am mentioned.)

Unfortunately, this war shows no sign of ending.  Presumably the
various participants will eventually grow up and get tired, but until
then we have to endure more of this nonsense.


News articles:
<http://www.itnews.com.au/storycontent.asp?ID=10&Art_ID=19041>
<http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/06/0024208&mode=thread&tid=126
&tid=172> or <http://tinyurl.com/yq9jz>

Netsky.R information:
<http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32netskyr.html>

Bunches of variants described:
<http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/archive-032004.html>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

              Comments from Readers



From: Todd Ellner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Thoughts on striking back

It's always interesting when two things that one knows are in conflict
with one another.  Not always comfortable but always interesting.

Your essays on hack-back and similar schemes are right.  Right morally
and ethically, right technically.  But there are parts missing, and I
think it's those absences which make me uneasy.  Please bear with me here.

The first part is what you call "vigilantism."  You define it as any
attempt by one party to harm another in response to a perceived
wrong.  You then combine it with the overlapping but most assuredly not
identical idea of taking the law into one's own hands.

Vigilantes or the Committee of Vigilance was a historical response to
lawlessness in times and places where law enforcement was non-existent
or incapable of responding to crimes.  The vigilantes were groups of
citizens.  The idea of a "lone vigilante" is semantically
null.  Vigilantism was an expression of community will and mores for
better or worse.

Bernard Goetz was not a "vigilante".  He was a guy with a gun.

When my wife was growing up in East Africa there wasn't a lot of money
for modern policing.  Very often if there were robbers operating in the
area, the men of the village would get together in a group, track them
down, and either deliver them to the nearest police or military
officials or mete out punishment, usually in the form of
beatings.  That is vigilantism.

You have, I fear, conflated vigilantism -- unofficial and informal
justice handled directly by a community rather than by the legal system
-- with something else entirely: self-defense.  Self-defense is not
about punishment.  It's not about revenge.  It's not about taking on
the legal system's job.  It's about doing what is necessary at the
moment to prevent harm to the innocent.

 From what little I can tell from their site and e-mails to their sales
people, Symbiot is run by a bunch of idiots.  But what they seem to be
trying to accomplish is self defense.  Stop the person who is trying to
hurt you by removing his capacity to do harm at the time he is trying
to inflict damage.

The difference is important and has been a fixture of the law since
time immemorial.

In my other life, the one where I don't write software and administer
Linux machines, I do a lot of things related to self-defense -- teach
women's self defense courses, get abused women out of dangerous
situations, do firearms instruction, get certified as an expert witness
for self-protection and use of force cases, that sort of thing.

In the physical world the issues are pretty clear and easy to
understand.  You can hit him to stop him from hitting you.  You can
hold him until the police arrives.  You can not hit him if he's not an
immediate threat.  You can't keep hitting him if he's not going to hit
you any longer.  You certainly can't put the boot into him an extra
time just because he deserves it.

There's another principle in the physical world and the psychological
one -- deterrence.  To a great degree, physical security and protection
are a communication process.  As the defender, you have to communicate
to the attacker in language he understands and believes that whatever
he wants is not going to be worth what he will have to pay for it.  If
you've ever had cats or dogs you will know exactly what I am talking about.

So if we de-conflate the two issues I think there's something
legitimate going on.  Deterrence rests on perceived costs.  The
standard security measures are pretty much entirely passive.  They
increase the time it will take before the criminal gets what he wants.

Criminal penalties help.  Highly publicized trials with stiff fines or
jail sentences will certainly make many black hats think twice.  But
the law, as any cop will tell you, doesn't act.  It reacts after the
fact.  And it doesn't do anything about attacks that originate in
foreign countries.

What I see people like Symbiot reacting to is not just the desire for
revenge.  It's a recognition of what we all know deep down about
self-protection and deterrence.  They are addressing a real concern,
however clumsily, and are aware (even if they aren't aware) of what may
be an irremediable weakness in electronic security.



From: Drew Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Security Benefits of Centralisation

I thought it was a great idea to try and model the economics of
centralising security (Cryptogram 15th March 2004), but I would like to
open some debate on your conclusion.  In reality, security spending is
constrained.  With this in mind I think the opposite is true:

Centralising is good!

Lets reconsider the two scenarios assuming I have $1000 to protect and
that I have a security budget of $10 to protect it with.

Scenario 1:

I go to a manufacturer and buy 10 $200-rated virtual vaults costing $1
each.  I store $100 in each.  Any attacker will need the cash flow to
find $200 up front if they wish to launch an attack.  After
successfully attacking the first vault, the attacker is $100 in the
red.  However, as all the virtual vault computers have identical
vulnerabilities, the same attack can be replayed at minimal marginal
cost (e.g. $1).  After attacking the 3rd vault, therefore, the attacker
is $98 in the black.

Having attacked all 10 vaults the attacker would make a $791 profit.  I
lose $1010.

Scenario 2:

I spend my entire budget of $10 on one $500-rated virtual vault and
store $1000 in it.  (Note that this initially appears to be less value
for money; each $1 only buys $50 of protection vs. $200 in scenario
1.)   The barrier to entry for the attack has now been raised to
$500.  Any attacker will also have to consider the operational risks
inherent in their attack.  The $500-rated safe may have improved
mechanisms to assist tracking and prosecution.

If successful the attacker would make a $500 profit whilst I again lose
$1010.

So how has centralising security (on a fixed budget) affected risk?

The impact is identical in both scenarios, but the likelihood has been
decreased in scenario 2.  This is because the entry cost for the attack
has increased (reducing the population of attackers) and the motivation
for an attacker has been decreased by decreasing the profit and
possibly increasing risk of detection.

I know how I'd spend my budget.



From: "A. L. Papadopoulos" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: V-ID

This system is open to abuse and incompetence.  With regard to the
former, I'm not convinced that everyone with access to potentially
threatening information will refrain from using that information
abusively, via blackmail, bigotry, red-lining and so forth.  Abusive
employees could create false negatives as well as false
positives.  This is borne out by the actual history of
background-checking agencies in the UK, where there is currently a
scandal about the hugely incompetent company that handles background
checks.  I haven't found the page that details the case of teachers who
were misidentified as criminals and refused jobs, so I won't make a
claim as to its veracity, but there are a variety of articles about the
UK Criminal Records Bureau, and about an IT provider called Capita, all
in a similar vein.

I think that these two factors -- abuse and incompetence -- are reason
enough to scrap any system that relies on the strategies of the V-ID as
reported.



From: "Bruce Kaalund" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: I am not a terrorist cards

This is another case of the haves vs. the have-nots.  The fact that
someone has a card "verifying" that he is not a terrorist not only
would be a vehicle for potential bad guys to slip into the system, it
would also create a large number of suspects.  Because you have to pay
for the card, you run the risk of making the economically
less-privileged into even bigger targets of the law enforcement
community.  You also include the people who are occasional travelers,
or who only go to one football game a year, because of the cost of the
ticket.  As much as we may hate to talk about it, such a system would
further relegate those who are ethnically, racially, socially and/or
financially on the outside as potential terrorists.  These people now
become the 21st century members of those "without papers."  Those whose
jobs require travel would get the card, because their company would
reimburse them for the cost.  These people tend to be in the more
economically privileged status, which does cover ethnicity and racial
categories, but not to the extent that it would be truly
"color-blind."  I'm also sure that civil libertarians would raise grave
concerns.



From: Nicholas Weaver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Microsoft Source Code and Security...

We must assume that a truly competent attacker already has access to
the Windows source code.  The Russian and Chinese governments have
legitimate access, and therefore their intelligence services have
access.  A related interesting thought exercise would be how much cost
would be required by a criminal organization in an attempt to
exfiltrate the latest copy of the source code from Microsoft.

Physical access seems an obvious one, and probably would take only a
few-hundred-dollar bribe and a USB key handed to a janitor in order to
gain a network toehold.  Network attacks also seem a possibility,
specifically IE attacks.  Corrupt some major banner server and, rather
than being indiscriminate, respond with a Trojan only to
Microsoft-owned IP addresses.  In either case, the risk of capture is
reasonably low, the cost in time is measured in man-months or less, and
the dollar cost negligible.

Thus, in all cases, the motto is clear: We MUST assume that truly bad
guys have the latest Windows source code, if the bad guys think they
would benefit from it.  Not a happy thought, especially when combined
with the observation that Windows is Critical Infrastructure.



From: "Ian D. Eccles" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: The Economics of Spam

In the February issue of Crypto-gram, you printed an article titled
"The Economics of Spam." You make a good point about spammers
responding to account shutdown by using stolen accounts.  Because of
this point, I strongly feel that Gates' third point is perhaps his
weakest.  While forcing someone to pay for the e-mail they send may
impose an incidental quality check on the message, it can only work if
the person sending the e-mail is the one paying for it.  Presumably,
any form of sendmail that allows for billing would have some form of
authentication (likely a username/password associated with a user's
account.) While this may make stealing accounts more difficult, it
certainly does not make it impossible, or even infeasible; passwords
are stolen on a fairly regular basis.  So, if Alice's e-mail account is
hijacked by Bob, who then bulk e-mails the world about his new "natural
male enhancement" product, Alice may be left footing the bill.  Thus,
the mass-messaging was still free for Bob, but not for Alice.  The
economics of spam seem worse off in this case because Alice has paid
for a service she did not make use of.  Granted, because there is a
bill involved, Alice is more likely to raise complaints, and maybe get
some sort of investigation going to find the real culprit.  However, if
a spammer employs the tactic of stealing multiple accounts and spamming
only a little from each and costing the victim very little, the damage
might go unnoticed.  In this case, spamming is still free to the spammer.


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Copyright (c) 2004 by Bruce Schneier.




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