Bob Scofield ([email protected]) wrote: > The problem with my computer started after I updated to the latest > version of ESET antivirus for Linux. The only thing I had not done > to get my re-install finished was to re-install ESET. So this > morning I did. And after the install the problem reappeared. > Cinnamon and Thunderbird would crash. Firefox was completely > unusable. So I uninstalled ESET and now everything is back to > normal.
I _had_ thought of mentioning that possibility, earlier, but feared it would have sounded too cynical. But yes, the sub-ttype of antimalware software that runs in background all the time (as opposed to the type that does periodic batch runs checking your files) can be a threat to system stability and performance. In that long screed of mine about 'security snake oil' (http://linuxmafia.com/faq/Essays/security-snake-oil.html), you'll find this passage: Way back in the late 1980s, I had my suspicions. Even though the main environments I was obliged to work in were MS-Windows 3.x and Mac System 6.0.x, which were nearly devoid of security infrastructure (e.g., no privilege levels), I had a theory: "Hey, suppose I tried the strategy of keeping my system upgraded, not running sucky software, dealing with malware by just not running it, and keeping good backups in case of that or other mishap?" I stripped off all of the corporate-mandated anti-malware crap. And there were two immediate results. 1. My systems became much more stable and better-performing. 2. The strategy worked perfectly. (At many firms, disabling corporate-mandated anti-malware software is a firing offence, but I was the #2 guy in the IT Department, and was pretty sure I knew what I was doing. But don't do that today without careful contemplation.) In my FAQ/rant about Linux/Unix viruses (http://linuxmafia.com/~rick/faq/), I also mention an _additional_ concern: (And, by the way, what's going to protect you from subverted or just dangerously defective (https://web.archive.org/web/20050729025654/http://news.com.com/Antivirus+insecurity+at+Black+Hat+confab/2100-7355_3-5805750.html) _virus checkers_, themselves wielding superuser authority? Hmm? And why on earth would we entrust our system security to ethically suspect firms who demonstrably (https://web.archive.org/web/20051201051328/http://www.wired.com:80/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html) -- and please note that both anti-virus and also commercial security-monitoring firms (with honourable exceptions ClamAV and F-Secure (https://web.archive.org/web/20051203024312/http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2005/tc20051129_938966.htm)) were culpable in that hyperlinked example of corrupt collusion -- have a tendency to sell their own customers down the river?) The links cover the revelations about the anti-malware industry that emerged in 2005. All of those firms appear to have been aware that hidden sofware placed on music CDs by Sony BMG Music Entertainment was hacking the security of customers' MS-Windows machines and degrading customer functionality -- the very model of what malware is -- and deliberately ignored it because it was _corporate_ malware. I.e., those firms deliberately screwed their customers -- with (to my knowledge) the two exceptions noted. (ClamAV is an open-source malware scanner focussed overwhelmingly on finding MS-Windows malware living in files stored on Linux/FreeBSD machines, e.g. on Samba shares for Windows boxes.) _______________________________________________ vox-tech mailing list [email protected] http://lists.lugod.org/mailman/listinfo/vox-tech
