Subject: William B. Quandt/Cold water on Reagan's Middle East legacy
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=5888
Cold water on Reagan's Middle East legacy
By William B. Quandt
Monday, July 05, 2004
Ronald Reagan, now dead for several weeks, was remarkably popular, as could
be seen by the large number of Americans who paid tribute to him as a person
and as a president. I am reluctant to spoil these warm sentiments toward a
departed leader, but I have always found it hard to understand why Reagan
was so well-liked. Yes, he was an unabashed patriot, he spoke proudly about
his country, and he helped Americans regain their optimism after the difficult
years of economic recession and the hostage crisis that accompanied the
Iranian revolution (and which helped Reagan defeat Jimmy Carter in 1980). But
his policies, both domestic and foreign, were often very counterproductive.
When I just look at Reagan's legacy in the Middle East, there is very little to be
proud of. When he became president, Egypt and Israel were on their way to
making peace, and a general framework had been worked out at Camp David
for initial steps toward an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Although much work
had to be done for a serious agreement to be reached, still Reagan had little
interest in pushing forward with one of Carter's significant achievements.
Reagan may not have had much interest in the Middle East in any case, but he
surrounded himself with advisers who were determined to approach the region
in a more tough-minded manner than Carter. The Cold War atmosphere that
had been generated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979
intensified under Reagan. New terms such as "rogue states" were introduced,
and Israel was regularly referred to as a "strategic asset." The mindset of the
Reaganites had little room for nuance or complexity.
It is a bit strange to write about the early Reagan period, since many of the
people who were shaping policy then are still influential - Donald Rumsfeld, Paul
Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith at the Pentagon; Elliott Abrams at the NSC; and
Colin Powell at the State Department. And in Israel, Ariel Sharon was defense
minister. In early 1982, Sharon came to Washington and essentially told the
Reaganites that he had a plan to intervene in Lebanon. Secretary of State
Alexander Haig came very close to giving him a green light to do so. And the
consequences of that war were long lasting and on the whole extremely
negative, both for Israel and the US, to say nothing of Lebanon and the
Palestinians.
For a brief moment, Reagan seemed to be aware that something needed to be
done for Middle East peace. His speech on Sept. 1, 1982, set out some
important principles. But it turned out that these were empty words. There was
no strategy to implement the vision laid out in that speech. As a result, the
1980s proved to be a wasted era for Arab-Israeli peacemaking, ending with the
radicalization of Palestinian youth, the intifada, and the rise of Hamas as an
alternative to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
In the Gulf region, American policy was, to say the least, confused. On the
surface, it seemed as if Reagan was playing a classic balance-of-power game.
When Iran seemed to be on the offensive, the US tilted to Iraq. Indeed,
US-Iraqi relations were resumed in the middle of the decade, and many
Americans who now only remember how terrible Saddam Hussein was as a
leader were singing him praises in those days.
The reason is obvious. Americans, on the whole, were more afraid of a strong
and militant Islamic Republic than they were of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. He, at
least, was secular, and he cleverly began to hint in the 1980s that he would
adopt a moderate stance on Israel. Many of the Reaganites also deeply hated
then-Syrian President Hafez Assad, and this was another reason for cozying up
to Iraq's Baath regime. Rumsfeld visited Saddam Hussein shortly after Iraq had
used chemical weapons against the Kurds and seems not to have mentioned
this fact. Congressmen and senators were happy to have their pictures taken
with the Iraqi leader. (I recall meeting with one congressman in 1990 who had
such a picture, but had hidden it away after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait).
In the cynical world of power politics, the tilt toward Iraq made some sense up
until about 1988. However, how could one explain Iran-Contra, the secret arms
deals with Iran in 1985-86?
Reagan wanted Iran to help with the release of American hostages held by
pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. (Some of the hostages were actually taken to
Iran and held there for part of their captivity, so Iran could hardly deny its
role). And he was happy to charge the Iranians inflated prices for arms
delivered from Israeli stockpiles and then use the proceeds to fund the Contras
in Nicaragua. But did the Reaganites ever think of the signal this duplicity sent
to countries in the Middle East? I was in Egypt at the time and met with
President Hosni Mubarak. He asked me why the US was sending arms to Iran.
At the time I was not in government and did not think that it could possibly be
true that we were doing so. But he insisted: "We know you're doing it, but we
just don't understand why."
American credibility, needless to say, took a long time to recover. One way of
trying to show that Iran-Contra was an aberration was to cozy up to Saddam
Hussein more closely than before, and to keep on doing so after the Iran-Iraq
war ended. This was another huge mistake, and may well have given the Iraqi
leader the impression that he could invade Kuwait with America's acquiescence,
if not blessing.
And then there was Afghanistan. The Reagan administration went to great
lengths to bleed the Soviet Union there. To do so, they sent arms, training and
funds to the Afghan mujahideen, cooperated closely with Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia. And when the Russians finally pulled out, they and the successor Bush
administration turned their backs on Afghanistan, leading the way for the rise of
the Taleban and the eventual emergence of Al-Qaeda as a powerful force.
Osama bin Laden owes a lot to the Reagan administration.
Without overstating the case, I think we can say that Reagan's policies
contributed to the failure to find a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict; they emboldened Saddam Hussein and continued America''s
estrangement from Iran; and they left Afghanistan a failed state to serve as an
incubator for Al-Qaeda. This is a pretty dismal legacy, and the US is still paying
the price for it.
Finally, many of the mistakes of the Reagan era were the product of deep
ignorance about the Middle East; a kind of intellectual arrogance that led people
in the administration to engage in reckless uses of force; and an excessive
deference to Israeli Likud policies, especially those of Sharon. These are
precisely the kinds of mistakes that the current Bush administration, which often
describes itself as the heir to Reaganism, has also been making. And the Bush
legacy in the region is likely to be even more negative than Reagan's
William B. Quandt, professor of politics at the University of Virgina,
was a member of the National Security Council staff during the Nixon
and Carter administrations. This article original
ly appeared in Arabic in Al-Ittihad and is published with permission in THE DAILY STAR
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