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From: "Middle East Report
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Subject: The Militarist and Messianic Ideologies
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2004 12:51:51 -0400
The Militarist and Messianic Ideologies
Neve Gordon
July 8, 2004
(Neve Gordon teaches political science at the Ben-Gurion University of
the
Negev in Israel.)
Two weeks after 60,000 Likud Party members voted against a pullout from
the
Gaza Strip, about 150,000 Israelis filled Rabin Square in Tel Aviv,
calling
on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government to proceed with the
withdrawal
plan. Those opposing the pullout from Gaza support the vision of a
Greater
Israel, while those favoring the pullout support the state of Israel.
The
first group believes that without Gaza, Israel will be destroyed; the
second
believes that with it, Israel will be destroyed.
Ironically, many of those who packed Rabin Square and today are over
40
years old also participated in a famous protest in 1982, only then
the
demonstration was against Sharon and his invasion of Lebanon, and the
plaza
was not called Rabin Square. The fact that many of those who
protested
against Sharon "the war criminal" in 1982 took to the streets
to support him
and his unilateral plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2004 warrants
an
explanation. Has Sharon undergone a metamorphosis in the 22 years
separating
these two protests or, alternatively, has the Peace Now rank and file
who
chanted in the Tel Aviv plaza changed over the years?
SHARON'S PAST
Following the establishment of the first Likud government in 1977,
Sharon
hoped that Prime Minister Menachem Begin would make him defense minister.
He
was dismayed when Ezer Weizmann received that portfolio, while he
was
appointed minister of agriculture. Soon thereafter, the peace agreement
with
Egypt began to unfold. Weizmann, who hoped to include the
Palestinians
within the accords, opposed the settlement project then underway; he
opined
that Israel should withdraw from occupied Palestinian territories within
the
framework of a peace treaty. Sharon, on the other hand, voted against
the
withdrawal from Sinai and wanted to preempt the possibility of any
future
agreement based on trading land for peace. Accordingly, as chair of
the
government's Settlement Committee, he initiated a massive
settlement
enterprise in the Occupied Territories. Whereas Israel erected 20
settlements in the West Bank between 1967 and 1976 (in addition to
those
built on confiscated Palestinian land around East Jerusalem), within
less
than four years Sharon managed to build 62 new settlements,
completely
changing the landscape of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since then,
Sharon
has been considered the father of Israel's unruly settlement
project.
Sharon's commitment to a Greater Israel, however, preceded his
political
career. While still a general in the Israeli military, Sharon created
an
alliance with Gush Emunim (in Hebrew, Bloc of the Faithful), the
highly
efficient settler movement. "I confess that I am the initiator of
the idea
of establishing Jewish settlements in the Strip," he said in a
1973
newspaper interview, right after he resigned from serving as the general
in
charge of Israel's Southern Command. Sharon went on to explain:
"I
established Kfar Darom [the first settlement in the Gaza Strip] and
I
established Netzarim, and encircled their territory with
fences."
In August 1981, Sharon became defense minister. Four years earlier, he
had
told an Israeli reporter that "the Arab states are swiftly preparing
for
war, and we are sitting on a barrel of explosives wasting our time
on
nonsense. The Arabs," he continued, "will launch a war in the
summer or the
fall." The war did not come, at least not until Sharon assumed
office. The
story of how Sharon led Israel into Lebanon, hoping to establish a
puppet
government in order to preempt attacks from the north, is by now
well-known.
Also well-known is the Sabra and Shatila massacre of September 1982, and
the
findings of the Israeli inquiry commission, headed by Chief Justice
Yitzhak
Kahan, which led to Sharon's resignation. The Kahan Commission did
not,
however, manage to change Israeli political reality. It took 17 more
years
before Israel finally withdrew its troops from Lebanon, after thousands
of
civilians and soldiers lay buried in the ground, hundreds of thousands
of
people had been displaced, and much of Lebanon was in ruins. Moreover,
the
Commission did not blame Sharon for the war or his role in the massacre,
and
he was never expelled from the political realm.
SHARON'S COMEBACK
In February 2001, 18 years after the Kahan Commission published its
findings, Sharon finally made his ultimate comeback, winning direct
elections and becoming the prime minister of Israel with an
unprecedented
62.4 percent of the vote. Two years later, he was reelected in a
landslide
victory, making him the first premier to be elected to a second term
since
Begin in 1981. Given his history in Lebanon and his more recent
notoriety
for visiting the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount under heavy armed guard
in
late September 2000, sparking Palestinian demonstrations that
mushroomed
into the second intifada, many commentators were surprised at the
avuncular
image he chose for himself during his first campaign. Is the new
Sharon,
they wondered, still the old Sharon? The prime minister's allies on
the
Israeli right wondered the same thing after he used the word
"occupation" to
describe the Israeli military presence in Palestinian towns and again
after
the promulgation of his "disengagement" plan.
But to focus on Sharon's persona is to miss the point. Over the past year
a
significant change has begun to take place in Israel, one that also helps
to
explain why the same people who protested against Sharon in 1982 flocked
to
Rabin Square in 2004 to support his withdrawal plan. The change has to
do
with a growing rift between two ideologies that for years had been
cemented
together: the messianic ideology of a Greater Israel and the
militarist
ideology of a Greater Israel. The connection of these two ideologies,
now
unraveling, had been one of the astounding historic accomplishments of
the
settler movement, Gush Emunim.
LAND AS A BRIDGE
While secular Zionism conceived the return of Jews to Palestine in
standard
Western nationalist terms, Gush Emunim's founders claimed that the heart
of
Zionism lies in following the religious duty to settle the land.
Zionism,
the leaders of Gush Emunim maintained, is not simply one national
movement
among many others, but rather a movement blooming from the revival of
Jewish
religious values. It is, as Michael Feige points out in his book One
Space,
Two Places (2002) [Hebrew], a messianic movement without a messiah,
since
the utopian vision will be realized not after the appearance of a
God-like
figure, but following the complete control of the land of biblical
Israel.
Early on, though, the movement's leaders realized that a messianic
ideology,
on its own, would not be enough to accomplish cultural and
political
hegemony in Israel, and that Gush Emunim would have to transform
the
collective Israeli consciousness if the movement were to realize
its
political objective of gaining control over Greater Israel.
Religious
rhetoric, by itself, would not justify the erection of Jewish settlements
in
the Occupied Territories to a largely secular public. Consequently,
Gush
Emunim integrated the modern nationalist discourse into its
messianic
ideology, while also adopting a militarist ideology. This is precisely
where
Sharon enters the picture.
As a secular Jew who grew up in Mapai (the precursor to the Labor
Party),
Sharon should ostensibly have had very little in common with Gush
Emunim.
Yet, the land Israel occupied in 1967 created a bond between the
military
man and the religious movement. To be sure, Sharon's connection to the
West
Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was never based on religious belief
or
messianic conviction. Rather, the attachment was informed by a
particular
military point of view that conceives of territory as the essential
ingredient of security. Even before Sharon resigned from the military,
an
alliance was born between him and Gush Emunim. The settlers' bloc aspired
to
build on the lands Israel had occupied to fulfill a religious duty,
while
Sharon thought that settlement in and control over the Occupied
Territories
was the way to secure the state of Israel. Gush Emunim provided the
cadres
for new Jewish settlements and Sharon provided both the military
justification, and, at various points in his career, the authority to
seize
lands owned by the occupied Palestinians. Not surprisingly, every time
the
legality of the settlements has been challenged before Israel's High
Court
of Justice, "security concerns," not religious edicts, have
been used to
justify the dispossession of the indigenous inhabitants.
Already in 1974, when the first government of Yitzhak Rabin sent
the
military to dismantle the Jewish outpost of Elon Moreh, Sharon, who was
no
longer in the army, protected the settlers with his own body. He told
an
Israeli reporter that it was an "immoral military command, and it
is
necessary [for soldiers] to refuse such orders. I would not have obeyed
such
orders." After years of disputes in the courts, Elon Moreh was
recognized by
the state (at an alternative location), becoming a symbol of
settler
resolve. For Sharon the command to evacuate the outpost near the West
Bank
town of Nablus was immoral because, in his view, it undermined
Israel's
security objectives; for Gush Emunim it was immoral because it frustrated
a
religious duty.
Rapidly, though, the distinction between the two ideologies was blurred
--
security concerns and fundamental religious duties were interlocked in
such
a way that it became extremely difficult to make out the difference
between
the two. Gush Emunim's ability to secularize and militarize its
messianic
aspirations is in many respects the secret behind its success in
changing
the Israeli collective consciousness and in attaining both cultural
and
political hegemony. The integration of the two ideologies also
served
Sharon's personal objectives, not least because the rabid nationalism
it
produced helped to broaden the constituency supporting him during his
races
for political office.
THE IDEOLOGICAL BREAK
For 30 years, Gush Emunim (which eventually was institutionalized
and
transformed into the Yesha Council, Yesha being the Hebrew acronym
for
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip) and Ariel Sharon were
bedfellows.
Together, they managed to accomplish a great deal. If in the early
1970s
there were no more than a few hundred Jewish settlers living in a handful
of
settlements, today one cannot travel more than a few kilometers within
the
Occupied Territories without running into a settlement. Taken together,
the
settlements house about 400,000 settlers. The settlement project has been
so
successful that several political analysts no longer consider the
two-state
solution a tenable option. Moreover, the Yesha Council's political clout
by
far exceeds the size of its constituency, in many ways resembling
the
influence wielded by the kibbutzim during the heyday of Mapai. There are
far
more members in today's Knesset favoring a Greater Israel than in
any
previous legislature, and the settler movement is probably the most
powerful
lobby group in Israel.
But while that movement's leaders may look back to the past with a sense
of
satisfaction, most of them look forward to the future with great
despair.
Speaking at Ben-Gurion University in the spring of 2004, Eliakim
Haetzni,
one of Gush Emunim's founders, told a room full of professors that
the
movement's settlement enterprise was on the verge of destruction. Israel,
he
maintained, was heading toward an abyss. This statement was, to say
the
least, perplexing to those in the room who share Haetzni's sense of
despair,
but from a diametrically opposed perspective, since they hail from
the
opposing political camp within Israel. What could explain this
shared
sensation of defeat among the mutual antagonists?
There is no doubt that Sharon's unilateral plan to dismantle the
Gaza
settlements and withdraw the troops who guard them, while closing of all
the
Strip's borders -- including access from air and sea -- is informed by
the
Greater Israel paradigm. But Sharon's notion of a Greater Israel is
founded
on militarism, as opposed to the messianic beliefs espoused by Haetzni
and
Gush Emunim. For years these two ideologies overlapped. Now, the
reemergence
of the difference between them is threatening the settlers'
hegemony.
Sharon has finally admitted that the Gaza Strip is not a military asset.
He
knows that within the Strip the Palestinians will always have a
demographic
advantage, and because the criterion informing his judgment is
ultimately
military and not religious, he is no longer willing to allocate
exorbitant
state resources to protect the handful of Jewish settlers living
there.
Advocating a withdrawal from the Strip represents the first move toward
a
divorce between the two ideologies.
Sharon's proposal, though, is also about annexation. One clause
stipulates
that areas within the West Bank "will remain part of the state of
Israel,
among them civilian settlements, military zones and places where Israel
has
additional interests." The Bush administration supported this
clause,
legitimating Sharon's request to annex de jure what has already been
annexed
de facto. The idea is to provide legal standing to almost all the
220,000
Jewish settlers living in the West Bank and the 180,000 living in
East
Jerusalem, and, in this way, reduce the possibility that they will need
to
return to Israel proper under any future agreement.
HAETZNI'S DESPAIR
Why, one might ask, did the West Bank settlers reject Sharon's
unilateral
plan? After all, in return for a pledge to relocate 7,500 settlers,
the
Israeli premier induced Bush to acknowledge the legality of 400,000
settlers
and, in this way, helped to realize the dream of a Greater Israel.
Sharon's
pledge, moreover, has only been approved in principle by the
Israeli
cabinet, and the prime minister must return to the cabinet in March
2005
before actually dismantling a single settlement.
The answer is complex. On one level, the settlers know -- better than
anyone
else -- that in the Occupied Territories the rule of law matters much
less
than facts on the ground. For the settlers, a withdrawal from Gaza
would
create a dangerous precedent. It would mark the first time since 1948
that
Jewish settlements were dismantled within the context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If settlements can be dismantled in the
Strip,
they can be uprooted in the West Bank as well. On a deeper level,
the
settler movement realizes that Sharon is creating a rift between
the
messianic and militarist ideologies. If Sharon convinces the Israeli
public
that the religious agenda is unconnected to security, the movement will
lose
much of its clout. This helps explain Haetzni's despair.
Although Sharon may have discarded the messianic ideology, he intends
to
pursue his political objectives until the very end. Accordingly, he
has
substituted for the messianic ideology a new and extremely
efficient
weapon -- the separation barrier. Made up of a series of fences,
trenches,
walls and patrol roads, the barrier was initially supposed to
separate
Israel proper from the Occupied Territories, yet it is actually being
built
deep inside Palestinian lands. It will create facts on the ground that
will
affect any future arrangement between Israel and the
Palestinians.
Although in many parts the barrier separates Palestinians from
Palestinians,
the militarist ideology has convinced the public that it is built
to
separate Israelis from Palestinians -- a classic example of an
ideological
superstructure camouflaging the material developments on the ground.
The
barrier being erected is qualitatively different from a barrier
whose
function is to demarcate a border between two countries; it is much
more
like the barriers used to create prisons. Moreover, if Sharon pulls it
off,
about 50 percent of the West Bank will be annexed to Israel and the
Palestinian "state" will be made up of a number of districts
that are not
contiguous. In apartheid-era South Africa, such regions were called
bantustans.
TRIUMPH OF MILITARIST IDEOLOGY
Tragically, many of the 150,000 peaceniks who demonstrated in support
of
Sharon's withdrawal plan also back the separation barrier and do not
really
care where it passes. Whereas Sharon may have given up on holding
100
percent of the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan, and
therefore
abandoned Gush Emunim's version of the Greater Israel ideology, many
liberal
Israelis are willing to support Sharon's 50 percent plan for a
Greater
Israel, replacing the two-state solution mantra with a new buzzword
--
"separation." The details about how to separate are not
important. All these
liberals want is an immediate divorce, and Sharon, they think, can
perform
the ceremony. In terms of militarist ideology, certain elements within
Peace
Now hold views that are in many ways similar to Sharon's.
Peace Now was founded in the late 1970s by a group of reservist
officers.
Although their aim was to pressure Israel to reach peace with Egypt and
its
other Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, these doves also
derived
inspiration from tenets underlying the Jewish state that are
non-universalistic. Peace Now ends its major rallies with Israel's
national
anthem, "Ha-Tikvah" (The Hope), which begins like this:
"As long as the
Jewish spirit is yearning deep in the heart / With eyes turned toward
the
East, looking toward Zion / Then our hope -- the 2,000-year old hope --
will
not be lost / To be a free people in our land / The land of Zion
and
Jerusalem."
These words, written in 1886 by Naphtali Herz Imber, were intended for
Jews
only and certainly exclude the 20 percent of the Israeli citizenry that
is
Palestinian. Given what transpired after the song was written, the
anthem
helps to perpetuate the Zionist myth that described the return of Jews
to
Palestine as a return of "a people without a land to a land without
a
people."
Although Peace Now avers that it recognizes the "fact that there are
two
peoples in this land, Palestinians and Jews, each with a history, claims
and
rights," in its activities the group fails to acknowledge the
1948
catastrophe of the Palestinian people, approaching the
Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as if it began in 1967.
This historical bias has helped to render the Palestinian citizens
of
Israel, as well as the pre-1967 Palestinian refugees, invisible.
Moreover,
this bias underscores Peace Now's unwillingness to confront history from
the
standpoint of the oppressed, which is a necessary component in
every
dialogic attempt to bring peace. So while Peace Now continues to
distrust
Sharon and vocally criticize his settlement policies, many of its
leaders
and cadres now support the premier's call for separation, as opposed
to
negotiation. They are also willing to "compromise" on the
amount of land
Israel returns.
What Sharon and the Israeli peaceniks who support the separation
barrier
neglect to see is that while the barrier imprisons the Palestinians, it
is
also encircling Israel, turning it, as it were, into an island, as
opposed
to a state among states in the Middle East. The crux of the matter is
that a
worldview based solely on militaristic concerns is destined to be
myopic.
Haetzni may be right to despair of his messianic vision's power to
drive
Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. But regardless of whether
Sharon
manages to implement his withdrawal plan, the vision of a Greater Israel,
as
opposed to a state of Israel, has, for the time being, triumphed.
That
triumph, in turn, helps to explain why the Israeli peace camp that does
not
support separation is also in despair.
-----
For background on the Gaza withdrawal plan, see Peretz Kidron,
"Sharon Sets
Sights on Strategic Objective," Middle East Report Online, April 14,
2004.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041404.html
For an overview of debates over the political future of
Israel-Palestine,
see Gary Sussman, "The Challenge to the Two-State Solution," in
Middle East
Report 231 (Summer 2004). The article is accessible online at:
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer231/sussman.html
Order back issues of Middle East Report, or subscribe, via a secure
server
at MERIP's home page:
http://www.merip.org
Middle East Report Online is a free service of the Middle East
Research
and Information Project (MERIP).
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