From: "Middle East Report Online" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>---End of Forwarded Message---
Subject: Orange Rampant
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2005 10:50:01 -0400
Orange Rampant
Peretz Kidron
July 15, 2005
(Peretz Kidron is a Jerusalem-based columnist for Middle East
International.)
Israel's national colors are blue and white. In the summer of 2005, however,
an Israeli driver adorning his vehicle with ribbons in those hues runs the
risk of a broken antenna or a vandal's scratches in the paint job.
Conversely, the motorist would be far safer joining what appears to be the
general trend by accepting the strips of bright orange proffered at every
main intersection by eager youngsters in orange T-shirts. Indeed, so
dominant is the orange that one may be forgiven for suspecting a mass
takeover by Protestant militants from Ulster.
Of course, nothing of the kind could happen in this self-proclaimed Jewish
state. Orange has been chosen as the campaign color of the opposition to the
upcoming Israeli "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip and the northern tip of
the West Bank. The smattering of blue-and-white ribbons is the rather
hesitant response from supporters of the planned pullout of settlers and
soldiers, now scheduled to begin on August 17. The threat of having one's
vehicle defaced may be one reason why so few moderates dare to display their
colors. (Another may be that the blue-and-white camp is largely drawn from
the left-of-center and centrist circles that harbor a long-standing dislike
for the instigator of the withdrawal, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.)
By contrast with the halfheartedness of their opponents, the orange camp is
bold and self-confident, with thousands of streamers on cars, backpacks and
purses generating the impression that theirs is the dominant voice in the
Israeli debate over disengagement. In fact, it isn't. Recent opinion polls
published in the Israeli press show that the Gaza withdrawal enjoys a clear
two-to-one majority among the Israeli public. There is nothing new in this
ratio, which has shown up consistently over recent years whenever the issue
of full or partial withdrawal from the Occupied Territories comes up. A
majority of Israelis are clearly weary of the occupation and everything it
entails.
"GOD ON THEIR SIDE"
But while that majority is largely silent and passive, a clamorous and
assertive minority refuses to consider the possibility of relinquishing
Israel's hold upon the entirety of the territories occupied in the course of
the 1967 war. For some, this refusal stems from implacable hostility toward
the Palestinians and a fundamental mistrust of their motives and long-term
intentions. Convinced that the Palestinian leadership is intent on nothing
less than "throwing the Jews into the sea," these circles believe that any
territorial concession can only fan Palestinian hopes of annihilating
Israel, reflecting fears that stand in contrast with the undisputed fact
that Israel has far and away the mightiest conventional forces in the
region, not to mention a tacitly acknowledged arsenal of 200 nuclear weapons
and the unqualified strategic backing of the United States. But a paranoia
deeply ingrained over generations of discrimination and persecution pays
little heed to verity.
Those opponents of withdrawal who cite security concerns may retain some
tenuous contact with objective realities and political specifics (the
dissolution of Israel was, after all, the professed objective of the PLO in
its early years). But the hard core of the opposition draws its motivation
from ethereal and metaphysical realms where rational discussion of pros and
cons has no place. To those true believers for whom every inch of territory
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea constitutes the "Land of
Divine Promise," there is no room for reflection or consideration. There is
only blind faith, to the degree that many of the settlers and their zealot
allies are convinced, even in the eleventh hour of mid-July, that the
withdrawal will be foiled by some unspecified twelfth-hour "miracle."
"With God on their side," underpinned with chapter and verse of Biblical
quotes, the diehard opponents of the withdrawal display unqualified fervor
in pursuit of their campaign. As an exercise in political determination, it
is indeed impressive. Tens of thousands have taken part in a variegated
assortment of protests, ranging from mass rallies and marches to a human
chain that stretched hand in hand from the Gaza settlements all the way to
the sanctified Western Wall in Jerusalem. As exemplified by the tireless
squads of youngsters extending orange ribbons at intersections throughout
the country, the campaigners can call up ample manpower for any task
required. Likewise, their financial resources seem almost unlimited, drawn
equally from the donations of wealthy patrons in Jewish communities
worldwide and from government funds skillfully (and illegally) siphoned off
from their earmarked development projects in West Bank settlements. On top
of material plenty, the settler leaders and their allies command
well-lubricated organizational structures that they wield with considerable
imagination, resourcefulness and theatrical flair. Fueled by faith and
commitment, the opposition has often seemed unstoppable.
"DIRECT ACTION"
In its earlier phases, the campaign relied mainly on persuasion to evoke
public sympathy for the Gaza "pioneers" about to be "expelled from their
homes." So effective was this tactic that much of the middle of Israel's
political spectrum wavered in its support for the pullout. Elated settler
leaders pointed to late June polls that showed the ratio of support to
opposition narrowing to as close as eight to seven; it seemed that success
lay within their grasp, and one more effort would tilt the scales in their
favor.
But the increase in public backing had already gone to the heads of the more
radical circles, who beginning on May 16 switched to "direct action,"
threatening to bring the country to a standstill unless the disengagement
plan was called off. In coordinated raids, well-drilled teams of youngsters
blocked key highways at the height of rush hour. By the time sweating
policemen managed to haul them away, traffic throughout the country was
hopelessly snarled. The tactic was repeated to lesser effect on June 27,
when convoys of orange-bedecked vehicles stopped in the middle of highway
traffic. Meanwhile, smaller groups went further, launching nocturnal forays
to padlock the gates of schools and pour glue into the locks of government
offices. Police and domestic security agencies seemed powerless to halt the
disruptions or lay their hands on ringleaders. Having given a foretaste of
the havoc they were capable of wreaking, the anonymous organizers promised
that these actions were merely a "general rehearsal" for the mayhem they
would inflict should the authorities launch the relocation plan.
The resort to these intimidating tactics, directed at the public at large,
was a grave blunder. Although the official leadership of the settlers
hastened to dissociate itself from the anarchistic young militants, the
damage was done. Tired drivers anxious to get home after a hard day's work
showed little patience for the engineered traffic jams, and the backlash was
swift. When telecasts showed footage of youthful ruffians making determined
efforts to lynch a helpless young Palestinian in Gaza on June 29, and then
clashing with police and soldiers, public tolerance ran out. Within days,
support for the settlers had dwindled to a bare 30 percent, while a clear
majority again expressed approval of the pullout. Notwithstanding the
promises of anti-disengagement organizers, there was no sea of orange in the
stands at the seventeenth Maccabiah Games, popularly known in Israel as the
"Jewish Olympics."
DUPLICITY
One would imagine that a government embarked upon a costly and controversial
enterprise would be delighted and reassured that solid public support seems
secure. In fact, that may not be entirely true. There are clear indications
that Sharon's resolute pursuit of the Gaza withdrawal carries undertones of
ambiguity, and that the frenzied opposition he is encountering is not
entirely unwelcome.
This note of duplicity has nothing to do with the small faction of ministers
from Sharon's own Likud Party -- headed by Finance Minister Benyamin
Netanyahu -- who miss no opportunity to register their reservations over the
entire project, or the party's parliamentary faction, a third of whose
members are in open revolt against the disengagement plan. In an effort to
secure his position as heir apparent to the Likud leadership, Netanyahu is
steering a prudent line, stopping just short of open defiance of Sharon
while keeping his lines of communication with the party's hardliners. Sharon
has contrived to weather the storm, treating both the settler protesters and
his rebellious party colleagues with unconcealed disdain. "I am telling you,
the [withdrawal] will be carried out even if every single road is blocked,
even if the entire country is shut down for two weeks," he said in June. "It
won't change a thing."
But even as Sharon rides roughshod over the objections of his own followers
(clearly recorded in May 2004 when a referendum of party members returned a
majority against the pullout) it seems evident that, in pulling troops and
settlers out of Gaza and the northern West Back, the prime minister is not
embarking upon a first step toward ending the occupation or implementing the
US-sponsored "road map to peace." In the early stages of the controversy,
Sharon's close confidant, Dov Weisglass, was imprudent enough to blurt out
in a press interview that the disengagement plan is "actually formaldehyde.
It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not
be a political process with the Palestinians." In other words, in going
through with the withdrawal, the ex-general Sharon is pursuing a number of
objectives, ending the occupation and achieving peace not necessarily
included.
Following the tactical manual familiar to any field commander, his first and
most immediate aim is to protect his flanks by withdrawing from positions he
knows to be vulnerable and indefensible. Indeed, sober-minded strategists
have long argued that the Gaza Strip settlements -- 7,000 Israelis embedded
in a hostile Palestinian population outnumbering them 200 to 1 -- are
untenable in the long run. In discarding them, Sharon is merely evacuating
exposed outposts whose preservation is excessively costly in manpower and
hard cash.
All the same, this tactical withdrawal is widely seen -- in Israel and in
the international community alike -- as a conciliatory step, for which
Sharon has picked up some badly needed credit. This newfound aura of
"peacenik" is reflected in the parliamentary balance, where his government
survives on the votes of his long-time adversaries of the Labor Party, and
even the left-leaning Meretz (Yahad) deputies support him against
no-confidence motions tabled by the far right. In the international arena,
the once reviled Sharon of Sabra and Shatila notoriety is once again persona
grata.
It is a fine piece of role playing. As veteran patron of Israel's
colonization drive, designed to perpetuate its hold on the Occupied
Territories, Sharon has not changed his spots -- far from it. Even as the
television cameras focus on the impending drama of the Gaza withdrawal,
Sharon is going ahead with moves to consolidate his grasp on the West Bank
heartland. While much controversy centers on whether or not completion of
the disengagement plans requires that the 1,700 settler homes in Gaza be
demolished, twice that number of housing units have been approved for
construction in West Bank settlements, in defiance of the "road map"
requirement for a total halt on expansion there. Construction of the
cement-slab barrier around "Greater Jerusalem" moves ahead at a furious
pace.
SHARON'S DRAMATIS PERSONAE
But the wiliest element of Sharon's disengagement plan actually relies on
the very opponents who campaign so vigorously to halt it. The erstwhile
followers who now miss no opportunity to revile their former hero, while
proclaiming their firm intention of going to the limits to foil his plans,
may unwittingly be playing the dramatic role for which Sharon has cast them.
With some 3,000 journalists from every corner of the globe scheduled to come
to Gaza to report on the withdrawal, television viewers worldwide are to be
riveted by heart-rending footage of entire settler families being dragged
from their homes. Cameras will focus on bearded men clinging to doorposts,
head-scarved women wailing in despair, tearful children struggling in the
arms of policemen, "right-wing refuseniks" in the army disobeying orders to
break down barricaded doors. A prelude came in late June, when Cpl. Avi
Bieber abandoned an army unit tearing down already evacuated settler houses
in Gaza. Israeli newspapers across the political spectrum ran a picture of
Bieber yelling at his commander: "Jews do not expel Jews!" The denouement to
this saga will be a tearjerker on a scale to make Hollywood green with envy,
and the message will go out loud and clear: if this is the price Israel has
to pay to remove 7,000 settlers, who would dare to demand the displacement
of the quarter million residing in the West Bank?
That this is the scenario Sharon has in mind is suggested by the way the
opposition is being handled by authorities not famous for their tolerance of
dissent. Mere weeks ahead of the planned relocation, militants from the West
Bank settlements -- the ferocious "youngsters of the hilltops" -- were
streaming into the Gaza villages, until finally checked by the army
roadblocks which control every access route. The Gaza Strip is under
military control, and the local commander has the authority -- regularly
invoked to halt Israeli and Palestinian anti-occupation protesters -- to
proclaim a "closed military zone" into which entry is forbidden. That
measure was belatedly and reluctantly imposed, but only after hundreds of
militant reinforcements had poured in with the avowed intention of putting
up violent resistance to the army and police.
In a further show of forbearance, the young zealots who have repeatedly
blocked key highways throughout Israel are treated with kid-glove mildness
by a police force that employed gunfire against Arab protesters who dared to
do likewise in the early days of the 2000 intifada: 13 were killed, dozens
injured. Israeli leftists and peace campaigners, whose non-violent protests
encounter systematic beating and tear-gassing by police riot units, can only
look on in envy as young rioters are hauled off the jammed roads by
policemen taking evident care to avoid subjecting them to pain or
discomfort.
Sharon launched his disengagement plan with multiple objectives in mind. The
rival camps, whether conveying their views in orange or in blue and white,
each have a role to play in their attainment. The blue-and-whites provide
much needed public support for the mid-August relocation of settlers and
soldiers. But the orange camp will also come in handy if or when Sharon
comes under pressure to undertake further withdrawals.
-----
For background on the split between Sharon and his erstwhile supporters in
the settler movement, see Neve Gordon, "The Militarist and Messianic
Ideologies," Middle East Report Online, July 8, 2004.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070804.html
For a critical view on Israel's post-disengagement strategy, see Gary
Sussman, "Ariel Sharon and the Jordan Option," Middle East Report Online,
March 2005.
http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/sussman_interv.html
Middle East Report Online is a free service of the Middle East Research
and Information Project (MERIP).
.
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