Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/24/special-report-negligence-crip ples-fight-against-terrorism.html
http://www.thejakartapost.com/jakartapost_logo.jpg Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com) Special Report: Negligence cripples fight against terrorism , , | Fri, 07/24/2009 1:56 PM | National The recent bombings of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta were an ominous reminder that terrorists still view Indonesia as a prime regional location for launching attacks against their *enemies'. The Jakarta Post's Rendi A. Witular and Lilian Budianto explore the problems still facing Indonesian security forces as they come to grips with the fact that the threat of terrorism is far from over. Despite encountering similar problems during his posting as chief political and security minister, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono seems to have lacking sense of urgency to immediately bring together various law enforcement and intelligence bodies under one unified and sustainable counterterror measure. Since the 2002 Bali bombing, Indonesia's counterterrorism measures have largely been dependant on an ad hoc covert operation run by an unofficial police terrorist surveillance unit, Satgas Anti-Terror. Run by less than 50 personnel taken from a range of police divisions, and unofficially coordinated by senior terrorist expert Comr. Gen. Goris Mere, Satgas is the only surveillance and intelligence unit working in the field to persistently track down terrorist networks across the country. Intelligence gathered by Satgas is then forwarded to the police's counterterror unit Detachment 88 for further investigation. Aside from Satgas, there is still no specific office that works to prevent terrorism by coordinating various resources at the security and defense agencies. "It's not surprising that such partial and unsustainable measures for combating terrorist threats have led to the failure of the intelligence community in preventing terrorist attacks," said former police Bambang Widodo Umar, who is also a lecturer at a higher education institute for police officers (PTIK). "The police are basically working alone without receiving any support from other intelligence agencies," said Bambang. Questions have been raised over the function of other Indonesian intelligence units, notably the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), and what role they actually play assisting Satgas and the police in tracking down terrorists. There are several other institutions involved in counterterrorism efforts as well, including the Counterterrorism Desk at the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, the military's Intelligence Strategic Agency (BAIS), the Attorney General Office's counterterror unit and the military's three counterterror squads. However, because these intelligence units do not operate under the guide of a single specific agency, communication between the organizations is poor and their efforts uncoordinated. Existing regulations on combating terrorism require the government to expand the function of the Counterterror Desk and transform it into a special Counterterror Agency. The proposed agency should have the full authority to launch crackdowns on terrorist sanctuaries and coordinate sustainable intelligence gathering for preventive measures. In February 2007, the House of Representatives' Commission I for defense and security affairs officially called for the President to immediately form such agency. The Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, has formulated a draft regulation for the creation of the agency, which has been waiting for approval from the President ever since. Despite this, the Counterterror Desk, which is supposed to manage and coordinate intelligence data, remains powerless and tucked away in a corner of the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. "The Desk is supposed to coordinate the functioning of counterterrorist operations, but frankly speaking, it becomes difficult if we ever want to coordinate *with other departments*," said the desk head, Ansyaad Mbai. "It is crucial that we form this Counterterror Agency immediately in order to establish who is actually in charge of coordinating preventive measures, managing the crisis, and pooling together all resources from the military, police, and even hospital and fire departments." The police and the Counterterror Desk have cited difficulties when trying to gain access to intelligence data from the Indonesian Military (TNI) intelligence, which experts claim is the best in the country. TNI spokesman Rear Air Marshal Sagom Tamboen said military intelligence, notably gathered by BAIS, was mostly related to defense matters, not security. However, in order to pass any intelligence information from BAIS onto the police, BIN or Counterterror Desk, he claimed the agency would first need prior approval from the TNI commander. Aside from poor coordination and bureaucracy, the fight against terrorism is also undermined by the fact that there is no systematic or sustainable program in place to rehabilitate former terrorist convicts. Sr. Comr. Benny Jozua Mamoto, who has been a senior terrorism investigator since the 2002 Bali bombing, wrote in his doctorate thesis in August 2008 that concerted efforts should be made to re-educate convicted terrorists in order to erode their radicalism. Another major reason for rehabilitation, he argued, is that without it the former convicts could be lured again into committing future acts of terrorism. As of 2007, there were 408 convicted terrorists in Indonesia, with nearly 60 percent undergoing a rehabilitation and re-education program run by Satgas. Due to a lack of funding and infrastructure, the rest have been ignored. Still, the rehabilitation measures by the Satgas is by nature partial and unofficial. "If these incomplete measures continue to make up Indonesia's fight against terror, I bet the President will be repeating his condemnation speech of another *terrorist* attack not too long in the future," said Bambang. What should be done 1. A Counterterror Agency should be formed to oversee coordination and ensure a sustainable and comprehensive surveilance measures in fighting terrorism. 2. Interrogation processes should be extended from the current seven days (under counterterror law) to one month, in which suspects cannot access lawyers. This is aimed at identifying terrorist networks and detecting future attacks. 3. Detention of terrorist suspects before their trial should be extended to a maximum of one year from the current 100 days. During this process the suspects can be put through a rehabilitation program. 4. Systematic and sustainable rehabilitation and re-education program for terrorist convicts and suspects in a bid to help eradicate their radicalism. 5. Localizing a detention center for terrorist suspects and charged offenders. 6. Overhaul the current criteria for identification cards (ID), and impose a single identity number for each citizen, in order to prevent ID fraud. 7. Making intelligence data available as evidence in court. 8. Concerted reform efforts at the police and the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Source: Ansyaad Mbai, doctorate thesis of Sr. Comr. Benny Mamoto, Bambang Widodo Umar, and other experts. Copyright C 2008 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved. _____ Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/24/special-report-negligence-crip ples-fight-against-terrorism.html ---------- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.392 / Virus Database: 270.13.28/2259 - Release Date: 07/24/09 18:24:00 [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
