Title: [145602] branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore
Revision
145602
Author
[email protected]
Date
2013-03-12 15:49:44 -0700 (Tue, 12 Mar 2013)

Log Message

Merged r129583.  <rdar://problem/13335073>

Modified Paths

Diff

Modified: branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore/ChangeLog (145601 => 145602)


--- branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore/ChangeLog	2013-03-12 22:39:02 UTC (rev 145601)
+++ branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore/ChangeLog	2013-03-12 22:49:44 UTC (rev 145602)
@@ -1,5 +1,25 @@
 2013-03-12  Lucas Forschler  <[email protected]>
 
+        Merge r129583
+
+    2012-09-25  Justin Schuh  <[email protected]>
+
+            Mask RenderArena freelist entries.
+            https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97494
+
+            Reviewed by Julien Chaffraix.
+
+            This is a mitigation for freelist spraying. See http://download.crowdstrike.com/papers/hes-exploiting-a-coalmine.pdf.
+
+            No new tests. This is a hardening measure. Found no measurable performance impact with Dromaeo.
+
+            * rendering/RenderArena.cpp:
+            (MaskPtr):
+            (WebCore::RenderArena::allocate):
+            (WebCore::RenderArena::free):
+
+2013-03-12  Lucas Forschler  <[email protected]>
+
         Merge r129186
 
     2012-09-20  Levi Weintraub  <[email protected]>

Modified: branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderArena.cpp (145601 => 145602)


--- branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderArena.cpp	2013-03-12 22:39:02 UTC (rev 145601)
+++ branches/safari-536.30-branch/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderArena.cpp	2013-03-12 22:49:44 UTC (rev 145602)
@@ -42,6 +42,23 @@
 
 #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
 
+#ifdef NDEBUG
+// Mask freelist pointers to detect corruption and prevent freelist spraying.
+// We use an arbitray function and rely on ASLR to randomize it.
+// The first value in RenderObject (or any class) is a vtable pointer, which always
+// overlaps with the next pointer. This change guarantees that the masked vtable/next
+// pointer will never point to valid memory. So, we should immediately crash on the
+// first invalid vtable access for a stale RenderObject pointer.
+// See http://download.crowdstrike.com/papers/hes-exploiting-a-coalmine.pdf.
+static void* MaskPtr(void* p)
+{
+    // The bottom bits are predictable because the binary is loaded on a boundary.
+    // This just shifts most of those predictable bits out.
+    const uintptr_t mask = ~(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(WTF::fastMalloc) >> 13);
+    return reinterpret_cast<void*>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(p) ^ mask);
+}
+#endif
+
 namespace WebCore {
 
 #ifndef NDEBUG
@@ -103,7 +120,7 @@
         result = m_recyclers[index];
         if (result) {
             // Need to move to the next object
-            void* next = *((void**)result);
+            void* next = MaskPtr(*((void**)result));
             m_recyclers[index] = next;
         }
     }
@@ -143,7 +160,7 @@
         const int index = size >> 2;
         void* currentTop = m_recyclers[index];
         m_recyclers[index] = ptr;
-        *((void**)ptr) = currentTop;
+        *((void**)ptr) = MaskPtr(currentTop);
     }
 #endif
 }
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