On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 9:48 PM, Tobias Gondrom <[email protected]> wrote:
> www.links.org/files/CertificateAuthorityTransparencyandAuditability.pdf > > https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/sovereign-keys-proposal-make-https-and-email-more-secure > > From my perspective this does not conflict with but could complement the > current pinning and HSTS approach. I have been tangentially involved in the SK proposal (I worked with Peter at EFF), and CT is partly motivated by SK. I *think* I speak for all of us when I say that we regard public key pinning as a useful short-term mitigation, but that some kind of public log system is The Real Solution. I agree there is no conflict, and that the approaches are complementary. Once The Real Solution is in place, we should be able to let go of short-term mitigations like pinning. Whether or not HSTS is "merely" a short-term mitigation that would be superceded by The Real Solution, I don't know. It might well turn out that we will always need to distinguish between "HTTPS is available, and make sure you use the right public keys" and "HTTPS is mandatory, and make sure you use the right public keys". Obviously, HTTPS should be universal, making the available/mandatory distinction meaningless. But until then... _______________________________________________ websec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/websec
