On 15/05/16 10:22, Yoav Nir wrote:
That’s interesting. With HPKP you can pin keys from existing certificates, or
keys that are not (yet) in certificates.
One of the early deployment scenarios (which got de-emphasized later on) was
that you include two pins: your current production key and a spare key that you
will certify if something bad happens to the production key (like the private
key leaking out).
Hi Yoav,
I had assumed this *is* the main deployment scenario. If it was de-emphasized, what do
you consider as the "classic" HPKP usage scenario?
Current certificate plus some CA certificate that you are likely to use to
certify your next certificate.
Yoav
But this too means that you're guessing how the CA will behave in the
future. If your current cert is expiring in a month and you generate the
new one, you can be surprised by the CA using a new intermediate cert.
And of course, some people would never pin to a CA cert. To me, the
whole idea of certificate pinning is to reduce the need to trust the PKI
industry, and that includes my own friendly CA.
Thanks,
Yaron
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