Very well, I just deactivated the gadget from the Spanish Wikipedia and
removed the now broken template from the two articles that used it, until
some decision is made about it. I shared my views at
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:OWID_Gadget#Three_ideas, in case
anyone's interested. Kind regards,

On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 2:50 PM James Heilman <jmh...@gmail.com> wrote:

> The other option would be to have a copy of the OWID software on our own
> servers (it is all openly licensed). We tried this sort of with the OWID
> mirror which you can see here on the wmcloud
>
> https://owidm.wmcloud.org/
>
> And functional within a mediawiki install here
>
> https://mdwiki.org/wiki/WikiProjectMed_talk:OWID/Archive_1
>
> From what I understand moving in this direction would require the software
> running on production servers with WMF staff support and maintance.
>
> We have already uploaded all the data that makes these graphs to Commons
> by the way.
>
> James
>
> On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 11:11 AM Amir Sarabadani <ladsgr...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> (Not Andy, but a global interface admin in my volunteer capacity)
>> Hi,
>> The difference is that here the third party code is being run under the
>> context of Wikipedia. That means even with sandboxing mitigation such as
>> iframe (which has been broken before), it's much easier to break out and
>> collect user credentials such as session information or run any arbitrary
>> action on behalf of the users. While, opening a link explicitly is
>> protected by browsers to make sure they won't be able to access cookies in
>> wikimedia or run arbitrary code on behalf of the user targetting wikimedia
>> projects. That's not impossible to break but it's much much harder (and
>> zero day bugs of this type are in range of millions of dollars). That's why
>> it's recommended to avoid opening unknown links or if you really have to,
>> open them in services such as "Joe's sandbox". What I'm saying is that it's
>> making it easier and cheaper to attack users.
>>
>> The second aspect is trust. Users understand links go to external website
>> we don't control but a dialog is not enough to convey wikimedia's lack of
>> control. People might assume the code or security has been vetted by
>> wikimedia which is not the case. It's worth noting that the click through
>> rate for SSL/TLS security warnings for Chrome was 70% (
>> https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity13/sec13-paper_akhawe.pdf).
>> Even in many cases where it was a legitimate "man in the middle attack". It
>> got better since 2013 but it's still quite high.
>>
>> Another aspect is that, it basically this turns OWID into a target for
>> what's called "watering hole attacks" (
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watering_hole_attack). This is similar to
>> what happened to MeDoc, a tax helper app where it got compromised to launch
>> NotPetya, one of the most devastating cyber attack ever recorded (
>> https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/
>> ).
>>
>> It also brings to question of users data being transferred. As far as I
>> know (I might be very wrong), we instruct browsers not to provide referer
>> information to target websites (via noreferrer attribute) so they can't see
>> any information that the user has clicked on Wikipedia while that's no
>> longer the case here and no way to prevent that from happening (I might be
>> wrong again. Writing this on phone).
>>
>> Last but not least, I'm seriously worried about the impact of this change
>> on wikis where editors are in countries that don't have a good track record
>> of respecting human rights. Breaking iframe or compromising OWID is not
>> something a basic hacker can do but it's not hard to do for an APT or a
>> government with deep pockets. That's why I urge you (as a fellow volunteer)
>> to remove this.
>>
>> Hope that helps,
>> Obviously my own ideas and limited knowledge. Not on behalf of WMF or the
>> security team.
>>
>> Best
>>
>> James Heilman <jmh...@gmail.com> schrieb am Fr., 26. Apr. 2024, 22:16:
>>
>>> Hey Andy
>>>
>>> How is the risk any different than having a reference for a graph that
>>> includes a url which links to OWID? When one clicks on such a url it brings
>>> you to OWID and shares your IP address with them. We have millions of
>>> references that include urls without warnings or consent before loading.
>>>
>>> James
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 1:44 PM Galder Gonzalez Larrañaga <
>>> galder...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello Andy,
>>>> There was a solution involving adding the software to our own platform
>>>> instead of loading it. It was dismissed by the Wikimedia Foundation. It's
>>>> not disappointment the word I'm looking for.
>>>>
>>>> Best
>>>>
>>>> Galder
>>>>
>>>> 2024(e)ko api. 26(a) 21:38 erabiltzaileak hau idatzi du (
>>>> acoo...@wikimedia.org):
>>>>
>>>> Hello everyone,
>>>>
>>>> I’m Andy Cooper, the Director of Security at the Wikimedia Foundation.
>>>> Over the past week, teams within the Wikimedia Foundation have met to
>>>> discuss the potential legal, security, and privacy risks from the OWID
>>>> gadget introduced on this thread. We’re still looking into the risks that
>>>> this particular gadget presents, but have identified that it raises larger
>>>> and more definite concerns around gadgets that use third party websites
>>>> more broadly, such as in a worst case scenario theft or misuse of user’s
>>>> personal identity and edit history. This, in turn, raises further questions
>>>> and how we should govern and manage this type of content as a movement.
>>>>
>>>> As a result, we’re asking volunteers to hold off on enabling the OWID
>>>> gadget on more wikis and to refrain from deploying more gadgets that use
>>>> third party content and/or are automatically enabled for all users for
>>>> certain pages until we have a better review process in place. I realize
>>>> that this is frustrating for people here who have been working on OWID and
>>>> are excited about it as a work around while graphs are disabled. The
>>>> creativity and effort of volunteer developers has been and continues to be
>>>> crucial for our movement’s success, and part of our team’s job is to make
>>>> sure that happens in scalable and responsible ways. We wanted to let
>>>> everyone here know about these concerns right away while we work to better
>>>> understand the issue. If you’d like to be further involved in this topic,
>>>> please visit the new Meta-Wiki page [1] where we’ll share updates,
>>>> questions, and discuss next steps.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> [1] https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/OWID_Gadget
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> James Heilman
>>> MD, CCFP-EM, Wikipedian
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>
> --
> James Heilman
> MD, CCFP-EM, Wikipedian
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