Sorry, I missed the obvious venue. This is at the Indian Institute of
Science campus, Bangalore. Department of Computer Science and Automation
(CSA).

best wishes
Shyamal


On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 2:08 PM, Srikanth Ramakrishnan <
srik.r...@wikimedia.in> wrote:

> Shyamal, where is this?
> I'm interested.
>
> Sent from the touchscreen equivalent of a Nokia 1100, pardon the sender.
> --
> Srikanth Ramakrishnan,
> Treasurer.
> On Dec 11, 2013 1:43 PM, "Shyamal L." <lshya...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Department of Computer Science and Automation
>> Ph.D. Thesis Defense
>>
>>
>> Speaker             :  Mr. Swaprava Nath
>> Title               :  Mechanism Design for Strategic Crowdsourcing
>> Faculty Advisor     :  Prof.  Y. Narahari
>>
>>
>> Date                :  Tuesday, December 17, 2013
>> Time                :  11:30 AM
>> Venue               :  CSA Multimedia Class (Room No. 252, First Floor)
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>> This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using
>> game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise
>> from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time.
>>
>>
>> The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational
>> technologies has made this task easier and given birth to a new era of
>> online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as
>> crowdsourcing. Two important
>> features of crowdsourcing are: (a) crowdsourcing
>> is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent
>> and they experience a payoff in some form through their participation, and
>> (b) the participants are connected over a social network. To understand
>>
>>
>> the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to
>> understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In the thesis,
>> we have considered the following three major facets of the crowdsourcing
>> problem.
>>
>>
>> (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers:
>> as the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is
>> important to determine if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the
>> highest quality.
>>
>>
>> (ii) Resource critical task execution:  due to the diverse geographical,
>> cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain
>> manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design
>> has to
>> be robust enough to handle fake identities or information provided
>> by the crowd.
>>
>> (iii) Improving the productivity of the crowdsourcing network: as the
>> designer's goal is to maximize some measurable output of the crowdsourcing
>>
>>
>> system, an interesting question is how one can design the network and/or
>> the incentive scheme so that the system performs at the optimal level
>> considering the strategic nature of the individuals.
>>
>> In the thesis, we provide novel solutions to all the questions above
>>
>>
>> using game theoretic modeling and mechanism design innovations. Our
>> investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability,
>> and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more
>> efficient.
>>
>>
>>
>> ALL ARE WELCOME
>>
>>
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