Interesting Shyamal! I will be there. Thanks for posting this. -Sowmyan
> Ph.D. Thesis Defense > > > > > > Speaker : Mr. Swaprava Nath > > Title : Mechanism Design for Strategic Crowdsourcing > > Faculty Advisor : Prof. Y. Narahari > > > > Date : Tuesday, December 17, 2013 > > Time : 11:30 AM > > Venue : CSA Multimedia Class (Room No. 252, First Floor) > Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore > > > Abstract > > > > This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using > > game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise > > from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. > > > > The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational > > technologies has made this task easier and given birth to a new era of > > online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as > > crowdsourcing. Two important > > features of crowdsourcing are: (a) crowdsourcing > > is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and > intelligent > > and they experience a payoff in some form through their participation, > and > > (b) the participants are connected over a social network. To understand > > > > the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to > > understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In the thesis, > > we have considered the following three major facets of the crowdsourcing > > problem. > > > > (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: > > as the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is > > important to determine if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the > > highest quality. > > > > (ii) Resource critical task execution: due to the diverse geographical, > > cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain > > manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design > > has to > > be robust enough to handle fake identities or information provided > > by the crowd. > > > > (iii) Improving the productivity of the crowdsourcing network: as the > > designer's goal is to maximize some measurable output of the > crowdsourcing > > > > system, an interesting question is how one can design the network and/or > > the incentive scheme so that the system performs at the optimal level > > considering the strategic nature of the individuals. > > > > In the thesis, we provide novel solutions to all the questions above > > > > using game theoretic modeling and mechanism design innovations. Our > > investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, > > and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more > > efficient. > > > > > > ALL ARE WELCOME > > > > >
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