On Tue, 14 Jan 2014, at 3:32, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 11:46 PM, Gryllida <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Mon, 13 Jan 2014, at 15:29, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> >> What freenode does is not functionally useful for Tor users. In my
> >> first hand experience it manages to enable abusive activity while
> >> simultaneously eliminating Tor's usefulness at protecting its users.
> >
> > The "register at real IP, then only use TOR through an account" flow
> > implies trust in some entity (such as freenode irc network opers or
> > Wikipedia CheckUsers). I currently believe that requiring such trust
> > doesn't "eliminate TOR's usefullness at protecting its users".
>
> I rather think it does. Assume a person under continual surveillance.
> If they have to reveal their true IP address to Wikipedia in order to
> register their editor account, the adversary will learn it as well,
> and can then attribute all subsequent edits by that handle to that
> person *whether or not* those edits are routed over an anonymity
> network.
Doesn't it get solved if, despite the "surveillance", the trust entity
("freenode opers" or "wikipedia checkusers") reveals the user's IP only under a
court order?
>
> To satisfy Applebaum's request, there needs to be a mechanism whereby
> someone can edit even if *all of their communications with Wikipedia,
> including the initial contact* are coming over Tor or equivalent.
Rubbish. This makes a vandal inherently untrackable and unblockable.
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