This is particularly important for non-Wikimedia instances of
MediaWiki, by the way.

(e.g. on RationalWiki there's a cultural thing of "everyone is a
sysop!" but the interface/JS editing rights are restricted to a much
smaller "tech" group who are trusted not to be silly)


- d.



On 19 March 2018 at 08:51, Derk-Jan Hartman
<d.j.hartman+wmf...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On a side note. Have we looked recently at decoupling the site wide
> JS/CSS rights from the edit interface right ? It has always seemed a
> bit weird to me that we had both these things in MediaWiki namespace,
> but the more we are closing down raw HTML in MediaWiki namespace, the
> weirder it becomes. Even if we would assign those rights to mostly the
> same groups, it would give some more healthy options in the long term.
> We've made a similar split in the user namespace (for much more
> practical reasons of course). But I think that shouldn't stop us from
> doing the same for global stuff.. We could even consider finding some
> way to detect raw html messages and have them subject to the same
> right..
>
> We have https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T120886 but i'm not sure if
> anyone gave it any serious consideration in the past 2,5 years..
>
> DJ
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 6:57 PM, Alex Monk <kren...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> You'd have to stop stewards from loading site-wide JS, gadgets, as well as
>> removing their ability to have their user JS from pulling in JS from other
>> sites/users/etc. somehow.
>>
>> Trying to restrict it would probably lead to a backlash from communities
>> that would make superprotect look like a joke. I suspect that if such a
>> feature were proposed today, it would never be given to local users, but
>> reserved for globally trusted people like developers. Local sysops are not
>> necessarily (or maybe even usually) technically skilled, and communities do
>> not appear to realise the amount of power that editinterface actually gives
>> you, and that code written with it may frequently be executed by people
>> with rights that the community would consider superior, like
>> steward/oversight/checkuser/bureaucrat.
>>
>> I would not tell them not to worry about it.
>>
>> On Fri, 16 Mar 2018, 17:33 Leon Ziemba, <musikani...@wikimedia.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Sorry to slightly sidetrack this discussion, but someone recently asked me
>>> if it were possible to modify a steward's user JS so that it granted them
>>> advanced rights like steward/checkuser/oversight. This of course is
>>> possible, but very rare since you need to be a sysop to edit these JS
>>> pages. The point this person was making to me however was that on smaller
>>> wikis it can be easy to become a sysop, and it's probable that by nature
>>> stewards will show up there occasionally, and that their own personal JS
>>> may not be closely watched. I told them not to worry about it, but if we
>>> really wanted to do something, we could make a steward's JS only be mutable
>>> by other stewards (or something).
>>>
>>> Maybe something else to think about?
>>>
>>> ~Leon
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Eran Rosenthal <eranro...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Lego already did a script to verify no external resources are loaded:
>>> > https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T71519
>>> > I think there is a Jenkins job running it on regular basis
>>> >
>>> > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 6:30 AM, MZMcBride <z...@mzmcbride.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > David Gerard wrote:
>>> > > >What ways are there to include user-edited JavaScript in a wiki page?
>>> > > >
>>> > > >[...]
>>> > > >
>>> > > >You can't see it now, but it was someone including a JavaScript
>>> > > >cryptocurrency miner in common.js!
>>> > > >
>>> > > >Obviously this is not going to be a common thing, and common.js is
>>> > > >closely watched. (The above edit was reverted in 7 minutes, and the
>>> > > >user banned.)
>>> > > >
>>> > > >But what are the ways to get user-edited JavaScript running on a
>>> > > >MediaWiki, outside one's own personal usage? And what permissions are
>>> > > >needed? I ask with threats like this in mind.
>>> > >
>>> > > There's an old post of mine that documents some of the ways to inject
>>> > > site-wide JavaScript:
>>> > > <https://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikimedia-l/2014-
>>> > August/073787.html
>>> > > >
>>> > >
>>> > > I believe, as Brian notes in this thread, that most methods require
>>> > having
>>> > > the "editinterface" user right so that you can edit wiki pages in the
>>> > > "MediaWiki" namespace. By default, this user right is assigned to the
>>> > > "sysop" user group, but if you search through
>>> > > <https://noc.wikimedia.org/conf/InitialiseSettings.php.txt> for the
>>> > string
>>> > > "editinterface", you can see that on specific wikis such as fawiki,
>>> this
>>> > > user right has been assigned to additional user groups.
>>> > >
>>> > > Jon Robson wrote:
>>> > > >It has always made me a little uneasy that there are wiki pages where
>>> > > >JavaScript could potentially be injected into my page without my
>>> > approval.
>>> > > >To be honest if I had the option I would disable all site and user
>>> > scripts
>>> > > >for my account.
>>> > >
>>> > > You could file a Phabricator task about this. We already specifically
>>> > > exempt certain pages, such as Special:UserLogin and
>>> Special:Preferences,
>>> > > from injecting custom JavaScript. We could potentially add a user
>>> > > preference to do what you're suggesting.
>>> > >
>>> > > That said, you're currently executing thousands upon thousands of lines
>>> > of
>>> > > code on your computer that you've never read or verified. If you're a
>>> > > standard computer user, you visit hundreds of Web sites per year that
>>> > each
>>> > > execute thousands of lines of untrusted scripts that you've never read
>>> or
>>> > > verified. Of all the places you're likely to run into trouble,
>>> Wikimedia
>>> > > wikis are, in many ways, some of the safest. Given all of this code,
>>> your
>>> > > computer, as well as mine, are vulnerable to dozens of very real
>>> attacks
>>> > > at any time. And yet we soldier on without too much panic or worry.
>>> > >
>>> > > >Has this sort of thing happened before?
>>> > >
>>> > > Salon.com recently prompted users with ad blocking software installed
>>> to
>>> > > voluntarily mine cryptocurrency: <https://arstechnica.com/?p=1259653>.
>>> > > This situation on fa.wikipedia.org was obviously involuntary. I don't
>>> > know
>>> > > of any similar incidents. We have had wiki administrators inadvertently
>>> > > inject scripts with privacy issues, such as Google Analytics. These
>>> > > scripts have generally been promptly removed when noticed. On the other
>>> > > hand, pages such as <https://status.wikimedia.org/> have been loading
>>> > the
>>> > > same problematic scripts (Google Analytics and JavaScript from
>>> > > ajax.googleapis.com) for years and nobody seems to have cared enough
>>> > yet.
>>> > >
>>> > > >Can we be sure there isn't a gadget, interface page that has this sort
>>> > of
>>> > > >code lurking inside? Do we have any detection measures in place?
>>> > >
>>> > > A much surer bet is that at least some gadgets and other site-wide
>>> > > JavaScript have privacy issues and potentially security issues. It
>>> would
>>> > > be shocking if, across the hundreds of Wikimedia wikis, none of them
>>> did.
>>> > >
>>> > > I think in the past Timo and maybe Alex Monk have done some surveying
>>> of
>>> > > public Wikimedia wikis using a browser or browser emulator to check if
>>> > > there are network requests being made to non-Wikimedia domains. As
>>> Lucas
>>> > > noted in this thread already, there are also tasks such as
>>> > > <https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T135963> that could be worked on,
>>> if
>>> > > there's sufficient interest.
>>> > >
>>> > > MZMcBride
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > _______________________________________________
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>>> > > https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l
>>> > >
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