This is particularly important for non-Wikimedia instances of MediaWiki, by the way.
(e.g. on RationalWiki there's a cultural thing of "everyone is a sysop!" but the interface/JS editing rights are restricted to a much smaller "tech" group who are trusted not to be silly) - d. On 19 March 2018 at 08:51, Derk-Jan Hartman <d.j.hartman+wmf...@gmail.com> wrote: > On a side note. Have we looked recently at decoupling the site wide > JS/CSS rights from the edit interface right ? It has always seemed a > bit weird to me that we had both these things in MediaWiki namespace, > but the more we are closing down raw HTML in MediaWiki namespace, the > weirder it becomes. Even if we would assign those rights to mostly the > same groups, it would give some more healthy options in the long term. > We've made a similar split in the user namespace (for much more > practical reasons of course). But I think that shouldn't stop us from > doing the same for global stuff.. We could even consider finding some > way to detect raw html messages and have them subject to the same > right.. > > We have https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T120886 but i'm not sure if > anyone gave it any serious consideration in the past 2,5 years.. > > DJ > > > On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 6:57 PM, Alex Monk <kren...@gmail.com> wrote: >> You'd have to stop stewards from loading site-wide JS, gadgets, as well as >> removing their ability to have their user JS from pulling in JS from other >> sites/users/etc. somehow. >> >> Trying to restrict it would probably lead to a backlash from communities >> that would make superprotect look like a joke. I suspect that if such a >> feature were proposed today, it would never be given to local users, but >> reserved for globally trusted people like developers. Local sysops are not >> necessarily (or maybe even usually) technically skilled, and communities do >> not appear to realise the amount of power that editinterface actually gives >> you, and that code written with it may frequently be executed by people >> with rights that the community would consider superior, like >> steward/oversight/checkuser/bureaucrat. >> >> I would not tell them not to worry about it. >> >> On Fri, 16 Mar 2018, 17:33 Leon Ziemba, <musikani...@wikimedia.org> wrote: >> >>> Sorry to slightly sidetrack this discussion, but someone recently asked me >>> if it were possible to modify a steward's user JS so that it granted them >>> advanced rights like steward/checkuser/oversight. This of course is >>> possible, but very rare since you need to be a sysop to edit these JS >>> pages. The point this person was making to me however was that on smaller >>> wikis it can be easy to become a sysop, and it's probable that by nature >>> stewards will show up there occasionally, and that their own personal JS >>> may not be closely watched. I told them not to worry about it, but if we >>> really wanted to do something, we could make a steward's JS only be mutable >>> by other stewards (or something). >>> >>> Maybe something else to think about? >>> >>> ~Leon >>> >>> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Eran Rosenthal <eranro...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > Lego already did a script to verify no external resources are loaded: >>> > https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T71519 >>> > I think there is a Jenkins job running it on regular basis >>> > >>> > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 6:30 AM, MZMcBride <z...@mzmcbride.com> wrote: >>> > >>> > > David Gerard wrote: >>> > > >What ways are there to include user-edited JavaScript in a wiki page? >>> > > > >>> > > >[...] >>> > > > >>> > > >You can't see it now, but it was someone including a JavaScript >>> > > >cryptocurrency miner in common.js! >>> > > > >>> > > >Obviously this is not going to be a common thing, and common.js is >>> > > >closely watched. (The above edit was reverted in 7 minutes, and the >>> > > >user banned.) >>> > > > >>> > > >But what are the ways to get user-edited JavaScript running on a >>> > > >MediaWiki, outside one's own personal usage? And what permissions are >>> > > >needed? I ask with threats like this in mind. >>> > > >>> > > There's an old post of mine that documents some of the ways to inject >>> > > site-wide JavaScript: >>> > > <https://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikimedia-l/2014- >>> > August/073787.html >>> > > > >>> > > >>> > > I believe, as Brian notes in this thread, that most methods require >>> > having >>> > > the "editinterface" user right so that you can edit wiki pages in the >>> > > "MediaWiki" namespace. By default, this user right is assigned to the >>> > > "sysop" user group, but if you search through >>> > > <https://noc.wikimedia.org/conf/InitialiseSettings.php.txt> for the >>> > string >>> > > "editinterface", you can see that on specific wikis such as fawiki, >>> this >>> > > user right has been assigned to additional user groups. >>> > > >>> > > Jon Robson wrote: >>> > > >It has always made me a little uneasy that there are wiki pages where >>> > > >JavaScript could potentially be injected into my page without my >>> > approval. >>> > > >To be honest if I had the option I would disable all site and user >>> > scripts >>> > > >for my account. >>> > > >>> > > You could file a Phabricator task about this. We already specifically >>> > > exempt certain pages, such as Special:UserLogin and >>> Special:Preferences, >>> > > from injecting custom JavaScript. We could potentially add a user >>> > > preference to do what you're suggesting. >>> > > >>> > > That said, you're currently executing thousands upon thousands of lines >>> > of >>> > > code on your computer that you've never read or verified. If you're a >>> > > standard computer user, you visit hundreds of Web sites per year that >>> > each >>> > > execute thousands of lines of untrusted scripts that you've never read >>> or >>> > > verified. Of all the places you're likely to run into trouble, >>> Wikimedia >>> > > wikis are, in many ways, some of the safest. Given all of this code, >>> your >>> > > computer, as well as mine, are vulnerable to dozens of very real >>> attacks >>> > > at any time. And yet we soldier on without too much panic or worry. >>> > > >>> > > >Has this sort of thing happened before? >>> > > >>> > > Salon.com recently prompted users with ad blocking software installed >>> to >>> > > voluntarily mine cryptocurrency: <https://arstechnica.com/?p=1259653>. >>> > > This situation on fa.wikipedia.org was obviously involuntary. I don't >>> > know >>> > > of any similar incidents. We have had wiki administrators inadvertently >>> > > inject scripts with privacy issues, such as Google Analytics. These >>> > > scripts have generally been promptly removed when noticed. On the other >>> > > hand, pages such as <https://status.wikimedia.org/> have been loading >>> > the >>> > > same problematic scripts (Google Analytics and JavaScript from >>> > > ajax.googleapis.com) for years and nobody seems to have cared enough >>> > yet. >>> > > >>> > > >Can we be sure there isn't a gadget, interface page that has this sort >>> > of >>> > > >code lurking inside? Do we have any detection measures in place? >>> > > >>> > > A much surer bet is that at least some gadgets and other site-wide >>> > > JavaScript have privacy issues and potentially security issues. It >>> would >>> > > be shocking if, across the hundreds of Wikimedia wikis, none of them >>> did. >>> > > >>> > > I think in the past Timo and maybe Alex Monk have done some surveying >>> of >>> > > public Wikimedia wikis using a browser or browser emulator to check if >>> > > there are network requests being made to non-Wikimedia domains. As >>> Lucas >>> > > noted in this thread already, there are also tasks such as >>> > > <https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T135963> that could be worked on, >>> if >>> > > there's sufficient interest. >>> > > >>> > > MZMcBride >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > _______________________________________________ >>> > > Wikitech-l mailing list >>> > > Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org >>> > > https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l >>> > > >>> > _______________________________________________ >>> > Wikitech-l mailing list >>> > Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org >>> > https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Wikitech-l mailing list >>> Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org >>> https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l >> _______________________________________________ >> Wikitech-l mailing list >> Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org >> https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l > > _______________________________________________ > Wikitech-l mailing list > Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org > https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l _______________________________________________ Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l