2009/1/25 Ben Klein <shackl...@gmail.com>: > Wine's goal is perfectly clear: to provide, as best as possible, a > complete and accurate implementation of win32 (and win64 long-term) > and related APIs. If putting invalid data into a specific function > causes a known crash on the only other implementation of win32 > (Microsoft Windows), especially considering that win32 is standardised > by the same company that produces Windows, it can be assumed that the > crash is the correct behaviour and Wine should emulate it.
Is it possible to meaningfully enhance Wine by crashing the app, but in such a way as to note on the terminal that the crash is for compatibility with Win32, what crashed where, etc? > No, it's dooming Wine to have more success than it should have. Big > difference. In implementing win32 API, Wine inherently opens up *nix > to a whole new world of malware. Sure, it still needs to be explicitly > run by the user, sure there is "wineserver -k" and "rm -rf ~/.wine", > but that won't stop spyware, trojans, worms etc. completely. And it > shouldn't, because if Wine attempts to stop malware, then legitimate > applications will surely suffer too. Not to mention legitimate > software that *acts* like malware, e.g. punkbuster :) Wine running malware correctly is a valuable feature, e.g. ZeroWine: http://www.offensivecomputing.net/?q=node/1028 It runs malware in Wine on Debian on QEMU for the purpose of producing a full trace of all Win32 calls. - d.
