I made some comments initially, but then I siezed to continue. This man does
not worth any respect even in reading what he writes. I am very astonished how
Americans are keeping such crap people continue to babble around them, as if
the facts and events never showed to date how idiot he/ they is/ are.
S1000+
PS/ Surely NYT pays him. I believe 3 dollars are more than enough for this
article.
p-Ed Contributor | Transitions
One Surge Does Not Fit All
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writePost();new_york_times:http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/opinion/23rumsfeld.html
By DONALD H. RUMSFELD
Published: November 22, 2008
THE surge in Iraq has been one of the most
impressive military accomplishments in recent years. It has been so
successful that the emerging consensus is that what may now be needed
in Afghanistan is a similar surge of American forces. President-elect
Barack Obama campaigned on his intention to do so, as did his former
opponent, John McCain.
S1000+ comment:
I am very astonished about this stupid guy. How come a country like USA makes
such an idiot babbles and continues to lie in this cheap selfish crap and
blind manner. Just like another Fox News reporter .. of BS to the end.. S1000+
As one who is occasionally — and incorrectly — portrayed as an
opponent of the surge in Iraq, I believe that while the surge has been
effective in Iraq, we must also recognize the conditions that made it
successful. President Bush’s bold decision to deploy additional troops
to support a broader counterinsurgency strategy of securing and
protecting the Iraqi people was clearly the right decision. More
important, though, it was the right decision at the right time. By early 2007,
several years of struggle had created the new conditions for a tipping point:
Comment by S1000+
New York Times and Rumsfeld thinks that we are narrowly idiots on all scales..
As if all the hearing of the generals were not broadcasted all over the world
through which we came to know that Rumsfeld insisted on minimizing the number
of troops to occupy Iraq, against all the reputable recommendations. It was
then evident that he wanted to make more money through his links with the
Security companies like Blackwater. And his only way to create the need for
them was to minimize troops number. But he was careless about Iraq stability or
the lives of the American soliders as consequent of that. He is so bold in
lying. S1000+
Al Qaeda in Iraq’s campaign of terrorism and intimidation had
turned its Sunni base of support against it. The result was the
so-called Anbar Awakening in the late summer of 2006, followed by
similar awakening movements across Iraq. • From 2003
through 2006, United States military forces, under the leadership of
Gen. John Abizaid and Gen. George Casey, inflicted huge losses on the
Baathist and Qaeda leadership. Many thousands of insurgents, including
the Qaeda chief in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, were captured or killed
and proved difficult to replace. • The Iraqi Security
Forces had achieved cohesion, improved operational effectiveness and
critical mass. By December 2006, some 320,000 Iraqis had been trained,
equipped and deployed, producing the forces necessary to help hold
difficult neighborhoods against the enemy. By 2007, the surge, for most
Iraqis, could have an Iraqi face. • And the political
scene in Iraq had shifted. Moktada al-Sadr, the firebrand cleric,
declared a cease-fire in February 2007. The government of Prime
Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, seated in May 2006, moved against
militias and Iranian-backed militias and has imperfectly, but notably,
rejected narrow sectarian policies.
The best indication that
timing is everything may be that there had been earlier surges without
the same effect as the 2007 surge. In 2005, troop levels in Iraq were
increased to numbers nearly equal to the 2007 surge — twice. But the
effects were not as durable because large segments of the Sunni
population were still providing sanctuary to insurgents, and Iraq’s
security forces were not sufficiently capable or large enough.
The
decision to conduct a surge came out of an interagency review in the
fall of 2006. By mid-December, as I was leaving the Pentagon, there was
a rough consensus in the Defense Department that deploying additional
combat brigades to Iraq was the right step. Some military leaders
raised reasonable questions about the potential effectiveness of a
surge, in part because of a correct concern that military power alone
could not solve Iraq’s problems. I agreed, and emphasized that a
military surge would need to be accompanied by effective diplomatic and
economic “surges” from other departments and agencies of the American
government, and by considerably greater progress from Iraq’s elected
leaders.
During my last weeks in office, I recommended to
President Bush that he consider Gen. David Petraeus as commander of
coalition forces in Iraq, as General Casey’s tour was coming to an end.
General Petraeus and his deputy, Gen. Ray Odierno, had the experience
and skill to recognize and exploit the seismic shifts that were taking
place in Iraq’s political landscape. And United States troops had the
courage to win the alliance of Iraq’s people against a common enemy —
and the benevolence to win their friendship.
At the critical
moment — a moment when the Iraqis were able and willing to be part of
the surge with the American forces — the United States surged into Iraq
with the right commanders, additional forces and a fresh operational
approach rooted in years of on-the-ground experience. Americans can be
proud of what has been accomplished in Iraq over the last five-plus
years. They should also be impressed by the results of the surge,
which, thus far, has outstripped expectations, including mine.
President Bush’s decision to increase combat troop levels in Iraq in
January 2007 sent a clear message that he was determined not to abandon
a people to death squads and terrorists. We will need the same
commitment to helping the people of Afghanistan succeed, but that does
not mean we will achieve it with the same tactics or strategies.
The way forward in Afghanistan will need to reflect the current
circumstances there — not the circumstances in Iraq two years ago.
Additional troops in Afghanistan may be necessary, but they will not,
by themselves, be sufficient to lead to the results we saw in Iraq. A
similar confluence of events that contributed to success in Iraq does
not appear to exist in Afghanistan.
What’s needed in
Afghanistan is an Afghan solution, just as Iraqi solutions have
contributed so fundamentally to progress in Iraq. And a surge, if it is
to be successful, will need to be an Afghan surge.
Left
unanswered in the current debate is the critical question of how
thousands of additional American troops might actually bring long-term
stability to Afghanistan — a country 80,000 square miles larger than
Iraq yet with security forces just one-fourth the size of Iraq’s.
Afghanistan also lacks Iraq’s oil and other economic advantages. It is
plagued by the narcotics trade. Its borders are threatened by terrorist
sanctuaries in Pakistan. Fractured groups of Pashtun tribesmen on both
sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border do not yet appear willing to
unite and take on the insurgents in their midst, as Arab tribes did in
Iraq.
Further, Afghanistan has a long history of defeating
foreign armies that sought strength in numbers. The Soviet Union tried
to occupy Afghanistan with hundreds of thousands of troops — and
withdrew, defeated and broken. More United States troops could raise
tensions, particularly in Afghanistan’s Pashtun south, where the
insurgency is strongest.
Only capable indigenous forces can
ultimately win an insurgency. Afghan forces, backed by coalition
troops, will need to move into the most violent areas to secure and
protect the local population, enabling Afghans to cooperate with their
government without losing their lives. To do this, the size of
the Afghan National Army will need to be increased well beyond its
70,000 or so troops and its training accelerated. More American forces
will need to undertake the unglamorous work of embedding with Afghan
soldiers as advisers, living and fighting together. Kingpins and senior
facilitators in the thriving poppy industry that helps to fuel the
insurgency will need to be treated as military targets, as Qaeda and
Taliban leaders are. Reconstruction projects should be focused on
provinces and towns that are cooperating with the Afghan government,
instead of making blanket commitments to increase foreign assistance
across Afghanistan and possibly fostering a culture of dependence.
The
current suggestion of “opening negotiations” with the Taliban may well
win over some low- and mid-level supporters, but if history is any
guide, offering the hand of peace to hardened fanatics is not likely to
prove successful. Aggressive action against Taliban and Qaeda
sanctuaries in Pakistan will need to continue. Pakistani officials will
have to isolate any factions in their military and intelligence
services that are sympathetic to the Taliban. In a few weeks,
the new commander in chief, Barack Obama, will assume the
responsibility of leading a nation at a time of war. Time and
flexibility are the two constants of military success. In a struggle
with an adaptable, thinking enemy, there is no single template for
success. More is not always better. One size does not fit all.
The
singular trait of the American way of war is the remarkable ability of
our military to advance, absorb setbacks, adapt and ultimately triumph
based upon the unique circumstances of a given campaign. Thus it has
been throughout our history. And thus it will be in Iraq and
Afghanistan, if we have the patience and wisdom to learn from our
successes, and if our leaders have the wherewithal to persevere even
when it is not popular to do so.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/opinion/23rumsfeld.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=rumsfeld&st=cse&oref=slogin
=======
S1000+
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