Thanks Stephen. To explain ... when I suggested a profiling activity, I had in
mind to describe the subset of PKIX that is actually used in the Web PKI (as
well as non-conformant variations). For instance, I don't believe any
publicly-trusted CAs issue delta CRLs or that any browsers use OCSP nonces. If
this is true, then it isn't recorded in any one place. I had in mind to record
those facts. And, there are - no doubt - many other features of RFC 5280 that
are not exercised in the Web PKI. Do that seem appropriate to you?
All the best. Tim.
-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Farrell [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2012 4:33 PM
To: Tim Moses
Cc: '[email protected]'
Subject: Re: [wpkops] First draft charter proposal
Thanks Tim for that.
I agree with Ron - that's a really good start, but does need work.
My initial thoughts on that:
- I think the milestone list you presented is too detailed for a charter,
especially at this point. But I'd say that can be left for now though until the
overall scope is clearer. So fix that later and let's try focus on the scope
for now.
- I'm not sure that omitting code signing is a good plan, since the same
libraries and trust anchors are used and code-signing has been a recent attack
vector of note. Omitting document signing and email seems ok to me though as
those are much more enterprisey things, but HTTPS and code-signing are both
common on the public Internet. So I'd like to understand that better.
- I think the putative OPS WG ought document deployed stuff as you say, but beyond that its scope ought be
explicitly limited to developing (at most) use-cases and/or requirements for any new protocol. So I'm not at
all sure how to interpret some of the deliverables you envisage. For example, what's the "certificate,
CRL, and OCSP profile" document? If that means "invent a new profile" then I have a problem
with that. If it means "document deployed deviations from 5280/2560" then that'd be fine I think
but then it ought have a different name.
- As Ron said, the IETF doesn't do product evaluations but I think that's an easy one,
just include in scope documenting the behaviour of "recent" browsers, web
servers and (I guess) relevant middleboxen, so long as they have non-trivial deployment.
Cheers,
S.
On 08/22/2012 01:44 PM, Tim Moses wrote:
Colleagues - Here is a first draft of a charter proposal. Please give it some
thought and share the results of your deliberations. Thanks a lot. All the
best. Tim.
The Web PKI is the set of systems and procedures most commonly used to protect
the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of communications between Web
browsers and Web content servers. It first appeared in 1993 or thereabouts and
has developed continuously in a somewhat organic fashion since then. Across
all the suppliers and the point releases of their products, there are now
hundreds of variations on the Web PKI in regular use. And this can be a source
of problems both for end-users and certificate issuers.
For end-users, there is no clear view whether certificate "problems" remain when they see indication of a
"good" connection. For instance, in some browsers, a "good" indication may be displayed when a
"revoked" response has been received and "accepted" by the user. Whereas, other browsers may refuse to
display the contents under these circumstances.
And for issuers, it can be difficult to predict what proportion of the user
population will accept a certificate chain with certain characteristics. For
instance, when a browser includes a nonce in an OCSP request but the server
supplies a response that does not include the nonce, it is hard to know which
browsers will accept and which will reject the response.
Starting from the premise that more consistency in Web security behavior is
desirable, a natural first step would be to document current and historic
browser and server behavior.
Future activities may attempt to prescribe how the Web PKI "should" work, and the
prescription may turn out to be a proper subset of the PKIX PKI. However, that task is explicitly
not a goal of the proposed working group. Instead, the group's goal is merely to describe how the
Web PKI "actually" works in the set of browsers and servers that are in common use today.
Additionally, a number of applications (other than the Web) may use the same
trust anchors as the ones used by the Web. These applications include:
document signing; code signing; and email. They may use PKI in a way that
differs from the way in which the Web uses it. Therefore, these applications
are explicitly out of scope for the working group.
Also, the reliability of the Web PKI depends critically on the practices of its
certificate issuers. However, the topic of practices is outside the scope of
the IETF. Therefore, this will be left to other competent bodies.
That there are technical shortcomings with Web PKI, as it is practiced today,
is well recognized. And, that there is also some urgency in addressing these
shortcomings is also well recognized. But, it is felt that too much haste can
be counter-productive. The expectation is that the work of this group will
bring to light, in a systematic way, aspects of the Web PKI that should be
progressed in future working groups of the IETF's Security Area, and that
suppliers will be willing to participate in those working groups and modify
their products to comply with their standards.
Given the urgency of the required developments and the scale of the task, it is
agreed that adherence to the published schedule should take precedence over
completeness of the results. The working group should focus its initial
attention on the browser and server versions that make up the largest part of
the desktop and mobile Web today.
The output documents will all be BCP-style RFCs.
1. Agree the working group charter (1 month).
2. Catalog the products and versions to be analyzed (1 month).
3. First WG draft of "trust model" document (4 months).
4. First WG draft of "public-key submission and certificate installation"
document (4 months).
5. First WG draft of "certificate, CRL, and OCSP profile" document (8
months).
6. First WG draft of "certificate, CRL, and OCSP processing" document (12
months).
7. First WG draft of "certificate re-issuance" document (4 months).
8. First WG draft of "certificate renewal" document (4 months).
9. First WG draft of "certificate revocation" document (8 months).
10. IESG submission of "trust model" document (16 months).
11. IESG submission of "public-key submission and certificate installation"
document (16 months).
12. IESG submission of "certificate, CRL, and OCSP profile" document (20
months).
13. IESG submission of "certificate, CRL, and OCSP processing" document (24
months).
14. IESG submission of "certificate re-issuance" document (16 months).
15. IESG submission of "certificate renewal" document (16 months).
16. IESG submission of "certificate revocation" document (20 months)
The schedule is predicated upon the group's ability to recruit a sufficient
number of editors and engage either the relevant product experts or other
experts willing to test the selected product configurations.
T: +1 613 270 3183
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