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Date : 2017/01/02 17:28
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Hostname : HSI-KBW-078-043-090-159.hsi4.kabel-badenwuerttemberg.de
Old Revision: http://wiki.x2go.org/doku.php/doc:howto:tce?rev=1483377899
New Revision: http://wiki.x2go.org/doku.php/doc:howto:tce
Edit Summary: [What options are available under FURTHER-OPTIONS-GO-HERE?]
User : stefanbaur
@@ -450,9 +450,9 @@
* ''broker-url=ssh:<nowiki>//</nowiki>your-broker-address-here'' - this
allows you to specify an X2Go Session Broker instead of a sessions file (not limited to an
ssh-based broker, works with an http-based broker as well)
=== These are entirely optional ===
* ''xorg-resolution=HRESxVRES'' - will force the horizontal resolution to
HRES and the vertical resolution to VRES, e.g. ''xorg-resolution=1280x1024'',
useful if autodetection for the correct
screen size fails, but you do get as far as seeing the X2Go GUI
- *
''xorgconfurl=tftp|http|https|ftp://your-http-server-ip-here/x2go-tce/x2go-tce.xorg.conf''
- when a client outright refuses to boot into the graphical X2Go login screen,
but gets stuck at the console or a black screen instead, yet you can get the
GUI to work using a regular Linux on the same hardware, you can disable the X
Server's autodetection and force it to use the xorg.conf specified here. Note
that you should use a more descriptive name for the file, as described below.
Also note that whoever manages to spoof the server name can inject rogue xorg
config files into your ThinClients. To mitigate this risk, use HTTPS, where
the attacker would have to spoof both server name and matching certificate.
+ *
''xorgconfurl=tftp|http|https|ftp://your-http-server-ip-or-dns-here/x2go-tce/x2go-tce.xorg.conf''
- when a client outright refuses to boot into the graphical X2Go login screen,
but gets stuck at the console or
a black screen instead, yet you can get the GUI to work using a regular Linux
on the same hardware, you can disable the X Server's autodetection and force it
to use the xorg.conf specified here. Note that you should use a more
descriptive name for the file, as described below. Also note that whoever
manages to spoof the server name can inject rogue xorg config files into your
ThinClients. To mitigate this risk, use HTTPS, where the attacker would have
to spoof both server name and matching certificate.
*
''pubkey=tftp|http|https|ftp://your-http-server-ip-or-dns-here/x2go-tce/x2go-tce.authorized_keys''
- Allows you to add an ssh public key file to the ThinClient, so your
administrators can log in remotely using SSH. Note that this file needs to be
chmodded 644, not 600, on the web server. **Attention: Whoever manages to
spoof this server name will have root access to your ThinClients. Using HTTPS
will mitigate this - an attacker would not only have to spoof the server name,
but
also the matching certificate.**
* ''xinerama=left-of|right-of|above|below|same-as'' - Allows you to specify how
multiple screens are handled (same-as clones the primary screen to all secondary screens,
the other commands will cascade and thus expand the screen). Note that the current
implementation will enforce "same-as" if it detects a touch screen driver
(wacom) and no other pointing device. This is so you won't get stuck being unable to log
off, for example, due to your touch device being limited to one screen.
* ''ldap=ldap.example.com:389:cn=cngoeshere,dc=example,dc=com'' - this
allows you to specify an LDAP server to authenticate against
* ''ldap1=ldap-backupserver-1.example.com:389'' - this allows you to specify
the first of up to two LDAP backup servers when using LDAP authentication
--
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