On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 4:04 PM Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> wrote: > > On 07/05/2025 10:42 am, Frediano Ziglio wrote: > > Ross Lagerwall (4): > > xen/lib: Export additional sha256 functions > > kexec: Include purgatory in Xen > > kexec: Implement new EFI load types > > kexec: Support non-page-aligned kexec segments > > I realise a lot of this is coming from kexec-tools and/or Linux, but it > looks very very mad. > > From patch 1, we're embedding this in Xen: > > xen.git/xen/arch/x86/purgatory$ ls -lah purgatory.ro > -rw-r--r-- 1 andrew andrew 30K May 9 15:24 purgatory.ro > > yet -Wa,--strip-local-absolute alone halves the size: > > xen.git/xen/arch/x86/purgatory$ ls -lah purgatory.ro > -rw-r--r-- 1 andrew andrew 17K May 9 15:25 purgatory.ro > > Looking at purgatory itself, we enter at purgatory_start, load a local > GDT, set up a local stack, call into C for the hashing (and nothing > else), then jmp to entry64... > > ... which loads a (different) local GDT, (different) local stack, loads > the GPRs and then jumps into the new kernel. > > Combined with kexec_reloc(), that's 3x we change GDT and stack in > several hundred instructions. > > > Looking further at patch 2, we only set up 3 GPRs; %rip, %rsp and %rdi > pointing the parameter block. > > Patch 2 also contains an a large amount of EFI-editing logic (all > vulnerable to XSA-25), which AFAICT exists only because purgatory is > built non-PIC and wants relocating. I can't see any external > references, or anything that couldn't be resolved at link time for a PIC > build. > > > There are two things which purgatory does which Xen doesn't currently > cater for: > > 1) Setting up the GPRs in that manner > 2) The digest checks > > #1 is very easy to fix and can probably even be done on the current ABI > (older Kexecs using purgatory won't care), and #2 ought to be easy too > by extending machine_kexec(). We can do the digest checks > unconditionally (it's a sensible check irrespective). >
I think the problem of #2 is that doing in the purgatory avoids problems like possible memory corruptions. For instance if the host is crashing due to some corruption it could not always be possible to boot the saved kernel. > I think that removes the majority of this series, with no loss in > functionality? > > Given that we're leaving the signature check to the dom0 kernel (which > is TCB and therefore can in the UEFI-SB model), we just might be able to > get away without any hypercall changes at all? > Yes and no. The user space could not provide the purgatory. But if the kernel is providing it, preventing the user space to send it, I suppose it can be done. At this point however the question is how to change the interface provided to userspace for doing it. It could make sense to have the changes in xen/include/public/kexec.h and let the kernel do the rest. > Thoughts? > > ~Andrew Frediano
