> On 21.12.2015 at 9:23pm, <jbeul...@suse.com> wrote: > >>> On 21.12.15 at 14:08, <quan...@intel.com> wrote: > >> On 21.12.2015 at 8:50pm, <jbeul...@suse.com> wrote: > >> >>> On 21.12.15 at 13:28, <quan...@intel.com> wrote: > >> > On 21.12.2015 at 7:47pm, <jbeul...@suse.com> wrote: > >> >> >>> On 20.12.15 at 14:57, <quan...@intel.com> wrote:
1. > >> > IMO, When VT-d is enabled, but is not working correct. These PCI-e > >> > devices > >> > (Disks/NICs..) DMA/Interrupt behaviors are not predictable. > >> > Assumed that, VT-d is effectively not in use for domains without PT > >> > device, while at least the virtualization infrastructure is not trusted. > >> > I think it is also not secure to run PV domains. > >> > 2. > >> > IMO, a VT-d (IEC/Context/Iotlb) flush issue is not a single domain > >> > behavior, it is a Hypervisor and infrastructure issue. > >> > ATS device's Device-TLB flush is a single domain issue. > >> > Back to our original goal, my patch set is for ATS flush issue. right? > >> One quick question, Jan, do you agreed the above 2 descriptions? Quan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
