>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojoc...@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> +long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
> + const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
> + const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8)
> access_list,
> + uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
> + unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> + struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
> + long rc = 0;
> +
> + /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
> + if ( altp2m_idx )
> + {
> + if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
> + d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
> + }
> +
> + p2m_lock(p2m);
> + if ( ap2m )
> + p2m_lock(ap2m);
> +
> + while ( start < nr )
> + {
> + p2m_access_t a;
> + uint8_t access;
> + uint64_t gfn_l;
> +
> + copy_from_guest_offset(&gfn_l, pfn_list, start, 1);
> + copy_from_guest_offset(&access, access_list, start, 1);
Coverity validly complains about the missing error checks here
(IDs 1373105 and 1373106). I have no idea how none of us who
have looked at the patch noticed this before it went in, but please
submit a fix (mentioning the two IDs).
Jan
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