With suitable canonical address checks added these can also be used in
do_set_segment_base().
Also with a canonical address check now in place, there's no need for
priv_op_write_msr() to use wrmsr_safe() anymore.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2613,9 +2613,9 @@ static int priv_op_write_msr(unsigned in
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE:
- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) || !is_canonical_address(val) ||
- wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, val) )
+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) || !is_canonical_address(val) )
break;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, val);
curr->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_user = val;
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
@@ -1037,24 +1037,33 @@ long do_set_segment_base(unsigned int wh
switch ( which )
{
case SEGBASE_FS:
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_FS_BASE, base) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
+ if ( is_canonical_address(base) )
+ {
+ wrfsbase(base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = base;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case SEGBASE_GS_USER:
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, base) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
+ if ( is_canonical_address(base) )
+ {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_user = base;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL:
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_GS_BASE, base) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
+ if ( is_canonical_address(base) )
+ {
+ wrgsbase(base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = base;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL:
x86: make more use of wr{f,g}sbase()
With suitable canonical address checks added these can also be used in
do_set_segment_base().
Also with a canonical address check now in place, there's no need for
priv_op_write_msr() to use wrmsr_safe() anymore.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2613,9 +2613,9 @@ static int priv_op_write_msr(unsigned in
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE:
- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) || !is_canonical_address(val) ||
- wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, val) )
+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) || !is_canonical_address(val) )
break;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, val);
curr->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_user = val;
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
@@ -1037,24 +1037,33 @@ long do_set_segment_base(unsigned int wh
switch ( which )
{
case SEGBASE_FS:
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_FS_BASE, base) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
+ if ( is_canonical_address(base) )
+ {
+ wrfsbase(base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = base;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case SEGBASE_GS_USER:
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, base) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
+ if ( is_canonical_address(base) )
+ {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_user = base;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL:
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_GS_BASE, base) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
+ if ( is_canonical_address(base) )
+ {
+ wrgsbase(base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = base;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL:
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
