On 22/01/18 22:45, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: > On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 01:32:44PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote: >> As a preparation for doing page table isolation in the Xen hypervisor >> in order to mitigate "Meltdown" use dedicated stacks, GDT and TSS for >> 64 bit PV domains mapped to the per-domain virtual area. >> >> The per-vcpu stacks are used for early interrupt handling only. After >> saving the domain's registers stacks are switched back to the normal >> per physical cpu ones in order to be able to address on-stack data >> from other cpus e.g. while handling IPIs. >> >> Adding %cr3 switching between saving of the registers and switching >> the stacks will enable the possibility to run guest code without any >> per physical cpu mapping, i.e. avoiding the threat of a guest being >> able to access other domains data. >> >> Without any further measures it will still be possible for e.g. a >> guest's user program to read stack data of another vcpu of the same >> domain, but this can be easily avoided by a little PV-ABI modification >> introducing per-cpu user address spaces. >> >> This series is meant as a replacement for Andrew's patch series: >> "x86: Prerequisite work for a Xen KAISER solution". >> >> What needs to be done: >> - verify livepatching is still working > > Is there an git repo for this?
https://github.com/jgross1/xen.git xpti Juergen _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
