In the original change I neglected to consider the case of us running as L1 under another Xen. In this case we're not Dom0, so the underlying Xen wouldn't permit us access to these MSRs. As an immediate workaround use rdmsr_safe(); I don't view this as the final solution though, as the original problem the earlier change tried to address also applies when running nested. Yet it is then unclear to me how to properly address the issue: We shouldn't generally expose the MSR values, but handing back zero (or effectively any other static value) doesn't look appropriate either.
Fixes: bfcdaae9c210 ("x86/AMD: expose SYSCFG, TOM, TOM2, and IORRs to Dom0") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t goto gp_fault; if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) ) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; - rdmsrl(msr, *val); + if ( rdmsr_safe(msr, *val) ) + goto gp_fault; if ( msr == MSR_K8_SYSCFG ) *val &= (SYSCFG_TOM2_FORCE_WB | SYSCFG_MTRR_TOM2_EN | SYSCFG_MTRR_VAR_DRAM_EN | SYSCFG_MTRR_FIX_DRAM_EN);