Hi Julien,

> On 31 Aug 2021, at 15:47, Julien Grall <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 31/08/2021 14:17, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>> Hi Julien,
> 
> Hi Bertrand,
> 
>>> On 27 Aug 2021, at 16:05, Julien Grall <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hi Bertrand,
>>> 
>>> On 25/08/2021 14:18, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>>> Sanitize CTR_EL0 value between cores.
>>>> In most cases different values will taint Xen but if different
>>>> i-cache policies are found, we choose the one which will be compatible
>>>> between all cores in terms of invalidation/data cache flushing strategy.
>>> 
>>> I understand that all the CPUs in Xen needs to agree on the cache flush 
>>> strategy. However...
>>> 
>>>> In this case we need to activate the TID2 bit in HCR to emulate the
>>>> TCR_EL0 register for guests. This patch is not activating TID2 bit all
>>>> the time to limit the overhead when possible.
>>> 
>>> as we discussed in an earlier version, a vCPU is unlikely (at least in 
>>> short/medium) to be able move across pCPU of different type. So the vCPU 
>>> would be pinned to a set of pCPUs. IOW, the guest would have to be 
>>> big.LITTLE aware and therefore would be able to do its own strategy 
>>> decision.
>>> 
>>> So I think we should be able to get away from trappings the registers.
>> I do agree that we should be able to get away from that in the long term once
>> we have cpupools properly set but right now this is the only way to have
>> something useable (I will not say right).
>> I will work on finding a way to setup properly cpupools (or something else as
>> we discussed earlier) but in the short term I think this is the best we can 
>> do.
> 
> My concern is you are making look like Xen will be able to deal nicely with 
> big.LITTLE when in fact there are a lot more potential issue by allow a vCPU 
> moving accross pCPU of different type (the errata is one example).

I agree and this is why Xen is tainted.

> 
>> An other solution would be to discard this patch from the serie for now until
>> I have worked a proper solution for this case.
>> Should we discard or merge or do you have an other idea ?
> Please correct me if I am wrong, at the moment, it doesn't look like this 
> patch will be part of the longer plan. If so, then I think it should be 
> parked for now.

Not sure it depends on what the final solution would be but this is highly 
possible I agree.

> 
> This would also have the advantage to avoid spending too much time on 
> resolving the emulation issue I mentioned in my previous answer.
> 
> No need to resend a new version of this series yet. You can wait until the 
> rest of the series get more feedback.

Ok, I will wait for feedback and next serie will not include this patch anymore.

> 
> [...]
> 
>> If we get interrupted, someone could program CSSELR differently and the next 
>> read
>> will not be reflecting what the guest actually wants to do
> 
> AFAICT, CSSELR is preserved during the context switch of vCPU. So that 
> someone would have to be Xen, right?
> 
> If so, what you describe would also be an issue even if we didn't trap the 
> register. Therefore, if Xen would ever use CSSELR, then that code would need 
> to save the value, use the register and then restore the value with 
> preemption disabled.

I could just remove the comment, I added it as information, but if you think it 
is misleading no problem.

Anyway as we will park this for now no need to discuss that further.

Cheers
Bertrand

> 
>> The code is not preemptible right now so this cannot be an issue but I added 
>> the
>>  comment more as a warning.
>> This is not something from the documentation, this is because value written
>> in CSSELR is defining what is read from CCSIDR
>>> 
>>>> +            WRITE_SYSREG(v->arch.csselr, CSSELR_EL1);
>>>> +            set_user_reg(regs, regidx, READ_SYSREG(CCSIDR_EL1));
>>>> +        }
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> -- 
> Julien Grall


Reply via email to