On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 12:38:24PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote: > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 18:07 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote: > > > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > > [...] > > > > > This looks like a bad idea: you're duplicating the secure boot > > > > check in > > > > > > > > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c > > > > > > > > Which is an implementation of policy. If we have to have policy in > > > > the kernel, it should really only be in one place to prevent drift; > > > > why can't you simply use the libstub efi_get_secureboot() so we're > > > > not duplicating the implementation of policy? > > > > > > Well, here is the first version of this patch: > > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/9/496 Ard did not like it. I was not > > > happy too. In general both approaches are not perfect. More you can > > > find in the discussion around this patchset. If you have better idea > > > how to do that I am happy to implement it. > > > > One way might be simply to have the pre exit-boot-services code lay > > down a variable containing the state which you pick up, rather than you > > Do you mean variable in kernel proper or something like that? If yes this > is not possible. EFI Linux stub is not executed in Xen dom0. All UEFI > infrastructure is owned and operated by Xen. Dom0 kernel can access some > stuff in UEFI, including variables, via hypercall. However, when dom0 > runs only UEFI runtime services are available. > > > calling efi code separately and trying to use the insecure RT > > I am not sure why they are insecure. > > > variables. That way there's a uniform view of the internal kernel > > secure boot state that everyone can use. > > That would be perfect but I have a feeling that in form proposed above > it is not possible.
Ping? Daniel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xenemail@example.com https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel