> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: 18 May 2018 14:34
> To: Paul Durrant <[email protected]>
> Cc: Anthony Perard <[email protected]>; Roger Pau Monne
> <[email protected]>; Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>; xen-
> devel <[email protected]>; [email protected];
> [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Paolo
> Bonzini <[email protected]>; Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] xen-hvm: stop faking I/O to access PCI
> config space
>
> >>> On 18.05.18 at 15:00, <[email protected]> wrote:
> > @@ -903,6 +926,80 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(ioreq_t *req)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +static void rw_config_req_item(XenPciDevice *xendev, ioreq_t *req,
>
> It looks to me as if both parameters could be constified.
>
They could for this function, yes.
> > + uint32_t i, uint32_t *val)
> > +{
> > + int32_t reg = req->addr;
> > + uint32_t offset = req->size * i;
> > +
> > + reg += (req->df ? -1 : 1) * offset;
> > + if (reg < 0 || reg > PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE) {
>
> Having fought a number of issues in this area in the hypervisor a couple
> of years back I wonder
> - why reg is of signed type,
I did that so I could do a < 0 check.
> - whether overflow of the first multiplication really doesn't matter,
It would be better to check it.
> - whether wrapping when adding in the offset is not an issue.
>
I'll do limits check on offset then... should be able to make reg unsigned then
I guess.
> I take it that the rather lax upper bound check (should imo really be
> reg + size > PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE [implying reg + size doesn't
> itself wrap], or at least reg >= PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE) is not a
> problem because ...
>
> > + if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
> > + *val = ~0u;
> > + }
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
> > + *val = pci_host_config_read_common(xendev->pci_dev, reg,
> > + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE,
> > + req->size);
> > + trace_cpu_ioreq_config_read(req, xendev->sbdf, reg,
> > + req->size, *val);
> > + } else {
> > + trace_cpu_ioreq_config_write(req, xendev->sbdf, reg, req->size,
> > + *val);
> > + pci_host_config_write_common(xendev->pci_dev, reg,
> > + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, *val,
> > + req->size);
> > + }
>
> ... these called functions do full checking anyway?
Yes, I'm deferring further checking to these common functions. I'm only
intending to avoid passing junk into them here.
>
> > +static void cpu_ioreq_config(XenIOState *state, ioreq_t *req)
> > +{
> > + uint32_t sbdf = req->addr >> 32;
> > + XenPciDevice *xendev;
> > +
> > + if (req->size > sizeof(uint32_t)) {
> > + hw_error("PCI config access: bad size (%u)", req->size);
>
> What about size 0 or 3?
>
Yes, I can reject those here also.
> > + }
> > +
> > + QLIST_FOREACH(xendev, &state->dev_list, entry) {
> > + unsigned int i;
> > + uint32_t tmp;
> > +
> > + if (xendev->sbdf != sbdf) {
> > + continue;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
> > + if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
> > + for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
> > + rw_config_req_item(xendev, req, i, &tmp);
> > + req->data = tmp;
> > + }
> > + } else if (req->dir == IOREQ_WRITE) {
> > + for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
> > + tmp = req->data;
> > + rw_config_req_item(xendev, req, i, &tmp);
> > + }
> > + }
>
> Wouldn't it be more sensible to fail req->count != 1 requests here?
>
I'm wondering whether we'd want to handle count > 1 once we allow MMCONFIG
accesses though. I guess it would be easier just to defer that.
Paul
> Jan
>
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