Other than in the feature sets, where we indeed want to offer the feature even if not enumerated on hardware, we shouldn't dictate the feature being available if tool stack or host admin have decided to not expose it (for whatever [questionable?] reason). That feature set side override is sufficient to achieve the intended guest side safety property (in offering - by default - STIBP independent of actual availability in hardware).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> --- v2: Drop ! from STIBP feature declaration. --- This is effectively accompanying the discussion rooted at the 4.8/4.7 patch at https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-05/msg01028.html dealing with a feature leveling issue. --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c @@ -642,14 +642,6 @@ void recalculate_cpuid_policy(struct dom recalculate_xstate(p); recalculate_misc(p); - /* - * Override STIBP to match IBRS. Guests can safely use STIBP - * functionality on non-HT hardware, but can't necesserily protect - * themselves from SP2/Spectre/Branch Target Injection if STIBP is hidden - * on HT-capable hardware. - */ - p->feat.stibp = p->feat.ibrsb; - for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->cache.raw); ++i ) { if ( p->cache.subleaf[i].type >= 1 && --- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB, 8*32+12) / XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4FMAPS, 9*32+ 3) /*A AVX512 Multiply Accumulation Single Precision */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRSB, 9*32+26) /*A IBRS and IBPB support (used by Intel) */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP, 9*32+27) /*A! STIBP */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP, 9*32+27) /*A STIBP */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(ARCH_CAPS, 9*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSBD, 9*32+31) /*A MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */ _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
