On 09/23/2018 06:04 PM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> Move p2m_{get/set}_suppress_ve() to p2m.c, replace incorrect
> ASSERT() in p2m-pt.c (since a guest can run in shadow mode even on
> a system with virt exceptions, which would trigger the ASSERT()),
> and move the VMX-isms (cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions checks) to
> p2m_ept_{get/set}_entry().
>
> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>
Thanks for the clean up. Two realtively minor comments...
> @@ -931,6 +942,16 @@ static mfn_t ept_get_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> mfn_t mfn = INVALID_MFN;
> struct ept_data *ept = &p2m->ept;
>
> + if ( sve )
> + {
> + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions )
> + return INVALID_MFN;
> +
> + /* #VE should be enabled for this vcpu. */
> + if ( gfn_eq(vcpu_altp2m(current).veinfo_gfn, INVALID_GFN) )
> + return INVALID_MFN;
> + }
Is there a good reason to return error her rather than just putting '1'
in the sve location, like the p2m_pt.c version of this function does?
> +int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve,
> + unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> + struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
> + struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
> + struct p2m_domain *p2m;
> + mfn_t mfn;
> + p2m_access_t a;
> + p2m_type_t t;
> +
> + /* #VE should be enabled for this vcpu. */
> + if ( gfn_eq(vcpu_altp2m(current).veinfo_gfn, INVALID_GFN) )
> + return -ENXIO;
What's the purpose of checking for this here, if we don't check for this
in p2m_set_suppress_ve()?
Everything else looks good, thanks!
-George
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