Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <[email protected]> --- Changes since v3: - Moved from the qemu-depriv doc patches. - Reword to include the possibility of having a non-dom0 "devicemodel" domain which may want to be protected - Specify `Linux dom0` as the currently-tech-supported window
CC: Ian Jackson <[email protected]> CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]> CC: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]> CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]> CC: Tim Deegan <[email protected]> CC: Konrad Wilk <[email protected]> CC: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]> CC: Julien Grall <[email protected]> CC: Anthony Perard <[email protected]> CC: Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]> --- SUPPORT.md | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md index 4f203da84a..1f0f5857a7 100644 --- a/SUPPORT.md +++ b/SUPPORT.md @@ -525,6 +525,26 @@ Vulnerabilities of a device model stub domain to a hostile driver domain (either compromised or untrusted) are excluded from security support. +### Device Model Deprivileging + + Status, Linux dom0: Tech Preview, with limited support + +This means adding extra restrictions to a device model in order to +prevent a compromised device model from attack the rest of the domain +it's running in (normally dom0). + +"Tech preview with limited support" means we will not issue XSAs for +the _additional_ functionality provided by the feature; but we will +issue XSAs in the event that enabling this feature opens up a security +hole that would not be present without the feature disabled. + +For example, while this is classified as tech preview, a bug in libxl +which failed to change the user ID of QEMU would not receive an XSA, +since without this feature the user ID wouldn't be changed. But a +change which made it possible for a compromised guest to read +arbitrary files on the host filesystem without compromising QEMU would +be issued an XSA, since that does weaken security. + ### KCONFIG Expert Status: Experimental -- 2.19.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
