Jan Kiszka wrote: > Gilles Chanteperdrix wrote: >> Jan Kiszka wrote: >>> Gilles Chanteperdrix wrote: >>>> Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>> Gilles Chanteperdrix wrote: >>>>>> Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>>>> Gilles Chanteperdrix wrote: >>>>>>>> Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>>>>>> Gilles Chanteperdrix wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Jan Kiszka wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Gilles, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm pushing your findings to the list, also as my colleagues showed >>>>>>>>>>> strong interest - this thing may explain rare corruptions for us as >>>>>>>>>>> well. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I thought a bit about that likely u_mode-related crash in your test >>>>>>>>>>> case >>>>>>>>>>> and have the following theory so far: If the xeno_current_mode >>>>>>>>>>> storage >>>>>>>>>>> is allocated on the application heap (!HAVE_THREAD, that's also >>>>>>>>>>> what we >>>>>>>>>>> are forced to use), it is automatically freed on thread termination >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> the context of the dying thread. If the thread is already migrated >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> secondary or if that happens while it is cleaned up (i.e. before >>>>>>>>>>> calling >>>>>>>>>>> for exit into the kernel), there is no problem, Xenomai will not >>>>>>>>>>> touch >>>>>>>>>>> the mode storage anymore. But if the thread happens to delete the >>>>>>>>>>> storage "silently", without any migration, the final exit will >>>>>>>>>>> trigger >>>>>>>>>>> one further access. And that takes place against an invalid head >>>>>>>>>>> area at >>>>>>>>>>> this point. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does this make sense? >>>>>>>>>> Yes, it is the issue we observed. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If that is true, all we need to do is to force a migration before >>>>>>>>>>> releasing the mode storage. Could you check this? >>>>>>>>>> No, that does not fly. Calling, for instance, >>>>>>>>>> __wrap_pthread_mutex_lock >>>>>>>>>> in another TSD cleanup function is which could be called after the >>>>>>>>>> current_mode TSD cleanup is allowed and could trigger a switch to >>>>>>>>>> primary mode and a write to the u_mode. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Good point. Mmh. Another, but ABI-breaking, way would be to add a >>>>>>>>> syscall for deregistering the u_mode pointer... >>>>>>>> That is the thing we did to verify that we had this bug. But this >>>>>>>> syscall would be also called too soon, and suffers from the TSD cleanup >>>>>>>> functions order again. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Right, the only complete fix without losing functionality is to add an >>>>>>> option to our ABI for requesting kernel-managed memory if dynamic >>>>>>> allocation is necessary (i.e. no TLS is available). >>>>>> No. TLS may as well suffer from the same issue, since it is handled by >>>>>> the glibc or libgcc, over which we have no control. So yes, it may work >>>>>> by chance today, but may as well stop working tomorrow. We use >>>>>> kernel-managed memory all the time, final point. >>>>> I think we are still in the solution finding process, no need for early >>>>> conclusions. >>>>> >>>>> See, we actually do not need kernel-managed storage for u_mode at all. >>>>> u_mode is an optimization, mostly for our fast user space mutexes. We >>>>> can indeed switch off all updates by the kernel and will still be able >>>>> to provide all required features - just less optimally. Adding a third >>>>> state, "invalid", we can make all mutex users assume they need the slow >>>>> syscall path on uncontended acquisition. And assert_nrt will probably be >>>>> happy about a syscall replacement for u_mode when it became invalid. >>>>> >>>>> This invalid state (maybe u_mode == -1 with TLS, and mode_key == NULL >>>>> without it) is entered during thread clean up with the help of a TSD >>>>> destructor. The destructor will then deregister our u_mode storage from >>>>> the kernel so that it doesn't matter if we release the memory >>>>> immediately and explicitly (w/o TLS) or leave this to glibc (/w TLS). >>>>> And in this model, it also doesn't matter when precisely the destructor >>>>> is called. >>>> We have to add a syscall to propagate this value to kernel-space, and >>>> clutter the kernel-space code which uses u_mode with tests to see if >>>> u_mode is valid or not, and we have to clutter the code which uses >>>> u_mode in user-space to handle that invalid state. And every time we add >>>> a user of u_mode, we have to think about the invalid state. A lot of >>>> clutter. >>>> >>>> The two last issues may be removed by handling the invalid state only in >>>> the function which returns the current mode. If the state is invalid, >>>> then issue the syscall. Admittedly, we get two syscalls for mutex locks, >>>> but who cares. >>>> >>>> However, what for? Allocating u_mode in the process private sem_heap, as >>>> I suggest since the beggining, looks so much simpler. No test, no >>>> special case, the address is always valid as long as the tcb is valid. >>> Try implementing it. >>> >>> I will post a prototype for my approach within a minute. Its major >>> implementation advantage is that there is no need to touch any skin, >>> neither on user nor kernel side, and that there is no need for backward >>> compatible syscalls. >>> >>> Another advantage of my approach is that it does not touch the fast >>> paths of mutex handling (before deregistration) - well, at lest almost >>> for non-TLS, but absolutely not for TLS. >> Do not forget the kernel-space part which detects whether we are using >> the older or newer user-space. > > Not required (famous last words). > > The only bit that should be missing in my RFC is the exit() trap, > probably a two-liner. Will look into this soon.
We discussed about it yesterday. The exit() trap does not guarantee that the system will be working. So the warning is required. -- Gilles. _______________________________________________ Xenomai-core mailing list Xenomai-core@gna.org https://mail.gna.org/listinfo/xenomai-core