I've been looking into this a bit more. As far as I can tell there are no known plaintext attacks against AES. Am I missing something? Or is it just bad in theory to add to the number of plaintexts available for a key?
-Mark Ivey- On Mon, 2003-12-01 at 13:35, Mark Ivey wrote: > On Mon, 2003-12-01 at 13:32, Rich Salz wrote: > > > Is it possible to do XML signatures using the AES algorithm instead of > > > RSA? > > > > I don't think this makes a lot of sense. Are you saying to do something > > like AES-encrypt the SHA-1 message digest? That would be bad -- it > > would mean that every signed document is a adding to known-plaintext > > attacks against the AES key, for example. > > > > Perhaps you want to use HMAC? > > /r$ > > Oh, that explains why I couldn't find any info on how to do it. Thanks > :) > > -Mark Ivey- > > _______________________________________________ > xmlsec mailing list > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://www.aleksey.com/mailman/listinfo/xmlsec _______________________________________________ xmlsec mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.aleksey.com/mailman/listinfo/xmlsec
